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I. N. A. 
DEFENCE 


' ‘MTjkitmhmp^ ft '»oc>i<-3eL!»-tf'«i». 
. .. '. tmuT j !* lac *» * ' 


BY 

BHULABHAI J. DESAl 



' Fublished by 
i n: A. DEFENCE 
COMMITTEE, 

B2^ Daryaganjy Delhi. 


Printed 

at 

Delhi Printing Works, 
Delhi. 



CONTENTS 


Fji:0E 

L Intbobuctioh ... ... i 

2. Oebeb Constituting Couet Maetul xiii 

3. Defence Counsel, ... ... xiv 

4. Chabge Sheet ... ... xv 

# 

5. Defence Addeess ... ... 1 

6. Pboclamation of Azad Hind 

Government ... ... 173 


Government ... ... 173 



Erratum: 

■ Page 25, line 1, 

Read ‘‘Pitt-Cobett’’ instead of **Dick Corbett/’ 



Introduction 


I have been asked by the L N. A* Defence- 
€ommlttee to write an introdnctory note to this reprint 
of tl'ie address delivered by Bri Bhulabhai Desai, Senior 
Defence Connsel > on behalf of the accused before the 
Ocnrt Martial. I was with several other colleagnea 
closely associated with Sri Desai during his defence 
of the case, and I may be considered somewhat partial 
to his great effort, but nevertheless I make bold to 
say that it will rank as a great forensic performance. 
It was deffnitely, I believe, the first argument deli- 
vered before a tribunal which endeavoured to justify 
in point of law, both International and Municipal, the 
right of the Indian people to wage a war for the libera- 
tion of their country from foreign bondage. The 
argument would have indeed a wider application ; it 
would cover all people at present subject, like India, 
to foreign rule and desirous of regaining their lost 
liberties. The case of Indonesia is directly in point. 
>Ti Desai delivered an oral argument. He spoke* on' 
two aays, altogether for over ten hours, and had almost 
uo notes. The argument w^^as well worthy of con- 
sideration in the highest law-courts of the land. There^ 
counsel would have been assisted in the development 
of bis points by observations made from the Bench. 
In the superior courts of justice, a legal argument of 
this magnitude and high importance would occasion the 
.keenest lively debate betw^een the Bench and the Bar, 
both engaged in the search and elucidation of first 
principles of International Law relevafit to the contro- 
versy before them. But speaking before a Court Martial 
consisting of military officers, Bri Desai had no such 
advantage. There w^ere. no interruptions of any kind* 
from, the first to the la^st, and the whole argument w^as 
a sustained effort to present a point of view^ 



Counsel thought was well-founded in law and fully 
applicable to the facts of the case. Speaking purely as 
a lawyer and in the interest of development of law and 
jurisprudence, I regret the absence of a formal judicial 
pronouncement on the merits of the case as presented 
by Sri Desai. His thesis was controverted by the 
Advocate-General of India (Sir N. P. Engineer) who 
appeared for the Prosecution, but the matter must rest 
without a judicial decision, at least for the present, 

Sri Desai quoted extensively from authoritative 
text books,— British, American and Continental, on 
International Law. It was noteworthy that all these 
books having been written by European jurists dealt 
at length with the States to be found in Europe and 
America. There was scarcely any mention of the 
countries or the peoples — or the inherent rights of these 
peoples --in Asia and Africa, then under the domination 
or protection or influence of European States. But it is 
beyond question that International Law is not static; 
It is a dynamic force. It has grown from century to 
century, and owes its exposition and development to 
the labour of publicists, of text-book writers, jurists, 
and agreement between the nations and international 
practice. Furthermore, International Law from the 
tflth to the 19th Century was professedly limited to 
Christian nations of Europe and America, the rest of 
the world was considered to consist of savages and 
ipucivilised barbarians. But there have been vast 
devdopments in the 20th century ; old conceptions 
have changed, the so-called uncivilised people, the 
•coloured races, have fought in the European theatres 
of i^ar, with or against the allies, — ^the British Indian 
troops and the Negro forces of America have fought 
ail over the globe* International Law must therefore 
be extended in ifls scope to include all peoples of the 
world living under recognised administrations in definite 
societies irrespective of considerations of colour or 
•race. Furthermore, while in the 18th and 19th 
people living in the ao-oafled colonies were 


eonsidered to be unfit for g;>ver3iment and wholly 
incompetent to govern themselves, in this century 
that eoTicoptiou must be discarded. In 1946 
America has definitely engaged to grant full independ- 
ence to the Phillipines the Arab countries including 
Egypt are independent in fact and in law; India has 
been promised independence. This being so, Inter- 
national Law must recognise the right of Indians to rise 
in revolt against its foreign rulers. 

Even in a national state. International Law 
recognises the validity and the legality of civil wars. 
Every civil war is a definite revolt against constituted 
government. A civil war in a national state is noth- 
ing but an attempt on the part of one political groxip 
or party to overthrow the constituted government and 
substitute its own authority therefor. It is really 
nothing but a mere change in the form or structure of 
the national government. If insurgents in such a civil 
war can under International Law engage in a civil war 
and acquire the status of belligerents, the greater must 
be the right conceded under International Law* to 
a subject people to rise in revolt against an external 
authority which is in military occupation of another 
country, and holds another people under domination, 
without any colour of natural right or justification. 
In view of the principles enunciated iti the Atlantic 
Charter and by President Truman, all people are en- 
titled to be free and all foreign rule is unjust and 
without any basis under International Law. 

Under the rules governing procedure prior tq 
the holding of a Court Martial, it is necessary to record 
preliminary evidence, as far as possible, in the presence 
of the emoused, and when it is finally decided to bring 
the persons concerned to trial before Cbuk Martial, the 
accused are furnished with a summary of this evidence. 
Such a summary had been furnished to the accused in 
the present ease. Its perusal made it evident that the 
themsd^sres .establdi that 


iii 



the accused were - members ot a well-organised and 
well-disciplined army which was maintained by a 
newly-formed State called the Provisional Govern- 
ment of Free India. At the trial, voluminous evidence, 
oral and documentary, was recorded. Defence 
produced high officers of the Foreign Department of 
the Japanese Government, and many members, officers 
and men of the I.N.A. were also examined as defence 
witnesses. At the end, really there was little dispute 
as to the actual facts of the case, and Sri Desai was 
able to establish— I say successfully — that the facts 
were really beyond controversy. He has marshalled 
those facts with great skill in his argument, and I 
may briefly summarise them here : — 

Over 2 millions of Indians were settled prior 
to 1941 in various couutries of Bast Asia, for example, 
Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Assam, Java, Sumatra, 
Borneo, etc. These people considered themselves to 
be a homogeneous community and were not the 
national or the domiciled subjects of the country 
where they resided. 

As soon as Japan declared war on Sth 
December 1941, the conditions of Indians in East Asia 
b^ame very precarious. As country after country in 
East Asia was run over by the Japanese in quick 
succession in a few months, Indians were left com- 
pletely unprotected, open to depredations of all kinds, 
and their life, honour and property were entirely at 
the mercy of the invaders. Their first thought was 
to take such steps as were open to them for their own 
security. British power, to which they ipiight possibly 
have looked up for protection, had for the 
moment disappea,red/ and the future was dark and 
uncertain The; demand of the present was insistent. 

In February, Singapore feM, and large number 
of Indian troops were surrendered %o the Japanese. 
Ooi. , Hunt handed !over these troops bag and ■ baggage 



to the Japs, aad expressly stated that henceforward 
they shoiiid obey orders of the Japs juft as they would 
have obeyed the orders of the British, otherwise they 
might be punished . 

Sri Desai submitted that this open handing 
over absolved in law Indian troops from their allegiance 
to the British King. This allegiance being purely 
legal, when protection was withdrawn, the duty of the 
subject to the King was also extinguished. In the case 
of the subjects of a nationalstate’ there may or may 
not have been a different result, but that questioxi did 
not arise here in this case. 

It was proved that the Japanese made a clear 
offer to the Indian troops to organise, if they wanted 
to, as a separate. State for the protection of their own 
countrymen in East Asia. This matter was carefully 
discussed by the Indian civilians and military people 
alike ; the real aims and objects of the Japanese in 
making this offer were closely scrutinised. There was 
not the least desire or inclination to become a puppet 
in the hands of the Japanese ; the real anxiety w’as, 
first, protection of the Indians in East Asia, and 
secondly, the achievement of freedom of India. This 
latter object was also important, because in 1942 there 
was a real danger of the collapse of British powe^ 
in India, and then the existence of a free Indian Govern- 
ment to carry on the administration in India was a 
matter of vital importance. 

Bepresentative Indians living all over East Asia 
met in conference in Bangkok, and decided upon the 
formation of an Indian Kationai Army. Immediately 
after the commencement of hostilities between Japan 
and Britain, the Indian independence movement had 
been launched, and an Indian Independence League 
had been established, and its branches had been formed 
in Malaya. After the Bangkok Conference in June 
1942, the movement spread all over East Asia. 



Branches of the 1. 1. League were formed everywhere 
with large memhership. The Indian National Army 
was wholly national in the sense that it was manned 
and oScered by Indians alone and was also supported 
and financed by Indians. Under the stress of circum- 
stances it had to buy, or take on a lend and lease basis, 
arms, ammunition and military equipment from the 
Japs. ■ 

It wa.s proved that while an I.N.A. was formed 
in 1942, it did not engage in any warlike operation 
against the British in 1942. 

Owing to internal differences and some suspicion 
arising out of the vagueness of the statements of 
Japanese Ministers in relation to India, the I.N.A. was 
disbanded in December 1942, and ceased to function 
even on paper as a military organisation. A Council 
of Action, however, continued to look after the 
security of the Indians in Malaya and elsewhere. 

On the arrival of Sri Subhas Chandra Bose in 
Singapore in June 1943, the Indian National Movement 
took a definite concrete shape. There was immense 
enthusiasm and support of Indians of all communities 
behind Subhas Chandra Bose. By common consent a 
new Indian National State was formed. Subhas 
Chandra Bose was by common consent elected to be 
its Head. He owed allegiance to this State. He had a.” 
Government consisting of many Ministers, and again 
all sw^ore allegiance to the newly formed State. Provi- 
sional Free Government of India was formed. An 
Army, the I.N.A., was organised, "equipped and trained 
in strict a eoordanoe with Military Law^ as obtaining in 
other countries in Europe and America. This new 
State declared war on Britain and America. It was 
recognised as an independent Stat@ by many powers 
who were then fightingthe British and its ailies. All 
frhe Indians in East Asia owned allegiance to this State, 
and as many as 2,23,0()0 were proved to have taken the 

vi 



oath of allegiance to the new State, and out of them at 
least over 23,000 actually volunteered to serve among 
the combatant ranl^s of the The Provisional 

Government had its own funds and resources, and 
subsequently acquired its own territories. From 1944 
it engaged in active warlike operations against the 
British. It took part in the Arakan campaign in 1944 ; 
it fought in Burma in 1945. 

Sri Desai contended that under Interna- 
tional Law the Provisional Free Government complied! 
with all the requirements of a sovereign State. Over 
2 millions of a homogeneous community were the- 
members of the State. The Government carried on,, 
in so far as it was possible in the circumstances then 
prevailing, all governmental activities. It had nume- 
rous Departments. It had a well- organised disciplined 
army, it had its own Act, aud it was at war with 
Britain. 

Sri Desai clearly showed from the evidence thar 
suggestions made on behalf of the Prosecution that 
Indian prisoners of war had been coerced into enlist- 
ii^ in the I.N. A. were baseless. Evidence was almost 
unanimous that no pressure of any kind was ever 
exercised. Sri Subash Chandra Bose — Netaji as he 
was called affectionately throughout East Asia by all 
Indians — made it clear over and over again that any 
one wlio did not wish to fight, may without the least 
hesitation withdraw. This option was given, almost 
quixotically, even at the front by some of the accused. 
Evidence was also emphatic that volunteers were too 
many to be absorbed in the I.N.A., and there was a 
large surplus of volunteers. And as Sri Desai said, in 
those circumstances it would be ridiculous for anybody 
to try to coerce any one to enlist. From Netaji down- 
wards, all leaders and officers insisted with almost 
painful reiteration, that this was an army for a noble 
cause, viz., the liberation of India, that Netaji could 
not offer anything but blood and sweat and voil and 



tears, that conditioBs of service were bound to be hard 
and austere, rations were scanty, and pay was meagre. 
With all this, the spirit and morale were high, because 
the resolve was great. The Army had its own flag, its 
own emblems, its own badges, and was definitely 
treated as Allies by the Japanese Government. Sri 
Desai pointed out that even in Europe as between 
Allies there were unified commands and mutual help 
of all kinds. He further insisted that whatever may 
have been the intentions of the Japanese Government, 
it was clear that the members of the new Indian State 
and their Army believed in good faith that they were 
fighting on terms of equality, and that when they 
entered India they would enter as liberators. 
Proclamations were issued by which it was declared 
that every inch of Indian territory conquered, would be 
administered by the Azad Hind Government, and for 
that purpose special officers had been trained for civi 
administration. 

Sri Desai also discussed at length that the 
Azad Hind Government had territories of its own. 
Andamans and Nicobar Islands had been formally ceded 
to them and had been re-named by them. They had 
also some territory in Burma, 15 sq. miles in area under 
their direct administration, and they exercised control 
over extensive tracts on the Assam border, which 
were temporarily occupied by the I.N.A. 

It is true that in the text-books on International 
Law, great emphasis is laid when dealing with insurgents 
on the possession by them of a definite territory. 
This must be so in the case of internal rebellions or civil 
wars, whether by some of the residents of the 
country or by a colony situated outside the mother 
country. If the insurgents are able to set up \ 
independent State, have an organised army, it is obvious 
that they cannot live in the clouds, and must have 
some definite territories under their control and 
administration. The case of Azerbaijan in Persia is 



instaace in point. Similariy with a colony like the 
American Cobnies in 1775-~^Sri Besai relied greatly upon 
the Declaration of Independence issued by Washington 
and his colleagues ; — it is equally obvious that the insur- 
gents in such colonies may set up a State by denouncing 
the rule of the mother country. But the same rale in 
International Law Sri Desai argued, would apply with 
•equal force to a liberating army coming from outside. 
Indians in East Asia were over 2 million in number 
but they had no territories of their own. They 
resolved to organise themselves for .their own 
security as well as for the winning of the freedom of 
India. They formed a State, they ^organised an army, 
but obviously they could only depend for a territory 
of their own either by cession from their allies or by^ 
the anticipated liberation of their own country. 

Desai pointed out that in the two world wars, landlesj^. 
Governments were a common feature. In World Wa . 
No. 1, Belgium lost all its territory. In World V/a^ 
No. 2, London was a haven of emigres Governments o 
Poland, Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia 
and others, who had for many years not an inch of terri- 
tory under their controL They ^ had lost ail" their 
possessions. Period of time makes little difference, it 
is the fact which matters. Similarly, under modern 
circumstances it is perfectly possible for a State to 
function as an independent, unit under International 
Law, whose, chief aim is to liberate its own territories 
from foreign occupation. 

I wish to emphasise clearly that Sri Desai was 
addressing a legal argument. He was not addressing a 
politicaln or a Legislative Assembly. He therefore 
insisted that once you find a newly formed State with 
a well" organised army carrying on war, then miinioipal 
law must cease to apply. The matter passes from the 
<lomain oJt ordinary criminal law to the rules, and laws 
of civilised war. Amidst the clash of arms the ordinary 
.•criminal law becomes silent. He quoted copiously from 
text-books, but still more forcibly from declarations 


made by British statesmen, including Mr. Churchill in 
1937 during the non-intervention controversies arising 
out of the civil war in Spain, about the right of 
people to rebel against constituted authorities 
and their further right to be recognised as belligerents 
by neutral countries. He referred to the announce- 
ments of General Eisenhower regarding the 
status of Maquis in Erance, I invite attention parti- 
cularly to a very apposite passage in a leading text 
book on International Law, viz., Oppenheim, which 
was published in 1945, and which, according to Sri 
Desai, constituted the present position /under 
International Law. " He further argued that even. under 
the municipal law of India, that is to say, the Indian 
Penal Code, Section 79 of the Code clearly recognised, 
as a justification for any offence — even an offence of 
waging war against the King — any law applicable to 
the matter, and Sri Besai said that rules of Inter- 
national Law are always accepted everywhere in all 
civilised countries, in America and in the English 
Courts, as rules having the force of law. Therefore 
even on the narrow ground of Section 79, a state of 
war was a complete »answer to the charge. Anticipat- 
ing an argument on the part of the Prosecution based 
on allegiance Sri Besai drew a distinction between what 
may be called legal allegiance as opposed to neutral 
, allegiance. In the first place allegiance involves a 
reciprocal obligation of protection on the part of the 
Sovereign, and Sri Besai insisted that when at the 
meeting held at Barter Park on 16th February 
1942, Col, Hunt handed over all officers and men of 
the Indian Army, almost body and soul, to the 
Japanese, the bond of allegiance was broken. At any 
rate the people concerned were justified in believing 
and did believe in good faith that the bond no longer 
existed. In a free country having self-governing 
institutions, a good deal may be said on the virtues of“ 
allegiance, but to insist upon an everlasting allegiance 
on the part of a subject people would be tantamount, 
'to asking them to agree to perpetuation of their 


y >1 I 

ft 




*1 ' 


“•X 


slavery. Sri Desai eonten^ed that it Was the right of 
every Indian, if he so thought fit, to disclaim his allegi- 
ance to the British King and join an army of liberation 
tor gaining the freedom of India. Dual allegiance to 
King and country may, in the case of free governing 
countries, coincide, but in the case of subject people there 
is bound to be a conflict of loyalties. The American 
Colonies in 1775 deliberately disowned the King in 
preference to the country, and the Indians and the I.N.A. 
were entitled to do the same. 

The accused are charged separately with 
murders in that in accordance with the provisions of 
the Indian National Army Act some deserters had been 
tried by Court Martial and sentenced to death. Sri 
Desai in the first place argued that there was no reli- 
able evidence that these sentences ,had been in fact 
carried out. On the contrary there was evidence that 
in inany other cases such sentences of death had been 
remitted. In the alternative he argued that any such 
separate charge was really groundless in point of law. 
The accused, who were members of the I.IsT.A, , were 
acting in obedience to superior orders, were units of an 
organised army, and could not be tried for individual 
acts. Liability, if any, was of their State. They owed 
no personal liability at all. There was not the slightest 
proof that they had committed any atrocities, so 
called, any acts of torture or anything. They had 
behaved throughout as honourable men from the highest 
motives of devotion and patriotism to their country. 
And they were enatied to be treated as P.O.Ws., and 
tins ■was precisely the claim which they made when the 
I.jSi.A, surrendered in Rangoon and wdTen peirticularly 
Cap^ Sahgcd oftered to surrender to a detachment of 
the British troops. 

I do iiot want to detain readers any further from 
a perusal of Sn Desai’ s effective argument. As I have 
said, my only regret is that it was not addressed before 
a Court of Law like the Federal Court or the High Court 

■ h'ixi 


in India. Had it bepn, I have no doubt that the 
Judaes v^ould have observed, in the words of the Lord 
Ohief Justice of England in an equally celebrated case, 
■“it was an argument well delivered in acoordanee with 
the hi<yhest traditions of the Bar and in furtherance oi 
iustica” SriDesai argued not only as a lawyer but 
as an Indian on behalf of brother Indians, who had 
sacrificed their all in a notable endeavour for gaming 
the lost freedom of their, country according to Lieir 
lights. 


December 27 , 1945, 


Kailash Nath Katjh 




Form of order for the Assembly of a General or 
District Court-Martial under the ■ 

Indian Army Act. 

Orders by Brigadier L. L. THWAYTES, I. A. 
Commanding Eahadurgarh Area. 

Place Delhi Cantl. Date 25 Oct., ’45. 

The detail of ofificers as mentioned below 
will assemble at the Red Fort, Delhi pn the 5th ^ 

day of ISIovember 1945 for the purpof^e of trying !^o. i. C. 22 fi, Oiipt. P. 
by a General Coisrt-martiai the accused (persons) Paiuei'.^ 

named in the mnrgin (and such other person or 33 ^^ Lieut. G. 

persons as may be brought before them) Dhiiioa, t,/i4 puu d- 

The senior officer to sit as President, ' all attached c.S.. 

MEMBERS: 

Major-Geneial A. B, BLAXLAND, C. B., O. B. E., 

Indian Army. 

Brigadier A J. H. BOTJRKE, Indian Army. 

Lieut Coi 0 R. STOTT, M.C,I.R. E. O. 

Lieut. Coi. T. 1 . STEVENSON, C. I. E , M. B. E., 

M. C., R. Garb. Rif: 

Lieut. Col. NASIR ALI KHAN, 7 Rajput Beet. 

Major B. PRiTAM SINGH, (L C. 44b), I. A. C. 

Major Banwari Lai, (I. E. C, 219), 15 Punjab Regt, 

WAITING MEMBERS : 

Lieut. Col. C. H. JACKSON, I. R. B. O, 

Major S. S. PANDIT, (L E. C. 766). 1 Punjab 
Regt. 

Capt. GURDIAL SINGH RANDHAWA, 

(L C. K. O. * 45 ), 13 D. C. O. Lancers. 

JUDGE^ADVOCATE : 

Col. F.C.A. KER jN O B.E , is a^pomied Judge 
D, J. A. G., Centra i Command, Advocate, 

INTERPRETER ; 

(To be appointed by the Court pursuant to I. A A. 

Rule 76.) 

Counsel for ike Pin^secutor, Sir Nasservanji P, 

Engineer, Advocate General of India. 

Lt. Coi. P. WALsH, A A.G., G.H. Q , is appointed 
Prosecutor. 

The convening offieerdeciares thatitis expei- 
dient to allow counsel to appear on behalf of the 
Prosecutor and accused at this trial. 

The accused will be warned, and all witnesses 
duly required to attend. 

The prc ceedings (of which only one copy is 
required) will be forwarded to H.Q. -Bahadurgarb 
Area. 

Signed this 25th day of October, 1945. 

(Sd.) 

Brig. Comd. Bahadurgarh Area 

♦ . ./ Xi 


COUNSEL 


1. Sri Bbulabhai 3 \ Advocate. 

2. The Rt. Hon. Sir T. B. Sapru, P. C., Advocate. 

3. Pandit Jawah'ar Lai Nehru, Bar-at-law. 

4. Dr. Kailaah Nath Katju, Advocate. 

5. M. Asaf AH, Bar-at Law. 

6. Bakhshi Sir Tek Chand, late Judge, Lahore Hio-h 

Court. . 

7. Rai Bahdur Badri Dass, Advocate. 

■8. Kanwar Sir Dalip Singh, Bar-at-Law,' late 
Judge, Lahore High Court. 

9. Dr. P.K. Sen, late Judge, Patna High Court, 

10. Mohd. Shafi Daudi, Advocate. 

11. Inder Deo Dua, Advocate, 

12. Shiv Kumar Shastri, Bar-at-Law. 

13. Ranbeer Chand Soni, Bar-at-Law. 

14. Rajinder Narain, Advocate. ^ 

15. Sultan Yar Khan,, Advocate. 

16. Sri Narain Andley, Advocate. 

17. J. K. Kha ana, Advocate. 


Charge Sheet ' ' 

shah 

Ho lO Regiment, and 

DHILLOV ?f,A I ^ C GHEBAKHSH SINGH 

to section 121 of the Indian Penal Code ^ agamst tnree 

accused jointly' '' 

-in that they together- 

-t* m Malaya, at Rangoon, in the 

vicimty of Popa, in the vicinity of Kvaukoadanno- 
|nd elsewhere in Burma, between tC r^onth ff 
September 1942 and the 26th day of April “945 d"d 
^Tndir -^“5esty tL E^'p^-r 

Bay MUR nm T®/ OFFENCE, that is to tndCharg. 

ht. Gur{»a^sfa 

-in that he. ?“uf 

March * 1945 ^*lfw ^°P“ Burma, on or about 6th 

«rcoJ^^ni«^er““« 

COMMIXriNG A CIVIL OFFENCF +Tnof • 
to say ABETMENT, co- ' rv to ^on mo !Ci 
the Indian Penal Code, of an ofFar,,..' ■ 

under Section 302 of the Ir^'an PenarCtode'”^^ 

-in that he- 

did 

as specified in the 2nd charge hereof wWa 
was committed in consequence of such abeLit"® 


i/xifciD la 3rd Charge 
fcion 109 of ^-AA. Sec, 41 
. , . . t' gainst. lihe said 

CapfcP.K. 
Sahgal 
■alone 


4tii Charge 
l.AA Sec- 4i 

auainst fciie s»id 

Lt- Gurbakhsh 
Singh Bhillon 

alone 


5th Charge. 

I A- A. Sec 41 
jigainst rh« said 
Capt. P K 
Sahgal 
«.lonr 


6th Charge- 
l.A.A Sec, 41 
flgaiiisc tiie said 
Lt. Gurbaksh 
Singh Dhillon 
alone 


7th Charge 
I A A. Sec. 41 
{iwainst the said 

Capt. P. K 
Sahgal 

ai ue 


8th Charge. 

I A-A. Section 

ngain.st tlje said 
■; ;Lt. Cnrhateh 
Singh l^hiibh 
alom; 


COMMiartlNO A CIVIL OFFENCE, that is to. 
say, MURDER, contrary to Section, 302 of the Indian 
Penal Code 

-in that he- 
at or near Fopa Hill in Burma, on or about 6th. 
Marc 1946, by causing the death of DuH Chand 
did ommit murder. 

CQMMlT riKO A CIVIL OFFENCE, that is to- 
say, abetment, contrary to Section 109 of the Indi- 
an Penal Code of an offence punishable under Section 
302 of the Indian Penal Code 

-in that he- 
at or near Popa Hill, on or about 6th Mar(!>h 1941 
did abet the offence of the murder of Dull Chand. a» 
specified in the 4th charge hereof, which offence was. 
committed in consequence of such abetment. 

COMMITTED A CIVIL OFFENCE, that is to 
say, MURDER, contrary to Section 302 of the Indian 
Penal Code 

-in that he- 
at or near Popa Hill in Burma, on or about 6th 
March 1945, by causing the death of Daryao Singh, did 
commit murdW. 

COMMITTING A CIVIL OFFENCE, that is to 
say, ABETMENT, contrary to Section 09 of the* 
Indian Penal Code, of an offence punishable under > 
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code 

-in that he- 
at or near Popa Hill, on or about 6th March 1945*; 
did abet the offence of the murder of Daryao Singh 
as specified in the 6th charge hereof, which ofience 
was committed in consequence of such abetment, 

COMMITTING A CIVIL OFFENCE, that is to 
say, MURDER, contrary to Section 302 of the Indian/ 
Pciial Code 

-in that he- 
at or near Popa Hill in Burma, on or about 
Gth March 1945, by causing the death of Dharam Singh,, 
did commit murder. 


XVI 



COMMITTED A CIVIL OFFENCE, that is' to 
say, ABETMENT, contrary to Section 109 of the 
Indian Penal Code of an offence punishable under 
section 302 of the Indian Penal Code 

-in that he- 


0th Charge. 

I A. A Section 
41 

against the saiti 

Cept.P K, 
Sahga! 

alone 


at or near Popa Hill, on or about 6th 
March 1945, did abet the offence of the murder of 
Dharama Singh as specified in the 8th charge hereof, 
which offence was committed in consequence of such 
abetment. 


COMMITTING A CIVIL OFFENCE, that is to 
say, ABETMENT, contrary to Section 109 of the 
Indian Penal Code, of an offence punishable under 
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code 

-in that he- 


10th Charge- 
I. A. A. Section 
41 

against the said 

C^pt. Shah 
Nawaz Khan 

alone 


at or near Popa Hill in Burma, on or about 29th 
March 1945, did abet the murder by one Khazin Shah 
and one Ay a Singh, of Gunner Mohammad Hussain 
of H. K. S. B. A., which offence was committed in 
consequence of such abetment. 

(Sd.)-~ 

CoL, 

Comdg., 

Place Delhi 

O.S/D. L C-Cl) 

Dated 17th September 1945. Delhi. 





DEFENCE ADDRESS 

BY 

SRI BHULABHAI J. DESAI 

During the last many days you have heard 
evidence on the two, charges with which my clients; 
the accused before you, have been arraigned. Shortly 
stated, the two charges are waging war against the 
King and, without detailing anything, murder and 
abetment of murder, in that certain deserters -were 
tried and ordered to be shot. M_y submission to the 
Court is that substantially there is really one charge 
before the Court, because in so far as the charge of 
murder is concerned, it is a part of the first charge; and 
I say so for this reason that it be quite possible,' 

in the case of a charge of w^ing ^ar against the.. 
King# to be able to charge every single act of firisrg: 
a shot, which would be, I think, reducio ad ahsurdeni^ 
and therefore it will fee my duty later on to point out 
to the Court that really and truly there is only, one 
charge before the Court and that is is^aging war against 
the King, Evidence has been\ admitted on other 
matters to which I do not wish at this si;age to' refer,; 
m that for the uioment, I will occupy the time of the 
Court for -the purpose of considering what facts. have 
been established in support of the first charge, namely, 
waging Var against the King ; and in due course it will 
also be my duty to point out to the Court that in so 
far as the second charg# is concerned, there is no! 
foundation in fact for it except to this extent that in 
reference to the four persons who are alleged to have 
been shot there is on record evidence that they 
were tried and sentence passed. In reference to. 
Muhammed Hussain, there is nothing on record , td 
show that any sentence was passed. In all these 


oases it will be my duty to submit that on the evidence 
the Court is bound to come to the conclusion that 
though sentence was passed in one case and 
not at all passed in the other, none of these sen- 
tences was actually carried out. That is the nature of 
the examination, on facts which will be necessary for 
me to place before this Honourable Court. 

There are one or two matters which I am bound 
to mention to the Court before I come to the actual 
facts of the case. This case raisbs issues which are 
not of the normal t3^e which a Court Martial is called 
upon to decide, because most, if not all, of such cases are 
generally cases of individual derelection of duty or 
individual offences. Here is a case in which, I venture 
to say — and the evidence supports it— that it is not at 
aU a case of what you might call three individuals 
waging war against the King. The evidence amply bears 
out the fact that these men charged before you were 
a part of an organised army which waged war against 
the King even according to the Prosecution. Therefore 
the case before the Court is not a personal case of any 
kind or sort. The honour and the law of the Indian 
National Army are on trial before this Court. 
What is now on trial before the Court is the 
right to wage war with immurJly on the part of a 
subject race for their liberation. I shall be able to 
cite authorities on International Law that a nation 
or part of a nation does reach a stage where it 
is entitled to wage war for its liberation, and 
I shall be able to prove that point to your Honours’ 
satisfaction. 

There is another thing I wish to say, and I say 
it with a certain degree of earnestness. This case has 
naturally aroused a considerable amount of public 
interest. It is not for me to say whether it is right or not 
but the fact remains that its is so, and opinions have been 
expressed from the point of view of the puKlio and 
£K>m the point of view of what I might caU 


‘official sources’ beginrimg with the Viceroy of India* 
You, Sirs, having sworn to do Justice to these 
men on the evidence before you will, I have not the 
smallest doubt, come to your own decision guided 
by your conscience and entirely unaffected by opi- 
nions for or against them. For in all trials of this 
kind— and In a few of them I have had the honour 
to be engaged — it is very difficult for the human 
mind to maintain that detachment which Justice 
requires. In the case of Juries I have had to cau- 
tion them against the use or abuse of the effect 
of public expressions of opinions on matters which 
it is for them to decide. In this case what I wish 
to say is this. Having studied the rules which guide 
the proceedings before this Court I find that you, 
Sirs, are the judges both of law and of fact. I am 
aware that the Judge- Advocate who is your adviser, 
will take care to do justice to everything that myself 
or my learned friend on the other side will 
place before you on questions of law and fact, and 
while you will very seriously regard his advice in 
the end, the final decision is ^^our privilege and your 
responsibility. Therefdre what I might have done in 
another place I do not do before you and that 
is, I caoinot say that I will address the Judge on law 
and the Jury on the facts. There it is an easier process 
because I must confess that before a trained Judge 
it is easier to deal with the question of law than 
before a tribunal of this character. At the same 
time I have this consolation that sometimes if the 
law is plain — as I submit it is in this case, it will 
probably be much easier, appealing to commoiusense, 
to establish the law on which I rely, and I 
desire to ask your indulgence and your atten- 
tion in the somewhat difficult task which I am 
undertaking. • 

My next submission to the Court is that I 
desire, as far as possible, to state categorically the 
conclusions of fact which are established in this case. 

t 



Having done that I will proceed to deal with the 
law a;^hcable to them. In dealing with any single 
Item shonld any donht arise in the Court’s Lad I 
trust that you will be pleased to tell me, so that, if it 
IS necessary, I will go into the details of evidence 
because as at present ^vised, I do not desire, unless 
there IS a real doubt about it, to weary you with 
reading over 250 pages of evidence and about 150 
pages of exhibits, which are before the Court. A 
few important ones I will certainly read where 
necessary, jiving regard to the attention which the 
Court has paid to the evidence as it was recorded, 
l will avoid reading them in extenso. ■ 

1 , r With these remaris I now proceed to place 
before the Court what I submit are the conclusions of 
tact 3 ustmed hj evidence. Before I do that I will 
give you a few important events. In the month of 
December 1941, war by Japan against 
Bntmn and ^mca. Then followed certain events 
which are the subject-matter of controversy to a 
certain extent before this Court. The next event of 
importance is the surrendSr of the British Indian forces 
at Singapore, which took place on 15th February 
and then the most important material event took 
place on 17th February at Farrer Park. 

+ 1 , r. importance, after that which 

formation 

otwhat l shall shortly descnbe ,as the first Indian 
Rational Army in -the month of September 1942. 
xne next event of importance is the dissolution of that 

1942. and the arrest 
of Capt. Mohan Singh. The next important events 
mere^ter are the efforts which were being made for the 
foi^tion of the second Ind||n National Army. On 
2nd July 1943, Sri Subhas Chandra Bose arrived 
m Singapore. He later took command of the IntHan 
JNationm Army and there was a conference of what is 
called Greater East Asia attended by Indians, with 


delegates belonging to tbe Indian Indepen-* 
denee League from different parts of the Far Eastern 
countries. One of the resolntiohs at that Conference 
was that a Provisional Government of Free India 
should he established. The next event of importance 
is that on the 21st October 1943 there was proclaim- 
ed a Provisional Government of Free India which 
for brevity I will call "Pfdyisional Government’. That 
Proclamation is one to which I shall refer later, but 
now I will try to give the Court events of importance 
which the Court will have to bear in mind. On the 
proclamation of that Government the different Ministers 
concerned with the functions of the State took Oaths of 
Allegiance,, of course headed by Netaji Subhas Chandra 
Bose as the head of the State, The next event of 
importance is the declaration of war by that Govern- 
ment on Britain and America. The next event of 
importance thereafter is that so far as the I. W. A. was' 
concerned, it began to carry out its functions under the 
orders of the new State. Thereafter the events of 
importance so far as the acfual facts are concerned, 
are only three : the movement of this Government 
from Singapore to Rangoon ; the movement of the 
Indian National Army from Burma into, beyond and 
within the territories of India right up to Kohima ; and 
the rest, dealing with the retreat of that Army 
back again until the event which took place at 
Rangoon slightly before, at the time, and slightly 
after the occupation of Burma by the British Forces. 
These, Sirs, are the main undisputed events with 
which the Court is concerned. Bearing in mind 
these events, I shall now place before the Court the 
conclusions of facts which we submit have been 
established either in -examination of the evidence 
of the prosecution *or in the affihnative evidence 
which we have caEed in defence. 

The first conclusion of fact which we ask this 
Court to accept is that the Provisional Government of 
Free India was formally established and proclaimed. 


I submit, Sirs, there can be no doubt about this ev en^ 
and no cross-examination of witnesses who have been 
called to prove that event, as far as I can see, has been 
seriously attempted* You have to remember, Sirs, 
the picture of the proclamation of that Government 
and Exhibits put in on that point. Before I proceed any 
further, I wish to call attention to that proclamation* 
It is Exhibit EFFE before this. Court. I do not 
wish to read the whole of that document; the only 
passages which I wish to read are passages which bear 
on the issue before this Court. 

(Reads paragraph 2 of Exhibit FFFF) 

Then I do not need to read the next paragraph. 

(Reads the next paragraph beginning with 
words ‘‘Thus on the event of the present 
world war” and ending with the words 
“total mobilization”.) 

I stop here to submit to the Court that evidence has 
been adduced as to the number of Indians in East 
Asia and the figure mentioned here is more or less 
what is borne out before the Court. 

(Reads rest of the paragraph up to the 
word ‘existence’.) 

I will read the last but one paragraph. 

(Reads last but one paragraph of Exhibit EF- 
FF beginning with the words “It will be 
the task of the Provi^nal Government” 
and ending with the *rd ‘“freedom.”) 

Then follows the signature of the members of 
the Government. The reason why I called attention 
to this document is the purpose for which the Provision- 
al Government was formed, and the means by w^hich 


that Provisional Government intended to carry out its 
purpose. The fact that it failed to achieve its purpose 
is entirely irrelevant to the issue before this Court. 
That is the first fact which we say has been established. 
The second fact which we say has been established 
is that it was an organised Government. It does not 
require many words to establish that proposition. 
Witnesses have spoken before the Court as to the alloca- 
tion of duties which appear at the end of the docu- 
ment which I have just read to the Court, and it is 
also in evidence before the Court that the Indian Inde- 
pendence League became the executive of the Provi- 
sional Government which organized, so far as it was pos- 
sible to do in those warlike conditions, the care of 
the people who owed aEe.ianceto it. InHhe month 
of June 1944, as the evidence is quite clear — it is also 
in the Exhibit — in Malaya alone, 2,30,000 persons 
actually took written Oaths of Allegiance to the Govern- 
ment. That was in June 1944, and it is in 
evidence that thereafter the process continued. The 
object of stating the figures is that it was not a case 
of a Government of what you may call, or what some- 
body being my opponent may facetiously call, a set of 
rebels, a desultory sort of crowd of no consequence. 

I wish to give a lie to that kind of suggestion, and 
that is the reason why I suggest that the Provisional 
Government was an organized Government to whom 
the whole cf the two .million odd people owed allegiance, 
and out of whom 2,30,000 persons actually took the 
Oath of Allegiance in Malaya. 

Then, Sic, the next fact which I submit is establi- 
shed before the Court is that this Government was 
recognized by the Axis powers. I use that expression 
briefly because it is qi^^ unnecessary either in law or 
in fact to prove that the recognition must be by a parti- 
cular number of Governments or by a particular class of 
Governments. The recognition is proof and more than 
proof that it had the right to declare war for the purpose 
for which it intended w fight, and having the right to 
declare war in so. far as its armies were, concerned they 


3>ecame subject to the interactional laws of war. 

On the question of recognition, I wish to call 
attention to certain cross-examination by my learned 
friend. Of course in so far as recognition by Germany 
or Italy was concerned there could be no cross-exami- 
nation and none was attempted. But with reference 
to certain East Aim matters in those days, a suggestion 
was made that those Governments were under the 
control of Japan. I for my part, with Very great 
respect, fail to understand the significance of the sugges- 
tion. Supposing Japan had an Empire, that C to say 
succeeded in keeping the territories it conquered with- 
out giving Jbhem liberty, the recognition would be none 
the less effective because it makes no difference 
whether and which Government recognised this parti- 
cular Government of Free India. The point still 
remains, and I assert that the recognition is but 
Sb proof of what. I may call a statehood which gives it 
the capacity of declaring and making war for the 
liberation of its own countrymen. The material point 
therefore is . whether it had attained that degree 
of statehood which gave it that power. Once you. 
have a State which can and is entitled to declare war, 
the war itself is its own justification. There is no 
question that any two independent States have a right 
to declare war. Any act done in the prosecution oi 
that war is justified by the "mere fact of the 
war itself. Barring this, it may be asked why 
trials are going on in parts of Asia and elsewhere, and 
in Germany. In fact they themselves emphasize the 
truth of the correctness of the proposition that any act 
done in due prosecution of war cannot be the subject 
of any municipal court by w^ of examination. What 
has happened is that in addition to the due prosecution 
of war according to civilised laws, individuals have 
been guilty of acts outside the pale of civilised trarfare, 
'which we popularly call now war crimes. But the very 
fact that you can only deal with and do deal with war 
crimes, emphatically and clearly proves that in so far 

■-m -v ■ 


«.asthe normal cMlised conduct ot trar is concerned 
including the use of an atomic bomb, is outside the 
pale of examination by way of right or wrong by 
any municipal tribunal. 

Then Sirs, the next fact which I submit is 
established is that this State had an army which was 
properly organised, having its own distinctive badges 
and emblems, functioning under regularly appointed 
officers. I am obliged to the Prosecution in this 
matter for I was spared the nefeessity of having to prove 
this ' proposition. They * put in document' after 
document to show that the Indian National Army was 
properly organised. First, that it was regulated by 
an Indian National Army Act. The only point as 
far as I could see from the cross-examination which 
was made was with reference to certain items of 
coi^oral punishment. On that it is necessary to 
point out to the Court that for the moment those 
who pursue that course forget the course of legisla- 
tion in British India itself. It is true that Lieut. Nag 
told the Court that apart from the Indian Army Act 
certain provisions relafei ng to corporal punishment 
were incorporated in the Indian National Army Act. 
It was probably forgotten that a little while before, 
in the Indian Army Act were incorporated provisions 
in Section 45 of that Act, headed ^‘Corporal 
Punishment.” I am reading from Section 45 of the 
Indian Army Act of 191 1: 

“Where any person subjectto this Act, and under 
the rank of warrant officer— 

(a) on active seyice, is guilty of any offence; 

or 

(b) at any time is guilty of the offence specified 
in clause (d) of section 31: or 


(c) at any time is guilty of a civil offenee 



which, would be punishable w\th whipping 
under the law of British India, and is 
triable by court-martial under this Act, 

it shall be lawful for a court-martial to award for that 
offence corporal punishment not exceeding thirty 
lashes.” 

It is true that about the time of this war this 
particular provision was omitted. But it is a mistake 
to think that a similar provision in the Indian Statute 
Law did not exist. As a matter of fact, in so far as 
the Defence of India Act and certain Ordinances are 
concerned, the provision was definitely made, making 
corporal punishment as part of the punishment applic- 
able to^ the personnel of the Indian Army. Ordinance 
37 of 1943 practically replaced the provisions of the 
Indian Army Act which were not found in it; a certain 
amount of effort was made as if under an Act 
governing a civilised army corporal punishment was not 
permissible as against the provisions which were to be 
found in the Indian National Army Act. I am quite 
certain that it was done under misapprehen- 
sion. 

The Military Operation Areas Special Powers 
Ordinance, Part II, Sections 20 and 23 read : 

‘‘Sec. 22: Whoever commits an offence 
punishable under Section 121-A, 122, 125 or 131 of the 
Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860) may, in lieu of any 
punishment to which he is liable under the said code, 
be punished with death. 

“Sec. 23 : Whoever (Entravenes any of the 
provisions of Rule 36 of the Defence of India Rules or 
is deemed under the provisions of the said Rules fco have 
contravened such provision, may, in lieu of any 
punishment to which he is liable under the said Rules, 
be punished with death, or with whipping, in addition 


10 



to any punishment to which he is liable under the said 
Eules.’ 

I will be able if necessary to read out all the 
Eules which clearly show that under the Indian Law, 
taken as a whole, the punishment with reference to 
whipping exists, such as the provision which was made 
in the Indian Army Act. I have got, Sirs, a summary 
made out of the provisions with reference to whipping 
which I shall afterwards hand over to the Court. Shortly 
stated, my submission to the Court is this that the 
only attack made by the Advocate- General 
on the making and framing of the Indian National 
Army Act, was the provision with reference to 
whipping, and I submit to the Court that that was 
done under a misapprehension, for it is as much a part, 
though not technically quite, in the Indian Army Act ^ 
but in the Defence of India Eules and the Ordinance. 

It makes no difference. But taking in the aggregate, 

Indian legislation does sanction corporal punishment 
throughout the period with which we are concerned 
and therefore it is that I say and submit to the Court 
that this was a properly organised army, having a 
code of its own, which for all practical purposes is the 
Indian Army Act and any condemnation of the rules 
under which that army functioned is a condemnation 
of the Indian Army Act itself, which I submit is not 
the purpose of the Prosecution in this case. Therefore, 
we come back, kSirs, to this point that this was an 
organized army functioning under a civilised code. 

As regards the appointment of officers and the regular 
method by which it was done, as regards the different 
branches and the functions, you, Sirs, are more compe- 
tent than myself to judge from the decuments which 
have been placed before you. They are in the shape of 
army orders or orders of the day and so on, which have 
been placed before the Court. On a question of fact ; 

we have arrived so far that there was a state which dec- I 

lared war for the purpose of fighting for the [ 

liberation of the country and it had an organised army, ^ ! 


11 


orgariised under a code which for all practical, sub- 
stantial purposcis, accorded with the aggregate law on 
the same subject preTailing in British India. I use 
the word aggregate, because I must bring in the other 
laws also which provided for and permitted the inflic- 
tion of corporal punishment in all these cases. 

The next fact which is established beyond aU 
dispute was that the object of the declaration of war 
by the Provisional Government of Free India was the 
liberation of India. 

The next important fact which I think 
must be mentioned is that the Indian National 
Army was formed with two purposes. The main 
purpose was the securing the liberation of India, 
and no doubt. Sirs, from the most important witness, 
that the prosecution called, it has never been 
difficult to establish that that was the object with 
which that Army was formed and that was the 
object with which the individuals who joined it joined 
it. The other object also was which was somewhat- 
subordinate, but useful purpose, the protection 
such as could be afforded to the Indian inhabitants 
of Burma and Malaya, particularly during the days 
when law and order in those parts of the country was 
poorly looked after, the lives and the honour and the 
property of the people was not quite so easily 
protected. 

The first object is the one which the army was- 
called upon to fulfil as a part of its duties. Again taking, 
the evidence as a whole, I submit it has been amply 
proved before this Court that the I.N. A. was formed 
with the object of fighting for the liberation of India and 
also with the object of protecting the lives, honour and 
property of people resiffing in East Asia at that time. 

The next point which is established, I submit, 
is this — though I speak with less confidence because 

12 . 



I do not see it admitted — ^bnt the fact has been 
proved and it is my duty to examine the 
evidence on it, is that the Japanese. Government 
or the Nippon Government as it is called, ceded to 
the new Indian State the islands of Nicobar and 
Andamaxis, that the Indian State acquired territory 
in the form of Ziawadi, .which was about fifty square 
miles in area, and that it administered, for a period of 
four to six months the Manipur and Vishnupur 
areas. 

As regards the first, in so far as Lieut. Nag was 
concerned, he has given definite evidence .that the two 
islands were ceded. The evidence falls under three 
parts ; , the first is a . declaration to that effect by the 
Japanese Government, amiounced by a document which 
has been proved before this Court. That document 
is a statement by , General Tojo that they were 
about’ to concede the islands of Andamans and 
Nicobar to, the Free Indian Government. That 
document is UUUU. ( Counsel reads relevant 
portions of the document) : This was on the 5th 
November 1943. . 

Then followed events which clearly showed that 
that purpose was carried out. You. have in .evidence 
that that declaration was made and that the new Indian 
State was called upon to administer it by means of a 
Commissioner, that a Oommissioner was in . fact 
^PP^i^fod, that the Commissioner in fact went, . and 
you have evidence of a definite ceremony at which the 
naval ana military authorities then in charge handed 
over the islands to the Commissioner on behalf of the 
Indian State at Port [Blair. These are points on which, 
as far as I am able to see the evidence, very little 
criticism has been made by way of cross-examina" 
tion. 

The point on which there has been a difference 
between the Prosecution and ourselves is the actual form 


and extent of the admiiustration of the islands. But 
it is clearly a misconception to confuse the ceding of a 
territory and taking over every item of a dministration 
of that territory, particularly under the conditions then 
prevailing. The fact is — and it is commonsense I sub- 
mit — that a house might well be sold and completely 
sold, sold outright and yet possession for a time 
may not be wholly given. It is a familiar illustration I 
am giving, so that it is easy to appreciate. 
In the somewhat elaborate cross-examination for 
this purpose of Gol. Loganadhan, it was intended 
merely to point out that the whole of the 
administration was not taken over — which is not 
denied — he said it over and over again; and I think it 
is established and I ask the Court to hold it is establi- 
shed that he went for the purpose of taking over the 
administration. It is true that he did not take over 
more than two items — one, education* and the fact that 
the area was small and the people ignorant is hardly 
an argument that he had not taken over the adminis- 
tration. I dare say in other countries where the 
standard of literacy is something like 99 percent, 
there are many more schools than in this unfortunate 
country where the standard of literacy is probably 15 
percent. Therefore the argument that schools were 
few and the expenditure was so little — I think there 
is very little point in the cross-examination on this 
matter. I did enter a protest but it was overruled and 
it is not for me to say anything more about it. But 
you do not detract from the cession of a territory in 
quantity or time by pointing out that the whole of 
the administration was not and could not be taken 
over. Colonel Loganadhan told the Court again and 
again^ — almost painfully over again — of the fact that 
until he got complete control of the police in the matter 
of spies (which seemed to be a sore point with the 
local inhabitants), he was not prepared to takeover 
any other part of the administration. But there 
is one significant thing that my learned friend got 
out of Colonel Loganadhan, and that is that one of 


the officers who went with Mm, administered what yon 
may call very elementary justice which it was possible 
to do in the conditions then prevailing in the islands. 
So much so that having asked it and got it, he tried 
to shake it off but he could not, and it was proved to 
the hilt that Justice and Education were taken over. 
True, poli ce was not taken over because the J apanese 
from the point of view of defence were keen on retain- 
ing control over what you may call the spy population 
of these islands. But one thing remains and that is the 
most significant fact, and that is the renaming of the 
islands. So that any amount of examination as to 
why or how month by month or day by, day further 
acts of administration were not made, cannot possibly 
get rid of three important facts : first, the clear solemn 
declaration that the islands would be handed over 
shortly. A suggestion was made— -it remained at a 
suggestion only^ — ^that they would he handed over after 
the war. Where my friend got the words after the 
war '' I do not know. I hope he will point it out and 
that is why I read out this document. The document 
clearly shows that they were to be very shortly 
handed over. 

The second fact was that it was to be adminis- 
tered through a Commissioner, which was a definite 
proposition made at that time. A Commissioner was 
in fact nominated by the Provisional Government 
and the Commissioner in fact reached there 
and began to function. No doubt, as in every case of 
tMskind, I presume this Court will take almost judicial 
notice of the fact as to how Germany and other 
countries are being administered today. No doubt the 
man was qualified, and he may book the best educated 
man from amongst his staffs and he hoped that the local 
machinery would soon adapt itself for the purpose of 
continuing the administration, because it is unthinkable 
that you can transfer quickly and at one stroke the 
whole administrative machinery from one country to- 
another. Anybody who is familiar with the adminis- 


tration of this very country^ is aware that Britain 
administers this country throngh practically the entire 
machinery of the Indian people themselves. So that the 
number of men and all the rest of it, I submit, is so 
much, without disrespect, hot air. The real point 
is, were or were not the islands ceded ? And I say there 
is so much evidence that they were. 

The last point is the re-naming of the islands : 
Shahid and Swaraj, 

I submit that it is clearly established on the 
evidence before this court that though by reason of 
the exigencies of the situation, it may not have been 
possible to take over the complete administration, in 
law and in fact the islands were given over to the 
Indian State , or to what I would call the Provisional 
Government. 

N’ext I deal with the question of Ziawadi. 
The position is this, accordance to the evidence on the 
record : that this was a property, about 5.0 sq. miles 
in area, with 15,000 inhabitants who were Indians. 
It had on it a sugar factory and various other means 
of production, agricultural or otherwise and every 
branch of administration of that territory was carried 
out by men appointed by the Indian National Army 
and belonging to the Azad Hind DaL 

My learned friend did not even venture, in the 
course ' of cross-examination, to challenge the truth of 
the statements made before this court by witness 
Shiv Singh and Arshad on this head. Shiv Singh 
said that every branch of administration was taken 
over. He gave the name of the person who was the 
officer in charge of every branch of administration, - Re- 
venue, Police, P,W.D., justice both civil and criminal. 
Under these circumstances, the legal position is 
simple, I shall came to it in greater detail afterwards, 
japan conquered Burma. By right of conquest 



it was in a position to dispose as it liked of the whole 
or any portion of any territory and as the witness 
told you clearly, by reason of the agreement between 
the Provisional Government and the Nippon Govern- 
ment, this territory was handed over as a part of the 
liberated territory to the I. A. and the Azad Hind 
Hal. At this stage let me point out to the Court that 
the Azad Hind Dal, it has been proved, was an 
organisation of men trained for the purpose of adminis- 
tering areas as soon as they came under the control 
OT occupation of the I. N. A. or as soon as they were 
handed over to them. I must also remind the Court 
that it has been proved beyond question — ^because as 
far as I see there was no cross-examination or 
effective cross-examination any way, that as soon as the 
I. N. A. crossed the borders of Burma into India a 
proclamation was issued in two parts, one signed by 
the Head of the Indian State and the other signed 
by General Kawabe under the orders of the South 
Eastern Command. In that it was distinctly stated 
that any part of the Indian territory which would be 
acquired by conquest or otherwise by the J apanese Army 
would be handed over to the I. N, A. for the purpose of 
forming part of the liberated territory and to be admi- 
nistered by them. That is the history of the ceding. 

Then we come to Manipur and Vishnupur areas. 
Evidence has been given before the Court without any 
reasonable demur to the effect that during the time the 
Japanese and the I.N. A. were operating, those portions 
of India were in fact administered by the I.N.A. through 
its organisation, the Azad Hind Bal, and the area was 
15,000 square miles. The duration of administration 
has no bearing on this issue, for indeed it can happen, 
as it did happen in this war, that territories were as 
easily acquired as lost. This Court is not concerned 
with the question of duration. I would ask the 
Court to hold that the two islands, Andamans and 
Nicobar, were in fact ceded, that Ziawadi became a 
part of liberated Indian territory, and that, though for a 





short period of time, Manipur and Yishnnpiir areas 
were exactly in the same position. 

The next point to which I wish to refer is the 
resources of the State. In order to judge of the 
existence of the State,#the resources of the State is 
also one of the matters to be considered. It has been 
proved before the Court that some 20 crores of rupees 
were in fact donated to the State, out of which was 
maintained the cml government and the army. Dina 
Nath, who impressed this Court, gave extremely clear 
evidence on this head. He' was one of the Directors of 
the Azad Hind Bank and he told the Court that 
between Burma and Malaya, during that short period 
of time, the State had resources to the tune of 20 
crores of rupees, in addition to the produce of Ziawadi. 
It is a remarkable thing to notice that on the reoccupa- 
tion of Burma and Malaya every single document 
which was in the possession of this Indian State 
was found intact. It was amazing. See the 
monthly reports which the Prosecution was able to 
produce with reference to the administration of the 
Andamans and Nicobars 1 It only emphasizes — and 
I wish to make a point of this — ^that there was a 
complete organisation, and that organisation was 
as good as could reasonably be expected. Thai 
alone accounts for half the documents which my 
learned friend was able to produce. 

The point is that we were a little handicapped 
owing to the lack of certain documents. As the 
evidence before the Court shows, this Bank was closed 
after the occupation of Rangoon, and in fact it is in 
evidence that some 35 lakhs worth of property was 
sequestered, I am not complaining of the sequ^tra- 
tion. That I think was the right of the conquerors. 
What I am saying is that in so far as the resources 
of the State were concerned, they were full and 
adequate for the purposes which the new State had 
then in view. 


Here I wisb. to refer to a bulletin. It is not 
what I might call technical evidence before tho 
Court but it will be my duty to submit that it is a 
document of which the Court should take judicial 
notice. The document is dated the 10th November 
1945 and called Stamp Collecting. 

Sir N. P. Engineer: My learned friend is* 
reading from a document which has hot been accepted.. 

Sri Desai : I am only making a submission, 
to the Court. Ts it my friend’s contention that if I 
read a book on law, it should be put in as an exhibit? 

Judge- Advocate : The document itself cannot 
be admitted at this stage. 

Sri Desai : All I am doing now is to make- 
a submission to the Court. 

Section 57 says: 

“The Court shall take Jhdihial notice of the 
foBowing facts: 

“In all these cases and also in' all matters of 
published history, literature,; science ^ or art 
the Court may resort, for ..help . to appro- 
priate books or documents of reference.” 

And if the Learned Advocate- General solemnly 
suggests that every single book of history, literature, 
science, and art is to be an exhibit before it can be- 
referred to, I am very sorry that it is a statement which 
defeats itself. 

Judge- Advocate: Mr. Desai, will you readout 
what you want the Court tatake judicial notice of ? 

Sri Desai: May I not apply that the Court may 
consider it? All I am asking is that this applicatioii^be 



V 


considered. Of course the Court may reject it ; I am not 
suggesting that the Court is bound to accept it. My 
submission is that under Section 57 it may be taken 
judicial notice of. 


issue of November 
10, 1945 of |a weekly publication called “Stamp 

Collecting published in London and edited by 
Douglas Armstrong, a ■well-known philatelist. In that 
issue at page 136, column I, the following appears : 


J 


“ Imphal Stamp that failed. 

" So confident were the Japs that they 
■would occupy Imphal, when they 
invaded Southern Assam that they 
actually prepared a special issue of 
stamps for use there. Needless to say 
these stamps failed to materialise, but 
our correspondent. Flying OfiScer T.A. 
Broomhead, informs us that he has 
seen proof impressions in the hands 
of the man who was responsible for the 
printing (in Rangoon). Two denomi- 
nations appear to have been prepared, 
viz., 3 pice plum and 1 anna red, -both in 
the same design and roughly perforated 
llix9| {approx.) The subject of the vig- 
nette(illustrated) is the old Mogul Fortress 
at Old Delhi accompanied by the slogan 
“On 'to Delhi Bi-lingual inscription 
reads “PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 
OF FREE INDIA”. When it became 
evident that the Imphal stamps would 
not be required, the dies were destroyed 
and the bulk supply of sheets printed in 
readiness was burnt with the exception 
of a small quantity salvaged by the 
prints.” 


^ top comer on the left-hand side is a facsimile 
01 the stamp referred to in the above qnotation. 

docnment should be 
taken jadimal notice of in support inter alia of proof 
that the Provisional Government of Free Indfia had 
got prepared, issued or were about to issue postal 
stamps of that character. As appears from the above 
question, the dies were prepared under the direction 
oi the Japanese. 

Counsel for the Prosecution : I Submit 


j Would it not be more convenient 

to deal with this point in your arguments, and so shall 
1 . 1 here is no point, when the document is read 
whether the Court accepts it or not. 

. Sri Desai: I frankly submit to the Court that 

^ IS not a matter of such an importance, but as the 
document was brought to my notice I thought it was 
my duty to put it before the Court. KTobody should 
question books of history, science,literature, and art. 

•xf H^agazinein England dealing 

^th this subject, edited by a very well-known man 
indeed. 


X1-* T Sir, it appears from the evidence that 

this Indian State had a Civil, and what I may call 
an Army Gazette of its own. That is also established 
before this Court. 

1,* -L. facts, Sir, the first question of law 

which I wish to raise is this : Having regard to the 
condition in which this Free Government of India 
had been formed and was functionmg, it was entitled 
to make war and it did make war for the purpose 
of- liberating this country. That is the first and the 
mam ^ue before the Court. This Court is trying 
€ml offences under the Indian Penal Code, and there 


are two ways of lookiiig at this question. One is that 
wh6h two States ' declprire ' a war-^and I. may assume 
for the purpose of thie argument, because I cannot 
do more than place evidence before this Court for its 
acceptance, that the condition in which the new Indian 
State found itself, it was in a position to declare 
war — and having declared war, in so far as any acts 
in the prosecution of that war are concerned, they are 
outside the, pale ,of municipal law. „ I will tell you. 
Sir? what I mean because I will .. elaborate ’ this 
sufficiently to make myself understood by the Court. 
Supposing a German during the prosecution of the 
war had shot two or three or ten Britishers in 
England and was found in England, the question 
is, could he be charged with having committed 
murder. I submit , never, for the simple reason 
tha-t those acts 'were done during the due prosecu- 
tion of the war which, , unfortunately, in the present 
world of infirmities the International Law accepts. 
That is to say, what International Law accepts is 
that two independent countries or two States, as 
they are called, r may make war on each other, 
and ' those who carry out any action in due 
prosecution of the war (apart from war criminals) is 
outside the pale of municipal law. Alternatively, 
if that is not sufficient for this Court (though I 
submit it should be in view of what I am going 
to read to you from accepted authorities on Inter- 
national Law) under. Section 79. .of the- Indian 
Penal Code the acts done in due prosecution of the war 
were not offences. Section 79 of the Indian Penal 
Code reads thus: 

“Nothing is an offence which is done by 

any. person who., is justified by law... 

And my submission to the Court is that under the 
term Taw' is covered international Law', and for 
that reason in. so far as that German — continuing 
the: example which I was giving— 'Who was arrested 
in England was concerned, his defence would be.: 


country, my State, was at war with your 
State.s Under the orders of my State, aiid in 
due prosecution of the war, I did the acts which 
under ordinary normal circumstances might be 
offences, hut which having regard to the circumstances 
are no offences at all/’ 

Sir, it is unthinkable that any member of any 
organized army could be charged with an oftence merely 
because he fought one or ten or a million men belonging 
to an army of the State with which he is at war. It is 
perfectly obvious to anybody that during the prosecu- 
tion of the war, the municipal law relating to that 
country does not apply, except, I quite agree, 
when one soldier steals the pocket-book of an- 
other soldier. That I appreciate. But the question which 
we have got to bear in mind is the very important 
distinction : Was that act done in due prosecution 
of the war which one State declared upon ■ 
another. 

Once you get to that state, it is perfectly 
obvious that that municipal law must and is bound 
to remain in abeyance. It is impossible to arraign 
any individual for carrying out as a matter of duty 
acts which might otherwise he offences— killing a man 
overy day, destroyiag property every day. In fact it is 
a very part of the war itself. Therefore the agree- 
ment is twofold. The alternatives are either that 
any act done in due prosecution of war is outside the 
pale^of municipal law — that is why I pointed out to 
you in the commencement 'that the charge against * 
these young men before you is not as if they had 
committed an act of private murder by reason of 
;some private quarrel. The documents accepted by 
the prosecution clearly bear but that whatever they 
did, they did as part of the prosecution of war 
^Remember that always, because without that the law 
-cannot be appreciated with reference to the facts in issue. 

. 23 



Bxit there is another way of looking at it, 
if you must. That is whether the exception provided 
by Section 79 is not equally applicable to the case. 
My submission to the Court is that whether you 
accept the one or the other makes no difference to 
the decision that I am asking for as to the immunity 
from those acts being offences at all ; because the 
very language of Section 79 is : ‘‘Nothing is an offence 
: which is justified by law.’’ The Section assumes that 
in private life it might ^ otherwise have been an 
offence. If you, gentlemen, in the due prosecution 
of war committed murders, could the civil laws as 
propounded by tlm other side be put into action 
against you, when in all.honour you acted in prosecu- 
tion of your duties as members of an organised army 
of a State that had declared war ? It stands to 
reason — and it must — that any act done by a member 
of an organised army fighting under the ordem of 
one State against another State between which war 
exists, is an act entirely outside municipal law. 
But assuming for the purpose of argument, the 
Court requires some nearer justification. In the eye 
of the Court, in so far as the administration by 
this Court is concerned, it is fortunate that I am able 
to find the exception in the Indian Penal Co(Je itself, 
because these young men are being charged either 
under Section 121 or Section 302 of the Indian Penal 
Code and I am rel 3 ?ing on Section 79 of the same Code 
which says in terms that it is not an offence. Suppos- 
ing war was declared between two States and when 
peace time returned every individual soldier is called 
upon to say whether he killed so and so. I am quite 
sure' that as I am addressing men of commonsense,. 
you would laugh at the idea. But then I quite 
agree that I would have to satisfy you that the new 
Indian State that declared war was entitled to do it in 
the sense of international law. 


And now I will proceed to quote from books of 
international law on the question of right to makes 


I aiUtireading to you;%oL II of Dick Corbett’s Case!^ 
of International Law under the beading of “War”, 1937 
Edition. 

“International war is a contest carried on by an 
armed force either between States or between a State 
and some community or body whieb is treated as a 
State for, the purpose of the conduct of hostilities. 
Int^national „ war differs froin other kinds of war 
m that it has the effect of setting up a new relation in 
law both as between the belligerents themselves andl 
as between each of them' and the other States. As 
between the belligerents, the State of war although it 
departs from normal relations, is nevertheless a State 
01 regulated violence in which the conduct of hostilities 
IS governed by certain principles and rules which 
rest part on custom and part on convention, 
and which are sanctioned in the last resort by the 
action of international society however uncertain 
may be their operation.” 

I next call attention to Wheaton’s International 
I reading Wheaton’s “International Law”. 
1945 edition, Vol. II, page 98: 

“War in the absence of any international 
authority competent to suppress effectively 
international wrongs has always been held 
legal by international law.” 

4 . 1 , 4 . ^^^®niber that as a definite proposition 
that so long as there are two States, if they declare* 
war against each ' other, there is no justification 
reqmred for it. And once you have a war, any .person 
being a rnember of an organised army or one of the 
warring ^ates, cannot be called upon individually 
o accourft for the acts, which in civil matters or 
normal times if done individually in a private 
edacity for private motive, be considered to be an 
offence. 


1 


*** War, in the absence of any international 
authority co&ipetent to suppress 
•'effectively international wrongs, has 
always been held legal by international 

law Even the creation 

of the League of Nations leaves war in 
certain cases legal, though there is now 
on record the unanimous Assembly 
•condemnation of aggressive war. War 
is essentially a struggle between States, 
^involving the application of force. 

Mere armed occupation, as in the 
seizure of Strassburg by Louis XIV in 
1680-Sl or as in that of Corfu by Italy 
in 1923, is not war unless the State 
affected declares it so, and 
similarly, as reg^.rds pacific blockade. 

The States need not necessarily be full y 
sovereign : in 1876, Serbia and Mon- 
tenegro warred on Turkey, though vassal 
States; in 1877, Rumania followed suit. 

In 1885, Bulgaria warred on Serbia, then 
fuUy sovereign, and in the treaty of 
peace of March 3, 1886, though Turkey 
as suzerain took part, Bulgaria ap- 
peared independently as* a party. So 
the South African Republic warred on 
the United Kingdom in 1899....'' 

So, the first- step in the argument is that 
the State which declares war is and must > be 
in a position to do it. But once it declares war 
against any other State, then there can be no 
qilCstion of its prop-iety, justice or right. In 
th^ particular case before the Court, and notwithstand- 
ing their territories which were occupied, I do say 
that this war at all events was completely a justified 
war. International law in the question of war is hot 
static. It is law that has grown from time to time 
with the progress of civilization. 


Therefore the question really is, once 
it comes to 'war, there is ho question of 
justification. But hitherto at all events now 
in the global war a great many events have 
occurred of which intemationaJ conscience takes note. 

I will read out to you two passages, one from Mr. 
Winston Churchill from the Hansard and another 
from Mr. Eden. The position now is that inter- 
national law has reached this stage that^ if liberty and 
4'emocracy are to . have any meaning ' all over the 
world, and not merely just for a part of it, and this 
is not politics, it is law — ^any war made for the purpose 
of liberating oneself from foreign yoke is completely 
justified by modern international law. And it will be 
travesty of justice if we were to be told as the result 
of any decision arrived at here or otherwise, that the 
Indian may go as soldier and fight for the freedom of 
England against Germany, for England against Italy, ^ 
for England against Japan, and yet a stage may not 
be reached when a free Indian State may not wish to 
free itself from any country, including England itself. 
We maintain that this particular war, according to the 
decisions, requires no justification. If one State can 
•declare war, then the other State can also declare 
war and fight, and anything done in «its 
due prosecution has no civil consequences of 
'any kind. In other words, not one of these 
men .now charged before you can be called 

upon to account for his actions. We can ^show that 
they have done nothing outside the scope of the due ' 
prosecution of war on a civilized basis. That is an 
•emphasis which I always wish to put. It is not 
.alleged against these men that there was any question 
about the acts with which they are charged. They 
were acts carried out in due prosecution of the war, 
under what you may call - civilised rules. 

'Therefore the question before the Court is a very 
narrow one. 

To continue what I was reading: 


27 


“A civil war between different members of 
the same society is, what Grotins calls, a 
mixed war. It is according to him public 
on the side of the established Government 
and private on the part of people resisting 
its authority. The general usage of na- 
tions is as regards such a war as entitling 
both the contending parties to ail the 
rights of war as against each, other and 
even as respects neutral nations. It 
seems to be now settled that it is un- 
. necessary in order to constitute war that 
both parties should ...be acknowledged as 
independent nations or sovereign States.'^ 

There was at one time the old idea that you had 
to be an independent State or a sovereign State in 
order to be able to declare war. Of course that created 
a vicious circle, that a subject race will remain in- 
perpetuity a subject race. It can never make a legiti* 
mate war for the purpose of liberating itself. 
Hence modern international law has now 
recognised the right of subject races which are not- 
for tl;^ time being or at the moment independent, to- 
be so organized, and if they are organised and fight an 
organised war through an organised army, the indivi- 
dual members of that army are unanswerable before 
any municipal court for what was done in due prosecu- 
tion of that war. 

It seems to be now settled that it is 
unnecessary in order to constitute a war that both 
parties should be acknowledged as independent nations 
or sovereign States. A war may certainly exist between, 
a State and its suzerain as in the Boer War. May I 
appeal to this Court . and all of you who are familiar 
with British history, — what about Charles I and 
his death? What about the Magna Charta ? What about 
James II? It is all recorded in history. In other words, 
you do reach a stage where the organisation, call it rebel 


if yon like, call it insnrgent;~insurgents or rebels may 
reach a stage of orgaiii?atio3i for the purpose of 
liheratiiig themselves when what they do after 
‘declaring war is subject to the laws of war. 

“A war may certainly exist between a 
State and a suzerain as in the Boer War. 
Moreover, a war may exist where one 
of the belligerents claims sovereign rights ^ 
as against the other, whether in a federal 
or a unitary State.. 

But it is quite an unnecessary requisite. If 
•ever a subject race finds itself in a position where its 
organisation is able to declare war, then acts done 
by the armies on either side come under this. I put 
,a very simple question : What about the acts of those 
^ho fought on the side of the British in this War ? They 
killed lots of people. Would they be put up before this 
^Court under Section 302 ? Most amazing 1 It was a* 
properly fought war, no doubt as in other wars one or 
the other side lost, and the fact that a war is lost has 
no effect on the immunity froni the consequences in acts 
done in due prosecution of the war. He says further : 

Whether the struggle is a war or not 
is to be determined not from the relation 
. of the combatants to each other, but 
from the mode in which it is carried 
on. The Government of the State may 
recognize its subjects as belligerents, 
in which case other States will normally 
but need not follow the same course. 

Or ^ other States may recognize 
belligerency, in which case the parent 
State will ^ but certainly follow suit. 

is the crux of the matter. I quite agree 
i)hat if ten persons in a village declare war on 


29 


Britain, they are rebels, and I am not here to 
justify it. What I am saying is this : in a striiggie* 
between two organizations a stage must be reached 
where the organisation of the State and the organisa- 
tion of the army are such that it is a war recognised 
by civilised nations; and if it hi once recognised,, 
then the immunity follows. As the books point out,, 
we had the instance of the war between the South and 
^the North of America and you have a declaration from 
Abraham Lincoln downw;ards that it was a proper 
war and there was nothing more to be said about it 
as soon as the hostilities ceased. It goes on. 
to say : 

“Among the tests are the existence of a 
de facto political organization of the 
insurgents sufficient in character, popula- 
tion and resources to constitute it, if 
left to itself, a State among nations 
capable of dibcharging the duties of a 
State; the actual employment of 
military forces on each side acting in 
accordance with the rules and customs 

of war If all these elements 

exist, the condition of things is 
undoubtedly war; and it may be 
war before they are all ripened into 
activity. ’’ 

Therefore what I wish to say is this that the test by' 
which you will judge this case is, have we or have- 
we not proved the existence of a de facto 
political organization of insurgents ? I do 
not deny that they were insurgents. Apart 
from the other question to which I shall -come* 
presently, I will assume against myself that the people- 
who declared war and who declared the Provisional 
Government of Free India were a set of insur- 
gents, a set of rebels — I will assume that against 
myself. 



President Grant said in his message^ 
of June 13, 1870: ‘The question of belli- 
gerency is one of fact not to be decided 
by sympathies for or prejudices against 
either party. The relations between the 
parent State and the insurgents must 
amount, in fact, to war in the sense of 
international law/ ’ 

I call upon you to do the same. It is not a questioife 
of prejudice; it is not a question of prestige or what 
happens to the Army, to this or the other person. 
Please remember that you are here as judges; you are- 
not politicians, I agree, and I do not want you to be 
such. If you find that there is a de facto political, 
organization sufficient in numbers, sufficient in 
character and sufficient in resources to constitute 
itself capable of declaring and making war with an 
organised army, your verdict muvst be in favour of ' 
these men — no more and no less than the verdict on 
your own men for killing others, of which act you are* 
justly proud. 

That is the-position in law. 

Then 1 wish to call attention to another book 
on Internarional Law — an accepted book and what is; 
more it is bopne out by all the earlier cases in which 
war was waged by what you may call insurgents - 
against their own sovereign, if you must use that 
expression. This book is by Lawrence — ^page 309.. 
The whole question before the Court under this parti- . 
cularhead is whether or not there was a properly 
declared war in prosecution of which the accused 
before you did the acts which they did. And if they 
did that in due prosecution of that war, then there 
can be no question of any civil offence, as I think all 
of you in your owxi person will easily realise. I am 



«0t obliged in my civil life to kiH 
■on pam of conviction, but you are, 

JLawrence says ; 

^‘War may be defined as a co; 
on by public force between states 
states and communities haviner 
to tue contest the rights of states, 
to it having the intention of end; 
^relations, and substituting for 

Ae with rfl the leg. 

These were no private acts don 
-motive or done for private individua' 
^ame to be done by them as members 
^rmy, having declared war and the 1 
that no sucli_consequenees as the govej 
*can arise. Lawrence goes on : 

It is true that two States are 
at war as soon as one ofi them I 
a declaration of war from thp, 


anybody except 


other. Therefore in due prosecution of it, acts which 
might be called offences under civil law are not 
offences: the very purpose is to ’ destroy men and 
property: the very thing which would otherwise be 
unlawful becomes right, becomes patriotic, becomes 
a duty. 

‘Tn any case it is universally recognised that 
war is a contention, i.e., a violent struggle 
through the application of armed force...... 

To be war, the contention must be between 

States .On the other hand, to an armed 

contention between a suzarain and its vassal 
State the character of war ought not to be 
denied, for both parties are States, although 
the action of the vassal may, from . the 
standpoint of constitutional law, be 
rebellion.’’ (Para 56.) 

I have already said that states are those 
which have the right to make war like States. 

The first proposition for which I stand before 
this Court is this, that the two States sufficient in 
number in organisation and in resources may make 
war against each other. That is the proposition to 
which I stand; and if they, made war against each 
other, then there* is complete immunity for what 
might otherwise be a private offence. ' That 
must necessarily follow from the acceptance of war 
as a necessary evil in this infirm world, and no 
individual member can be called upon to answer for 
the consequences of his acts so long as it ds a properly 
declared war. I shall call the Court’s attention to 
Mr. Hyde’s book on ‘International Law’, Vol. Ill, 
page 1792, para. 648. 

‘ ‘So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign 
government and takes the soldier’s oath 


33 


of fidelity, he is a belligerent ; his killings 
wounding or other war-like acts are not in- 
dividual crimes or offences. No belligerent has 
a right to declare that enemies of a certain 
class, colour or condition, when properly- 
organised as soldiers, wiU not be treated 
by him as public enemies.’^ 

In other words the position is simple. Any 
act done by niembers of an armed force against any 
opponent, which in ordinary times in a personal case 
would be a civil offence, ceases to be an offence 
altogether. Otherwise, war and recognition is not 
a possibility. 

There is a very important decision of the 
Federal Court of the United States expressing the 
same thing. I may be pardoned for multiplying 
authorities, b\it I do so because I feel that instead of 
paraphrasing the idea myself, if I do it through the 
medium of an accepted authority, I might be able to 
carry better conviction. It is VoL 168 United Statea 
Beports. page 250. It is the case of Underhill v. 
Hernandez. I am reading the judgment of Chief 
Justice Fuller. The opinion of the Court is as follows: 

‘‘Nor can the principle be confined to 
lawful or recognised Governments or to cases, 
where redress can manifestly be- had 
through public channels. The ^ immunity 
of in(hviduals from suits brought in foreign 
tribunals for acts done within their own 
States in the exercise of Governmental 
authority, whether as civil officers or 
as military commanders, must necessarily 
extend to the agents of governments ruling 
by paramount force as a matter of fact. 
■V^ere a civil war prevails, that is, where 
the people of a country are divided 
into two hostile parties, who take up 

u: ' ■ 


arms and oppose one 'another by military 
force, generally speaking foreign nations 
do not assume to jtidge of the merits of 
the quarrel. If the party seeking to dislodge 
the existing government succeeds, and 
the independence of the government it 
has set up is recognised, then the acts 
oi such government from the commencement 
of its existence are regarded as those of 
an independent nation. If the political 
revoltfefails of success, still if actual war has 
been waged, acts of legitimate warfare 
cannot be made the basis of individual 
liability.” 

Chief Justice Fuller was deciding the case arisinf 
out of the war between the North and the South. A 
wa,r might exist between what you might call an 
existing State and insurgents, and yet the insurgents as 
they were called by the Federal Government, may have 
such organisation, force and strength that the relation 
between the two partie.s is one of the existence of war 
Once the war exists, what is the legal position* If the 
party seesing to dislodge the existing Government 
succeeds, it is now accepted law that a successful re- 
bellion IS a Government established by law. The 
question is — what is the position in case of an un- 
successfol rebellion. The law is, I submit, that if the 
st^e IS reached where the rebels Or insurgents are 
sufeciently organised and are;sufficiently resourceful to 
make war, then it is entitled to be regarded as war, and 
Imre will be no individual consequences to persons 
who ta.ije part in it. If actual war has been waged 
and my learned friend himself was at pains ’to prove 
that a replar ^r was being waged, and he put forward 

to prove it, then the question. 
IS .V\ hat IS the distinction between a private individual 
waging war on his own and his waging war as a 
member of a force or organized State. That is the real 
distinction which makes one immune from the conse- 


qnences. If actual war has been waged, then acts of 
legitimate warfare cannot be made the basis of indivi- 
dual liability. 

There is another case belonging to the same 
period. It is Ford V. Surget, 97 United States 
Reports, page 594, (equal to 24 Law F. D.) : 

''The Confederate Government can be 
regarded by the Courts in no other light than 
as simply the military representative of tl|.a 
insurrection against the nhlitary authority of 
the United States. 

"To the Confederate Army was however con- 
ceded, in the interest of humanity and to pre- 
vent the cruelties of reprisals and retaliation, 
such belhgerentjights as belonged, under the 
laws of nations, to the armies of independent 
Governments engaged in war against each 
other ; that concession placing the soldiers and 
officers of the rebel army, as to all matters 
directly connected with the mode of prosecut- 
ing the war on the footing of those engag- 
ed in lawful war and exempting them from 
liability for acts of legitimate warfare.’’ 

The &st proposition is this that in view of the 
fact that a state of war existed between the Pro- 
visional Government of Azad Hind and the British, 
any act done in prosecution of that war has not 
the consequences which the Crown claims or might 
have claimed in the case of a private individual. 

In International Law it is permissibly for those 
who are subject to a foreign authority to organize 
themselves, and having reached that stage of re- 
organisation and having an oreanized army to fight 
for liberation, whether it is successful or not, during 
the process while the war is being carried on, there 


36 


is immunity, so far as individual members of the 
organized army are concerned for all acts done in due 
prosecution of war on a civilized basis (other than 
war crimes like those which are the subject of trial 
now in different parts of the world ). That being 
so, my submission is that the accused men before you 
are entitled to be declared innocent in that there is 
no civil or criminal responsibility for those acts. In 
terms of the language of the books on law, the liability 
is on A State under whose direction they fought, and 
such liability in international law on the cessation of 
hostilities does not exist. Of course if a rebellion is 
successful, then it becomes a new Giovemment, 
and there is the end of it and there will be no 
tribunals, but it is only in a case in which it 
is not successful that the question arises and the 
answer is given in my clients’ favour by international 
law. 

The next point to which I wish to advert is 
the alternative point which I made under Section 79 
of the Indian Penal Code. The issue which arises 
apart from the Indian Penal Code is an issue of great 
international importance. It has arisen, if I may say 
so, in ’ its actual form for the first time though 
the authorities directly or indirectly support 
the principles on which my contention is based. At 
the same time, appearing before this ^Tribunal, it 
becomes my duty to justify it on what I may call a 
narrower ground to the extent to which it is necessary, 
for I do feel that before a Tribunal constituted as this 
is, it is equally important that I should put myself 
within the narrow sphere of the Indian Statute itself. 
Then I submit, as&uming my submissions are correct 
and accepted, the hands of the Tribunal are fairly 
strengthened. The words which I referred to in 
Section 79 of the Indian Penal Code are " justified by 
law The question is what is the meaning of the 
word ‘ law ’ appearing in Section 79 of the Indian 
Penal Code. If I can satisfy this Court that the law 


there comprekends and mcludes international law, I 
submit my Honourable Friend on the other side would 
have hardly any case to present to the Court at all. 
If the word 'law’ in Section 79 includes International 
Law so far as the immunity which I have described 
before is concerned, then I submit the three men at 
your bar are entitled to plead that they were so 
justified in the actions which in ordinary private 
personal life, might have been offences under the Indian 
Penal Code. I wish to call your attention i# a certain 
number of authorities on the question. The first 
authority to which I call your attention is Blackstone’s 
Commentaries in Book IV, but it is Volume II in 
this binding. It is accepted at all events by British 
lawyers that Blackstone’s Commentaries are the 
fountain-source of Common Law of England and it is 
a matter which I vfish to particularly assert before this 
Court. The page that I am reading is 2237 (Vol.II, 
edited by W. C. Jones ) . Most of us who are not lawyers 
are familiar with Blaekstone’s Commentaries and know 
that he is father, to a very large extent, of Common 
Law. Blackstone’s Commentaries are relied upon in 
British Courts as a very authoritative exposition of 
the law on the particular question which" he 
has dealt with. ’ 

'Tn arbitrary states this law, wherever 
it contradicts or is not provided for by 
the municipal law of the country, is 
enforced by” royal power ; but since 
in England no royal power can introduce 
^ a new law, or suspend the execution 
of the old, therefore the law of nations 
(wherever any question arises # which is 
properly the object of its jurisdiction), 
is here adopted in its full extent by 
the common law, and is held to be 
a part of the law of the land.” 

So that, as soon as the Court has ascertained 

.38 



what is the international law on a particular point 
before the Court, it is the bounden duty of the 
Court to administer that part of International Law 
as a part of the law of the land, and hence it is that 
I am submitting to the Court that the word law^ 
in Section 79 should he given that extensive mean- 
ing which the law has hy^ the Common Law of 
England. 

_ _ Tl* next work on which I rely for the purpose 
of the meaning of the word ‘law’, meaning thereby 
that ‘nothing is an offence which is justified by law’, 
is Oppenheim’s International. Law. The question 
is what is law, and it is in support of that that I am 
submitting next Oppenheim’s International Law 
Vol. I, Fifth Edition, page 36, article 21a: 

“In view of this wide divergence of 
doctrine it is necessary to inquire into the 
actual legal position in the principal 
countries in the matter of International Law 
and Municipal Law. 

(1) As regards Great Britain, the following 
points must be noted : 

(a) All such rules of customary International 
Law as are either universally recognised 
or have at any rate received the assent 
of this country are per se part of the 
law of the land. To that extent there 
is still valid in England the Common 
Law doctrine, to which Blackstone gave 
expression in a striking passage, that 
the Law of Nations is part of the law 
of the land. It has repeatedly been 
acted" upon by Courts. Apart from 
isolated obiter dicta it has never been 
denied by judges. The unshaken con- 
tinuity of its observance suffered | a 



reverse as the result' of the dicta of 
some judges in The Franconia Case in 
1876,- but West Rand Central Gold 
Mining Co, v. The King decided in 1905, 
must be regarded as a reaj&rniation of 
the classical doctrine,’' 

So that, ever since the time of Blackstone, 
until the last edition of Oppenheim, which belongs to 
the year 1937, there has never been any question that 
on any issue in which the doctrine of international 
law is accepted to be the international iM?*, it becomes 
apart of the law of the land, law of the land in Eng- 
land, and law of the land here. 

Next, I call attention to the work of an 
American Jurist Hershey on International Public Law 
and Organization, page 14, 1927 Edition : 

*Tnternational Law is a part of our law, and 
must be ascertamed and admitted by the 
Court of Justice of appropriate jurisdiction 
as often as questions of rlglit depending 
upon it are duly presented for their deter- . 
mination. For this purpose, where there 
is no treaty and no controlling executive 
or legislative act or judicial decision, resort 
must he had to the custom and usages of 
civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, 
to the works of jurists and commentators 
who, by years of labour, research, and 
experience, have made themselves peouliariy 
well-acquainted with the subjects of which 
they treat.. Such works are resorted to 
by judicial tribunals, not for the specula- 
tions of their authors concerning what the 
law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence 
of what the law really is.” 

So, you wiir see from this quotation 
which . has come from Justice Gray in the case 

40 



wkich is cited — 195 United States Reports, page 
113 at page 163, that it has been accepted that- 
while administering justice it is your bounden duty to 
find out, recognise and apply the principles of inter- 
national law where a person at your bar seeks justice 
on the ground that the act with which he is claarged 
is an act justified by law and that for the purpose of 
- ascertaining it you may have resort as it is stated By 
the learned Judge himself to “the usages and customs 
of civilized nations, and as evidence to this to the work, 
of jurists, commentators, who by years of labours 
research and experience have made themselves 
peculiarly well-acquainted with the subject of which 
they treat.’’ 

Therefore I plead that when the time comes for 
your deliberation you will carefully^ of which I have no 
doubt, and diligently, of which I am p< 3 rfectiy conscious,, 
study and apply your mind to the citations which I 
have already given* and which I am about to give. 
Because according to the weU-accepted canons, the 
commentators who by years of labour, research and 
experience^ have made themselves peculiarly well- 
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat, and 
such worcks are restored to and have to be restored to 
by judicial tribunals. I have got; Sirs, the original 
judgment from which this quotation is given. The 
judgment is reported in 175 United States 
Reports in the judgment at page 700. The 
case is Paquet Habana, Appeals from tlie 
District Coirrts of the United States for 
Southern Districts of Florida. The judgment of 
Mr. Justice Gray on this question is to be found 
at page 700. I do not wish to read it again> 
because I have already read it from the textbook in 
which it js now accepted. At the same time 
I may be pardoned for pressing this point 
upon the ’Court because then the issue before 
this Court becomes exceedingly narrow. If I am 
able to persuade this Court, as I submit I hope to do,. 


41 



ihat in administeriiig the law you ace bound to 
have regard to international law, there will be no diffi- 
eulty wliatever in th^ way of the defence which I am 
presenting. Then the Statute law has made it in- 
cumbent upon you, and in fact has declared that 
nothing is an" offence which is justified by law. 
If therefore the acts which are said to be offences 
are declared not to be offences, and if I am able 
to show that the law so declares them, then it 
will be your duty to declare -that, notwithstanding 
apparent confusion of thought, words like treason 
and so on, will have no value. 

The law of treason in India is codified. 
It is to be found in Chapter VI of the I. P. C, 
(Offences against the State) in Sec. 121 and following 
Sections. Therefore let me caution the Court against 
the general use of words like “treason"’. The 
question is whether my clients who have been charged 
under Sections 121 and 302 have or have not, in doing 
those acts, been justified by law, i. e. the law of 
nations, and if they are so justified the law of this 
country declares that it is not an offence. In other 
words the law of this councry recognises that there 
may be acts which if done in private life for 
private motive might be an offence but which in 
public life or public duty are not an offence. A 
Judge is not liable as an abettor of murder because 

^ he orders a man to be hung, because he is justified 
by law. Similarly and equally, if not more empha- 
tically, the member of an armed force having 
declared war, if during the state of that war he 
has committed acts which in private life might be 
offences, the law says nothing shall be an offence. 
Therefore I do wish in so far as in m^ lies, to press 
this point upon your attention, because the first line of 
argument which I submitted to the Court stands, and 
I submit to the Court that is the law. In other 
words the law is that in the prosecution of war the 
acts which take place are beyond municipal law. But 

1 ^ ' ' ■ 

42 



assuming for the purpose of argument I have to take 
my stand on a narrower ground. Then the la%v of this 
country, the Indian Statute Law itself enjoins upon 
you that if I can show justification by means of inter- 
national law for those acts, then my clients are 
entitled to a verdict in their favour. X say this to you 
in the language of one of your greatast poets that if in 
so far as God grants me the tongue of persuasion 
and you the ears of hearing, I have not the 
least doubt that when you have considered the 
cases before you, you will have no difficulty or 
hesitation to decide in my favour on that narrow 
ground. 

The next point to which I wish to call attention 
is Moore’s International Law and Digest, page 2, Vol. 
I, and this is how it is stated : 

It is thus apparent that from the 
beginning the scene in question denoted 
something more than the positive legislation of 
independent States and the term international 
law which has in recent times so generally , 
superseded the earlier titles served to empha- 
size his fact. It denotes a body of obligations 
which is in a sense independent of and superior 
to such legislation. The Government of the 
United States has on various occasions 
announced the principle that international 
law as a system is binding upon nations, not 
merely as somethingo which they may be 
tacitly assumed to agree but also as a funda- 
mental condition for their admission to the 
full and equal participation in the inter- 
^ coui^se of civilised nations. ’’ 

I therefore cannot more emphatically assert than the 
ground on which I appear bef6re the Court and I have 
no doubt that it will rise superior (in the language of 
one^ of the cases that I read) to all question of 
prejudice and come to the right conclusion in con- 


sidering Section 79^ and the immunity granted 
by it. 

Just one more passage to which I wish to call 
attention. It is the judgment of the Privy Council on the 
this question. The last under these heads is a judgment 
of their Lordships of the Privy Council, reported in a 
recent, number, 1939 appeal cases, page 168. There a 
question of international law arose. The name of the 
case is Chang Chi Ohu. It was a case of murder commit- 
ted on a Chinese ship and that is how the question 
arose of the liability of the prisoner to be tried. And 
the question arose to what extent in international law 
it was necessary to consider whether the prisoner was 
liable. The contention shortly stated was that the 
Chinese ship was so much floating Chinese territory. 
That was the claim made under the international law 
Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that under 
international law it is probably not correct to say 
that a floating ship of foreign power is so much, what 
you may call, island foreign territory. But they 
have ruled by reason of the respect accorded 
to conimity of nations, that anything that occurs 
on a foreign ship is not within the authority 
or jurisdiction of municipal law. In this 
particular case what they held was that in as much as 
the ship itself accepted the authority of the power 
which was exercising authority in those waters, they 
held it became an excej)tion. But in considering the 
applicability of international law to the question 
whether or nqt the Court had jurisdiction to try this 
particular Chinaman, the question arose to what extent 
international law has to be considered and the 
judgment of Their Lordships delivered by 
Lord Aitkins is very important from this point of view. 
I would not enter into the question of details which 
arose in that case though by themselves they are 
interesting enough. But I may say this that the 
observations which I propose to read are necessary and 
essential because the whole defence to the charge of 


44 


miirder, and the want of jurisdiction of -the Court, ! 

were based on the ground that under international \ 

law the Court had no jurisdiction and for that purpose j 

the Court went into the question of what was the ! 

appropriate intef national law on the question. Their j 

Lordships said with reference to the necessity of the I 

application, or rather with reference to the obligation | 

to ascertain and apply international law ourselves was 
a part of the law. That is how that part of the case is 
stated. 

Page 167 : “Their Lordships entertain no 
^ doubt that the law is the correct conclusion, 
namely that a ship is nob so much floating 
part of a foreign' territory, but that immunity . 
is granted for whatever happens in that ship 
in so far as jurisdiction is concerned. It more 
accurately and logically represents the 
agreement of nations which constitute interna 
tional law, and alone is consistent with the 
paramount necessity expressed lin general 
terms for each nation to protect itself from 
internal disorder by trying and punishing 
offenders within its boundaries.” 

It must always be^ remembered that in so far as, 
at any rate, the courts of this country are concerned, 
international law has validity in so far as its principles 
are accepted and adopted by domestic law. There is 
no external power that imposes its rules upon our code 
oTsubstantive law or procedure. The Courts achnow- 
iedge the existence of a body of rules which nations 
accept among themselves. On any judical issue they 
^ek to ascertain what the relevent rule is, and having 
found It, they will treat it as incorporated into 

•rt, inconsistent 

■mth the rules enacted by any Statute or finally 
declared by their- tribunals. What then are the 
Hnmunities of public ships of other nations accepted 
by our courts and on what principle ? I say 
that in this particular case not only there is no Statute 


45 


to the contrary, but in fact the Statute imposes that 
obligation, coming back to the action of Section 79, 
viz,, nothing is an offence which is justified by law: 
Therefore what you have got to do, Sirs, is to ascer- 
tain the relevant body of international law^and having 
done so, apply it to what is described as domestic law. 
Therefore there can be no reasonable doubt that in 
the construction and application of Section 79 the 
submission which I have already made on the immu- 
nity of individual members of an armed force fighting 
in a war properly declared, that immunity is a part 
of international law and therefore is a part of national 
law. And I submit that your own experience w^hen- 
ever emergencies of war have arisen should bear 
ample testimony to that position. Each time a soldier 
fights under the orders of a state in a war properly 
declared, if he were to cojisider what would be his 
liabilities, I am afraid the efficiency of war would be 
a very difficult process indeed. It is an assumed part 
of the law of nations that once you become a member 
of a fighting force of a properly qualified State entitled 
to make a war, there is an end of all individual 
liability for the acts which if they were private acts 
for a private purpose might be an offence within the 
law. Though according to my submission the first 
is an essentially correct ground, in any case the justi- 
fication by law is a sure ground on which I stand 
before this Court. Hence I submit that nothing is 
an offence which is justified by law, and I therefore 
say that the acts with which the accused are charged 
before the Court are justified by law, that is to say 
by the international law, and therefore, there can be 
no question of a personal or individual liability. 

This question has been considered in a different 
form or perhaps in different language because I 
wish to point out to you, as you have seen in the 
earlier- works to which I referred, the law of war is 
often described as the law of belligerency. I 
wish to point out to the Court, as I, shall presently 


do, what is the law of belligerency ; in other words,, 
who are entitled to be treated as belligerents in the 
light of international, and what I may call,, 
immicipal or domestic law. 

For that purpose I wish to call attention to the 
authorities which clearly show where and how the 
law of belligerency rests. I agaixi refer you to 
Oppenheim on International Law, 1944 edition, VoL 
li : he was professor of international law at Cambridge 
and falls within the description which I gave of men 
w^ho have by their labour and research and ex- 
perience and knowledge, contributed to the formulation 
of international law on many questions. The present 
question is dealt with on page 200— Article 76 A : 

' Recognition of belligerents by other states 
is not as a rule binding upon the State. 
Notwithstanding such recognition, it is 
entitled to treat the insurgents as traitors ; 
but the position is controversial with regard 
to recognition as a belligerent power granted 
to separate armies which comprise subjects 
of the enemy who are fightmg to free 
their nation from this rule and which are 
responsible to an authority recognised as 
representing the nation in question,” 

That rea lly epitomises the whole of the issue — 
but the position is controversial with regard to the 
recognition as a belligerent power granted to separate- 
armies which comprise subjects of the enemy who are- 
fighting to free their nation from this role and which 
are res;^nsible to an authority recognised as^ 
representing the nation in question . ” 

To translate it according to law, the accused 
before you were members of an army responsible to 
the Provirional Government of Free India, fighting 
to liberate themselves from the rule of the army of 


those who were fighting against them, and I submit 
that is precisely the ease before us. The author - goes 
on and gives instances of cases of that kind, and I 
want to draw your particular attention to those histo- 
rical instances which fortunately have occurred before, 
so that I stand before you on much more solid’ 
ground than if this were perhaps actually the first 
instance: 

“Thus, in the year 1918, during the world war. 
Great Britain, France, Italy and the United 
States of America recognised Czecho- Slovaks 
as co-belligerents. Similar recognition was 
granted in the year 1917 to the Polish 
National Army, com;^osed to ' a 
substantial degree of the subjects of the 
enemy powers. It has been maintained that 
a.s in the case of insurgents in a civil war — 

(quotaticns of which I have already given) 

the enemy is entitled to disregard such 
recognition and treat the members of the 
insurgent army when they fall into his hands, 

in accordance *with the provisions of the 
criminal law. The better opinion is probably 
that when such recognition is granted by 
an adversary to large bodies of men 
effectively organised on foreign soil in 
anticipation of independent nationhood, 
point is reached at which ■ the belligerent’ 
confronted with disaffection and 
desertion of a considerable number of his 
subjects engaged in hostilities against him, 
can no longer, without exposing himself 
to justifiable retaliation, aasert the 
provisions of his own crimina law as the 
only legally relevant element in the 
situation.” 

I want to draw your attention -pointedly to 
the conations which are here laid down and which, 


48 



n amply fulfilled, 
that is the better 
t^e reached a stage 
ration given by 
merely men were 
mu- u V ® regularly 

inis nas .been amply proved by the 
to them for that. They have 

was a regular army, a 

army oa foreign soil it is ^ true 

qualification in my favour, that 
army was 
s, even a 
women 
and 
Gov- 
countryi— 

none the less the 

you may at your peril call 

0 * the country against such 
. , ^ r” foreign 

independent hatiophodd. 
■and that IS why I rea;d the Broclamation 
dread It with a view to show to you 
, —a which on foreign soil an inde- 
government was formed was with the object 
ir country : It was undoubtedly 
. , Independent statehood; and of 
independent state had been established 

1 prosecution of force, as I said. 

would not have'; been there, to try 
it yas., done in antici- 

noint , does not detract 

point, that a stage.., is reached in which a 

d with the disaffection and deser 

a considerable number of his subjects engaged 

against him, can, no longer assert the 

own criminal law as the only leffallv 
4 -u 1 „ r““ situation. In other word« 

-the legally relevant element in this’ sitna^i i. S 


Opinion, and I do say 
ar in advance of 
Oppenheim. In this 
effectively organised, 
organised army. T.' 

Prosecution — thanks 1 
amply proved that there 
properly organised ar: 
but with this added 

Indians residing in places where the t 
““«^^ering not a few hundreds, 
fnd two million men and' 

and children, through 2,30,000 adult men 

allegiance to that Provisional 
ernment, for the purpose of liberating their 
vvhiey unfortunately failed, but 
condition required that yc; ' 

to aid the criminal law of 

an organisation— effectively organised on 
•soil in anticipation of ‘ ' 

It is true- ’ 
to this court — I ^ 
that the object with 
pendent 

of liberation of thei 
in anticipation of 
-course if the 
by the successful 
this tribunal 
them. It was because 
Ration, which failed, 
from the point, that . 
belligerent confronted 
tion of 
in hostilities 
provisions of his 
relevant element 





we, meaning the tyro armies, had reached a stage 
where, having reached a stage of war — there can be 
no question at all that under Section ,79 we 
are entitled to the justification which the laws of war 
give to belligerent armies. And that no acts done 
during the course of the prosecution of the war are 
matters of what you may call domestic law, pure 
and simple ; which would be as if any one of these 
three accused went and did any of these acts 
out of private motive. Therefore* it is essential to 
remember that in aU these cases the substance of the 
law is this : two independent states can always make 
war and the member#of their combatant forces are 
unanswerable for their acts. Only the question arises, 
or the intermediate stage arises, whether without 
having reached the stage of independent statehood 
(to take the words of Oppenheimj you have attuned 
a stage, and whether having founded a state 
for the purpose of liberating your own country, 
you are so organised, both the state and the army, 
that it assumes the proportions of a state and as a 
result of the war — as much a war between two 
independent states. I ain pleading befdre you that we 
have proved before this court, and the documents which 
otherwise we would not have had the benefit of and 
have generously been produced by the prosecution 
all of them distinctly arid clearly showed that 
we had reached that stage and this court would not 
only he justified, but, I submit, bound in law , and in 
conscience to regard the accus^ as. belonging to 
that organisation, and as member of such' a belligerent 
army they 'We entitled to all the privileges of the 
laws of war/ Iri other words, immunity for per- 
sonal acts carcded out in due prosecution of fehe 
war, as you yourself ^iri your, own person would 
claim.* ^ 

. , The next hook to which 1 would call attention 
is the British Year Book of International Law, 1937, 

'Vcf ,^'5.!. 



cill ^elllgererit rfec0gnltion is ixot .>’* 
so miich recognition, even temporary and 
provisionai, of a new government, as the 
recognition of the existence of a war/' 

I may explain what is meant here, because 
the recognition comes as a stage when it has not 
yet succeeded in establishing its own government. Of 
course, if for instance perchance this very army had suc- 
ceeded in its aim, as the maxim of international law is, 
the successful revolution is the government estab- 
lished by law. But earlier than that there is the 
stage at which it is in a state of Vaf and that is all that 
is necessary for the purposes of my case. If 
I can establish that they were making war, which is 
regarded as a stage of belligerency by international 
law, they are entitled to the same privileges and 
immunities as would be accorded to the armies of 
two independent nations. It continues: 

^‘The existence of war is purely a question of 
fact; but if we recognise the fact that a war is 
being carried on, then the recognition of the 
insurgent ^ government follow^ as a necessary 
consequence. Wars can only be carried on by 
governments, and there must be at least two 
parties to every war. , Much of the confusion 
which obscures the current discussion of the 
Spanish problem arises from the failure to 
observe this correct logical consequence. The 
true doctrine is that recognition of the insur- 
gent government is the necessary and logical 
consequence of recognising the fact of war.” 

Therefore I submit that once you recognise, 
as I submit this court is bound to do on the evidence 
before it, that there was a regular properly declare 
and properly prosecuted war, then I submit there 
can be no question that the apfs of these men, ^ done 
in due prosecution of that war, are completely justified 
by international ' law and thhrbfore by law. 




I 


The instances are given in the Year Book of 
International Law* This is what it says : 

^‘Lest this should seem to be merely doctri- 
naire, that is the kind of criticism with which 
we people are sometimes apt to run away, — 
and theoretical opinion, I shall try to fortify 
my doctrine by authority. In 1828 Don 
Miguel, the Pretender to the throne of 
Portugal was carrying on war by sea and land 
against his niece and nominal fiancee the 
child-Queen Donna Maria, who was recog- 
nised by Great Britain and other powers as 
the legitimate sovereign of Portugal. At no 
time during the struggle was Don Miguel ever 
recognised by Great Britain under any form 
dejureoT de facto. In 1828 he proclaimed 
naval blockades of Oporto and of the Azores, 
These blockades were notified to the British 
Government which published the notices in 
the London Gazette and communicated them 
to the committee of Lloyd’s. The King’s 
Advocate Sir Herbert Jenner advised the 
British Government that the blockades, if 
effectively maintained, might be recognised 
as valid, although no form of recognition had 
at any time been conceded to Don Miguel.” 

In other words the distinction that is sought to 
be made is that you may recognise the state of 
belligerency without necessarily recognising the 
State. 

Refusal to recognise the blockade, so Jenner 
advised, woulld be a departure from tfie neutrality 
which this country had professed in the civil war. 
Twenty ye&s later the Palmerston Government, 
following the advice of Sir John Dodson-fand I hope 
the Judge Advocate will advise you accordingly — ^then 
the Queen’s' Advocate decided to recognise the 



blockade of Trieste by the Italian insurgents during 
the Kevolution of 1848, although iheife h^ been no 
other act of recognition of the insurgent government.' 

The point I am trying to emphasize is this 
that you need not necessarily recognise your opponent 
as a government, and yet during the course of the 
war, once you recognise that it was a proper state of 
belligerency, then the immunities and privileges which 
I described before foUow, because the men, and in 
modem times the women, who are fighting for the 
insurgent government are recognised for the purpose 
of these immunities. It goes on : 

^‘Upon the point which we are now discussing Dodson’s 
opinion is very clear. ‘It is sufficient ’ he says ‘ to 
justify a blockade if duly maintained that a de facto 
war is carried on by Sardinia and Venice on one side 
and Austria on the other 

Even more clear is the opinion of a later Queen’s 
Advocate Sir John Harding when advising the 
Government in 1860 upon the question raised by 
Garibaldi’s rebellion. This is perhaps nearer in its 
applieation. This is the quotation from the opinion 
of Harding : ' ^ 

‘Tf Her Majesty’s Government considers that 
a civil war actually exists between the dicta- 
torial Government of Southern Italy and that 
of His Majesty the King of the two Sicilies in 
which Great Britain is to be strictly neutral 
and that the dictatorial government has in 
fact attained (howsoever) an independent and 
sovereign existence and governs de facto a 
portion of the Neapolitan dominions, then Her 
Majesty’s Government may without violating 
or disregarding the law of Nations and with- 
out encouraging piracy, so far recognise the 
acts of this de facto government as to adroit 



the validity of auieffiective blockade^ main- 
tained by k competent naval ( force acting. 
?nhder its orders, for to acquiesce in the cap- 
ture and coiidemna- tion by it of articles of 
contraband of war designed for the use of the 
. ,;Kmg of the two Sicilies/" 

The. belligerency which existed was between 
what you might call the King of Italy and the insurgents, . 
and the advice of Sir John Harding was that if there 
was a de facto war between the two, then the rights 
of .the belligerents should be accepted and acknow^ 
ledged: In other words, supposing they took , as prijse 
of war ships belonging to what you might call the 
constituted .King of Italy, it would still be a perfectly 
good prize. , , 

In the course of the same opinion, Harding^ 
pointed out that Garibaldi and his officers could not* 
possibly be regarded as pirates, since they were carry- 
i.og on war in a regular manner and had been dealt 
with on equal terms by British naval officers. The 
three opinions which I have just cited are those of 
British law officers ranging over the period from 1828 
to 1860. 


Without further multiplying citations, I 
will therefore summarise their effect . by . saying 
that what we recognise in these cases, is the existence 
of war. The recognition of the insurgent , government 
is merely incidental or consequential since a war 
implies the existbnoe of some independent authority 
which carries oh ihe war. .v . 


'T^he' 
attentip%ietto p 
from 

Boreighiip^ir^ary^ 
Hansafd^jdifolijs.t; 


, wen 




debates of ' the 14th April' ^i93i’^^p‘age 1133. This is 
what I have here : 

‘^Ths Leader of the Opposition spoke earlier 
today as though the Government had given something 
np in this case. Of oonrse we have not given anything 
up, because you can never grant belligerent rights to 
one side only ; they must be granted to both sides, if 
they are granted at all.’’ 

Tins issue arose on the question of the Spanish 

war. 

** The Honourable Gentleman remarked that be 
thought that never in history had there been any ques- 
tion of granting belligerent rights early in a dispute. 
As a matter of fact, in the American Civil War we did 
grant belligerent rights within six weeks of the out- 
break of the Civil War 

^‘Mr. Noel Baker said : The Government them- 
selves declared a blockade, which, as all international , 
lawyers will agree, compels them to grant belligerent ' 
rights to both sides.” 

'^r. Eden : We ourselves made, in point of fact/ j 
a declaration of neutrality but of which arose the 
grantifig of belligerent rights ' to both sides. That is 
what we did in the American Civil War. Of course 
that does not stand alone. It is not the only example. 
The Honourable gentleman is probably familiar, I 
think, as I know something of his associations in this ; ’ 
respect,' with the Greek rebellion against Turkey in*' 
1821-25. “ At that time also — remember that in each 
case these were insurgents agaijost thdr , p'arehf State 
fighting for their liberation, and it was during the 
course of that struggle that the rights of belligerents 
were granted by Britain. At that time also, belligerent 
right^^^^were' granted, Government 

voiced this opinion ihraw 



tion of the House ; the character of belligerency was 
not so much a principle as a fact that a certain degree 
of force and consistency acquired by any mass of popu- 
lation engaged in war entitled that population to be 
treated as a belligerent and even if this title were ques- 
tionable, rendered in the interest well-understood of 
all civilised nations so to treat them.” 

The position of British politicians and British 
law on the question of the recognition of belligerency 
even as between what I might call the parent state 
and the rebel states has always been recognition of 
belligerency. 

At that time , /JJanning was Foreign Secretary 
of this country and Pr^%sor Philips in his History of 
Europe deals with this very interesting chapter 
of modern Greek independence. He says : 

“Curiously enough as in the affairs of Spain^ 
so now his (Canning’s) attitude was frankly 
based upon the interests of Eagland. The interests of 

Eiigiand in his opinion demanded peace... The 

recognition of the belligerent character of the Greeks 
was necessitated by the impossibility of treating as 
pirates a population of a million souls and of 
bringing within the bounds of civilised war a 
contest which had been marked at the out-set on 
both sides, by disgusting barbaritie-^. 

“Those were both cases in which belligerent 
rights were granted. A third and perhaps, in a 
way, even more remarkable case, was , the revolt 
of the Spanish Ameripan Colonies against the Spanish 
Government,, from which resulted the establishment 
ot the South American independent republics as we 
know them today.” « 

So that you have instances on both sides of the 
line. You have instances where those who rebelled. 


against a State for their own independence ultimatel3r 
succeeded, but while they were in a state of war 
both were recognized as belligerents. ‘ Those others- 
in which they did , not succeed but nonetheless 
during the interval of the struggle, they were botk 
recognized as belligerents. 

“A third, and perhaps, in a way, event 
more remarkable case was the revolt of the 
Spanish American Colonies against the*‘ 
Spanish Government, from which resulted 
the establishment of the South American, 
independent Republics as we know them 
today. In that dispute we recognized the 
rights of the belligerent colonies. 

People were actually revolting against their own 
Government for oheir own freedom, and one need not 
be apologetic in this period of world history to say 
that the subject race may free itself. 

*‘In that dispute we recognized the rights 
of the belligerent colonies long before we 
recognised them in any otehr way, and, when. 

I heard the Right Hon. Gentlemen below the 
Gangway speaking earlier’ this afternoon, I 
bethought me that he might well have 
remembered the enthusiasm shown by the 
Liberal Party of that day for those new 
Sta|;es across the Atlantic to whom we 
accorded belligerent rights, though they were 
rebels against their own mother country.” 

Sir, I say that I could not quote a stronger authority 
for your adoption than the action of the British 
Governme.nt as stated authoritatively by the Foreign 
Secretary of Britain and I would like to read it again. 
11 order that I may not miss the point : 

“I bethought me that he might well have 
remembered the enthu 4 asm shown by the 


Liberal Party of that day for' those new 
States across the Atlantic to whom we 
accorded belligerent rights, though they were 
. rebels against their own mother country,” 

And I say that the same point arises - for you. 
It is true that those who fought were rebels from the 
point of view of constitutional law as against their 
own King — and later on I will come to the question 
of allegiance — it will be my duty to analyze before 
you what that means, though it is irrelevant to 
the issue as I shall point out. The very fact 
that those colonies were fighting against their 
mather country as it is called, shows that at 
that time there was what you may call ‘legal 
allegiance’, but legal allegianee cannot be a matter 
of perpetuity because if it becomes a matter of 
perpetuity no subject race will ever attain freedom. 
For the moment, the point with which we are 
concerned is merely this : that while in a state of 
belligerency Britain recognized the rebels as proper 
belligerents, those who were fighting against their 
mother country, and if that belligerency is recog- ' 
nized, I venture , to submit it will be far too much 
to ask this Court to refuse it to this Provisional 
Government of Free India and the Armies fighting 
under them. Mr. Eden goes on — because he wanted 
to make the point that the State will be recog- 
nized not only when it comes into existence, but while 
.still the struggle goes on. Now I read ; 

“What I wish to deduce from these three 
examples is that the natural thing, ” 

mark the words— 

when a struggle has reached the 

large dimensions of the present war in Spain, 
would have been to recognise its belligerent 
character, and for States whose maritime - 


interests are involved, as^ TO are, to grant 
belligerent rights to both sides.” 

In other words, as he put it before, it is 
essentially a matter of fact. If we 6nd that the 
struggle, — call it rebeUioh, call it insurgence, call it 
what you like, — ^has reached * such proportions that 
you cannot control it by normal means, then you 
must recognize that it is a state of war, and once 
you recognize that it is a state of war, those who 
fight in |)ttrsuance of the declaration of war and in 
prosecution of it are entitled io all the rights of 
belligerency. Then he goes on : 

^‘That would have been the natural thing 
to do. Recognition of belligerency is, of 
course, quite distinct from recognising anyone 
to whom you gite belligerent rights as being 
the legitimate Government of the country,” 

And that is what I want to impress upon you, 
that if it is asserted on the other side that it is 
required for the purpose of immunity from all acts 
done in due prosecution of the war that the Pro- 
visional Government should have, been recognized 
by Btitain, it is a completely futile argument. In 
fact, the very hypothesis cannot exist. The hypo- 
thesis is this : The rebels as I have called them — 
I do- not mind it — are fighting . for their freedom 
against another country. If they succeed, the Gov- 
ernment will be recognized, but, in the meantime, 
during the course of fighting, the Government wont 
be recognized, but what is recognized is belligerency, 
I shaU presently point out what it involves, 
— ^immunity from all acts done in due prosecution of 
the war. 

‘^Recognition of belligerency is, of course, 
quite distinct from recognising anyone to 


whom you give beiligereut rights as being 
the legitimate Goveniment of the country*” 

It is a fact that the Provisional Government 
was not then and did not become the actual Govern- 
ment of India, but that does not matter at all. 
What are the rights and privileges during the course 
of the struggle, and if I am right in my submission 
to the Court, there can be no doubt that during 
the course of struggle there was only one duty 
owed by men like the accused before you, and that 
is to prosecute that war under the orders of the 
Provisional Government,— and anything that they did 
by way of prosecuting that war gives them complete 
immunity. 

‘‘ It has nothing to do with it. It is a con- 
ception simply concerned with granting 
belligerent rights which are of convenience to 
the donor as much as they am to the re- 
cipients. I will not go into the reasons, but 
for a variety of reasons in the present dispute 
we are not granting belligerent rights.” 

So that you have here • recognition of an 
adoption of the principle supported by precedents as 
stated by ^the Foreign Secretary of that day. 

Then there is a quotation from Mr. ChurchiU^s 
speech during the course of the same discussion to 
which I wish to call your attention. That is on the 
14th of April 1937, page 1068 : 

‘^When I hear my Right Hon. friend 
opposite speak of rebels, I must remind him 
that, sitting there as he does in the seat of 
the Whigs,* he is departing from Whig 
principles. The sacred right of rebellion was 
one of their first doctrines. In regard to ' 


liberal statesmen, there the Bight Hon. 
Oentleman sits, the successor to Mr.Gla dstone, 
striving to uphold the great principles for 
which his party stands* But what 
was Mr. Gladstone’s record ? He was a 
strong supporter of rebels. He was |t strong 
supporter of the rebels in the war of Ameri- 
can secession. There, we had a civil war in 
which the rebels were not only rebels but 
slave owners. Mr. Gladstone went about 
the country, and in a famous speech either 
at Hew castle or Hull, proclaimed that the 
Confederate States the Southern States) 
had not only founded an army, but that they 
had founded a navy, they had founded a 
Government, and more than that, they had 
founded a nation. (An Hon. Member: 

‘‘ He was a Tory then . ”) He was not a Tory 
then. Therefore, before one takes the view 
that rebels are like mad dogs to be put 
down and shot at sight, we should remem- 
ber these things. ” 

In other words, in that debate the Government 
of the day in England recognized that while a rebel- 
lion may or may not be • successful, while it has 
attained a stage of war, you must recognize and give 
immunity to those people who fight on either side, for 
what justification is there on the part of one set of 
them to fight and claim immunity as against the other 
side? If the I. H. A. shot, I dare say the British Indian 
Army equally shot from the other side. The justification 
is equal in both cases in so far as this particular 
struggle is concerned. Mr. Churchill goes on : 

“If we search the history of the nineteenth 
■century we shall find many cases where 
British Government have actually ^espoused 
the cause of rebels. The Hon. ' Member 
(Mr. Maxton), the leader of '' the 


61 


‘ Clydeside party, with his customary candour 
9,nd frankness, made no bones about 
supporting rebels. He declared that the 
question was whether or not they were 
rebelling for the thing you wanted.”" 

I am quite certain that we have proved to the 
hilt that they were rebelling for a thing they w^anted 
which is fully approved of by any civilised humea 
being. There cannot be two dijfferent laws for two 
different sets of people. ‘‘Every one will support 
rebels who are fighting for the things of which they 
approve and they will criticise the Government w^hich 
is for the things which they dislike. 'Therefore do ant 
let us have too much of an attempt to make out thar 
the Government in Spain have all the right on their 
side and fche rebels none.” 

The Court will appreciate that I am pleading 
for a very limited right. I am not here before this 
Court on the question of the recognition or non-recog- 
nition of the unfortunate failure of the Provisional 
Government to obtain the independence of India. 
That is not the issue. There is a very narrow issue. 
It is this. While they were fighting and struggling, 
were they or were they not entitled to the rights of 
belligerents. 

Mr. Churchill goes on : “Therefore do not let 
us have too much of an attempt to make out that the 
Government in Spain have all the right on their side 
and the rebels none. It is one of the most evenly 
balaifced struggles and one of the most unpleasant and 
certainly it is the least cause for us to espouse. Tf we 
were to take the course which is recommended by the 
Right Honourable gentleman and to break the blockade, 
if we throw the might of the British Navy into the 
scale, could he guarantee or could he be sure " that we 
might not provoke that very alignment and crystalisa- 
tion in Europe along those unnatural and idiotic — ^per» 


haps I had better say ideological — ^lines which it is our 
whole message and mission 'to rupture, or least to 
avoid.” So that Sir, even up to the very last war, 
up to the year 1937, just on the eve of the last war, it 
is perfectly obvious that^ a distinction has been 
maintained, a distinction which I cannot too often 
insist upon between a state of belligerency which may 
be recognised and the rights accorded" without the 
ultimate success of those who fought for the cause 
for \Yhich they could fight. They may fail but none 
the less in the interval they are entitled to the rights, 
of beliiger- ency. 

Then, Sirs, there is a further point and I tell 
the Court that it is a question of fact. This Court 
should find that this Provisional Government had ceded 
to it the territories which I have described. But while 
insisting on that finding of fact, because we submit 
that it was a fact, I wish to point out to you that 
from the point of view of belligerency it is quite un- 
necessary that the particular Government for the time 
being need have any territory in its possession at all, 
and for that purpose, I wish to give you illustrations 
in history. Take Belgium in the last war and all the 
emigre Governments residing in London during the last 
but on€f war and the last war. What were those* 
emigre Governments ? Not an inch of territory which 
they could call their own at that time and yet who 
ventures to say before this Court that a member of the- 
Dutch Army or for that matter the Polish or 
^the French or the Yugoslavian Army may not fight 
to liberate its own country and not have the right to 
claim, even if they failed, all the rights and immunities 
as far as their soldiers are concerned of belligerency. I 
think, Sirs, the last war has illustrated more than any 
other that some of these old principles may be overdone 
and that it is quite unnecessary in order that you may 
have a state of war, that country that is fighting a war 
on one side need not necessarily at that" time 
have, what I may call in the comman English 

aa 


•parlance, a local habitation thoiigh it may have a 

name. Many of these emigre Governments were 
deprived of their territory and the fact that they 
'we^e deprived of their territory temporarily, or 
the fact thafthe Indians were deprived of their terri- 
tories for 150 j^ears, makes not the slightest difference 
to the point that we are submitting to the Court. 
What we submit to the Court is this. They were ail 
liberating armies, trying to liberate their country and 
therefore were entitled to the immunities of those who 
'were fighting. The next question before you, Sirs, is 
this. There is no such thing as the law of limitations 
in dealing with nations so that if either the Dutch or 
'the French or anybody else was trying to fight for the 
liberation of their country while having lost their 
territory to the enemy, can it ever be argued in a 
British Court that those who were fighting to liberate 
their country were not fighting a struggle where they 
were entitled to the rights of belligerents. Suppos- 
ing any one of them failed, is it to be said in a British 
Court that they were not fighting a struggle to which 
jail the laws of immunities and privileges of a fighting 
.army exist ? I therefore urge upon you not to take the 
instance that you have before you as any different 
because we happen to be Indians. Remember that. 
*They were trying to liberate their country. I am not 
here to espouse the cause of the Provisional Govern- 
ment. lampleading for men who fought under the 
.orders" of their Government for the liberation of their 
own country. If therefore they were entitled to fight 
I“or their own country for the purpose of liberating 
;their country, I am entitled to tell this Court that 
J}hey are entitled to the privileges of belligerency. 
One more instance on which there was a certain 
.amount of struggle in proving the facts is the case of 
the Maquis in France. Remember the facts. At 
the time when the Maquis were fighting, the de facto 
and the de jure Government in France was Marshal 
Retain’ s Government and the latter were allied 
with Germany, The Maquis were fighting in order 


44 


/ 


f A 



to release France from their own French Government 

which wiis allied .with;: ' Gcriiiany,. ■ and ■ what did 
Eisenhower say? I am going to read that to 
yon because it is a very short document and it; is 
.very imports nt. . . At that, time it ■ was apprehended 
that the Maquis might be dealt .with unjustly by " the' 
then French Government, because it the de "jure 
Government of the time and would shoot as rebels 
very much the same, aS' the Advocate. General will later 
on argue to say about the persons vrho took part in the 
Indian Rational Armj^ But you have the pronounce- 
ment (M no less a person as Field Marshal Eisenhower 
that tnat shall not be. In other words, if persons 
with a view to liberate their Government, fight 
against their own Government, they are entitled to the 
rights of belligerents. That was the reason w^hy I was 
very anxious that I should be able to prove that 
statement. Sirs, this is the statement which has been 
proved and I may incidentally agree to what my learned 
iriend insisted upon that I should put in also the 
Ge:^an view of the matter. If he prefers that it is his 
look^ out. I do not. I prefer the American and 
the British view. 


•‘ There is conclusive evidence that the German 
forces in France are 

- *1, ol^liged to my honourable friend for say- 

mg that he does not doubt the authenticity of the 
source, meaning that it came from General Eisenhower 

Of course he insisted that 1 should put in the second 

passage and I leave you to judge which of the two you 
should prefer, with the submission that you should 
prefer Eisenhower to General Keitel.) 

“now recruiting members of the French 
resistance group as Franc Tireurs and today 
an announcement issued from SHAEF in the 
name of General Eisenhower makes these 
tour points : • 


1 That the French forces of the interior 
constitute a combatant force commanded 
by General Koeniggand forming an 
integral part of the Allied Expedition- 
ary Forces. 

2. That the French Forces of the interior in the 

Maquis bear arms openly against the 
enemy and are instructed to observe the 
rules of war. They are provided with a 
distinctive emblem and regarded by 
General Eisenhower as an Army under 
his Command. 

3. Reprisals against resistance groups violate 

the rules of war by which Germany 
is bound.” 

This is what I ask you to do: that anything 
done against the members of the Indian National 
Army fighting for their freedom according to 
the rules of war, — submit that any action taken 
against them is a breach of international law. 

4. ‘^Every effort will be made to tr ace the authors 

of any atrocities against members of the 
forces under General Eisenhower’s Com- 
mand. Steps to this end are already 
being taken.” 

Then the rest reads : 

General Eisenhower in a declaration broad- 
' , cast to the B. B. O. tried to legalise the French 
partisans as a fighting force ” 

The question that arose was somewhat delicate 
from a constitutional point of view, because for the 
time being the then French Government was still 
under the thumb of Germany. The people of 


fighting against their 
WWnment_w}nch was pro-Germany were imdoubtedly 
guilty of fighting against their own Government, but 
tlie ground of immunity accorded was that they were 
fighting alongside the allies for the purpose of freeiiw 
1®, ^he distinction, I ask, between th^ 
who fought on the side of, even if we say Japan, 
for the purpose of freeing their own coimtry ? With 
very gr^t respect it is difficult to undferstand any 
distinction. In other words, if the Maquis w^ 
Sw *f privileges and immunities of a good 

?' liberating their own country, I 
treatment ^tn you^ can fail to accord a similar 

Then, I read on ; — 

“ General Eisenhower in a declaration broad- 
cast by the B.B.C. tried to legalise the French 

p^tisans as a fighting force. From respon- 
sible circles in the Wilhelmstrasse the follow- 
* statement has been given out : 

"This attempt by the Allied High Command 

IS unjustified. French partisans revolt 
agaimt the legal French Government and 
violate the French laws, which enforce capital 

punishment for such violatiom// 

Gertnan^^rj”’^ solemnly to adopt what the 

situation. With what face 
CW! aigument be presented to a British 

of the French partisans do not 
be adviSSf argument that is likely to 




'‘The activities of the partisans do not consri- 
tute a regular war conduct but a malicious 
system of ambush fighting against the occupa- 
tion power. Thus the partisans have forfeited 
the right to be treated as regular troops.” 

I submit that the view put forward by General 
Eisenhower is the more correct of the two. But the 
other view clearly shows what I have to establish before 
you in order to claim immunity, namely that it is a 
regular organised army, fighting according to the laws 
of war, and not guilty of any personal atrocity beyond 
and outside merely %hting a regular war, and it is 
fortunate in this case, the first test of its kind, because 
the issue is neat. There is not even a charge of any 
personal atrocity. My submission to the Court is that 
the British, and I mean no empty compliment, civilised 
instinct has recognised that if a struggle for freedom is 
waged, then if it reaches a stage at which there is an 
organised Government and an organised army, it must 
be accorded ail the rights, privileges and immunities of 
a fighting army, and that is what I plead for. 

The question which arises under Section 
of the Indian Penal Code is that by all rules of 
civilised warfare what you claim for yourself you 
must accord to your opponents, even though you may 
have succeeded in defeating them. You are entitled 
to come to your own conclusion on the merits of the 
controversy at issue before you. But the Government 
says this 

''Thepohcy of the Government of India is, 
however, that only these cases will be brought to trial 
where there are serious charges, apart from that of 
waging war against the Edng . ” 

As I said, it is not law and in no manner binds 
you, I must frankly confess that much^ because it 
must not be said that I was trying to take refuge 


behind any executive statements. But the fact 
remaim that behind that statement is almost a reluct- 
ant emission that waging war is in this ease not 
an ottence, or at least seriously treated as an offence, 
iiiat IS perfectly obvious, not because waging war 
per se is not an c derice, but because in the -circum- 
stances 01 tne case, where, with an organised government 
and an organised army, a war was carried on, then 
waging that kind of War is not an offence. I am not 
irir^it-iduals in India collected arms 
and began to figt-t the Government of India, wa<^ia<^ 
war IS not or would not be an offence. But what is 
meant is that waging war, meaning the prosecution of 
war m the circumstances of the case, namely, of the 
Indian National Army under the Provisional Govern- 
ment,— thatis not an offence. But it is a matter 
wliich i want to be judged entirely on the merits of the 
legai and factual submissions which I have made. 

- 1.'^!^® I submit, does not 

arise, but in as much as I have only one address before 
this court I must try and anticipate things and answer 
them,— sometimes it is unjust to one’s self, because one 

may raise more things than the opponent is likelv to 
think of and I may make a present of an argument to 
him— but having regard to the rules of this court I 
am obhged to resort to that course- it cannot ’be 
idped ; otherwise I should have preferred bo have a 
any new point- which may be raised 
0 ^ ray learned friend on the other side. The 
ShTl T^i deal with the issue is this: the cases 
^ ^ ^ and the authoritative works 
which I have quoted to the Court, clearly show 
tJat in judging this ease, no question of allegi- 
ance arises. AU insurgents, while they Tre 

allegiance, and all the books 
hich I have read will be worth nothing if the 
question of allegiance had been raised,— because until 
you successfully throw it off, the prima facie aUegi- 
nee, if 1 may so call it, exists ; and none the less 


wMe it is not sncoessMly thrown off, while it is in that 
ambulatory stage, the rights of fighting and the rights 
<rf war, if it is a properly declared war and a properly 
eondncted war (I will not repeat that qualification 
again, you will assume it from me that when I talk of 
the rights, of war I am talking of a properly declared 
war and a properly prosecuted war as to which I have 
made my submission) — ^in such a ease ex hypothesi 
lie allegiance exists. The rebels want to throw off 
the foreign yoke, and the result is that undoubtedly 
if the question of allegiance arose or had ever 
arisen, no grant of immunity to insurgents fighting 
for liberty against the parent State would 
bme ever arisen ; but the fact remains that 
notwithstanding the fact of allegiance remaining, the 
right and freedom to liberate their own country being 
recognised at the same time, it is given effect to by 
recognising belligerency; that is to say, when an 
organised force is fighting under an organised govern- 
ment for its own freedom, while they have not compl- 
etely succeeded and token allegiance remains, they are 
still entitled to fight. That is recognised by the law 
of nations. But should such a question ever be 
raised by my learned friend — ^which I submit is irrele- 
vant— I have important submissions to make. First, 
that on the events which took place at Farrer^ Park 
on 17th February, there was no allegiance left and 
hence it is very important that I try to concentrate 
my attention on what occured at that meeting. 

The fach, which probably may remain unnoticed, 
but which was most important, was that the British 
officers and British other ranks were separated from 
IiMian officers and Indian ranks. It is an extremely 
important fact to remember, in order to be able to 
appreciate the events and the occurrences of that day. 
They having been separated, the Indian officers and 
ranks, numbering an 3 ijhmg between 30,000 to 45,000, 
were all asked to assemble at Farrer Park. — 
Colonel Hunt made a short statement or speech, saying 


that he was handing them over on behalf of the 
British Go^' nment to the representative of the Japa- 
nese Government, Colonel Fnjiwara. Colonel Fujiwara 
then made a speech in Japanese which, as the evidence 
now shows, was translated both in English and in 
Hindustani ; and the statement of CoL Fnjiwara 
amounted to this— using my own language — that those 
of the Indian prisoners of war who wanted to join an 
army for the purpose of liberation of their own country 
were free to do so, and handed them over to Captain 
Mohan Singh. Captain Mohan Singh then addressed 
them saying that he was prepared to organise the 
Indian National Army for the purpose of fighting for 
the liberation of India ; and we had the evidence — 
uncontradicted — that he was acclaimed by the whole of 
the Indian prisoners of war present- I wish even at the 
risk of repetition to submit that when an insurgent fights 
against the then constituted government to free Ms 
own people and his own country from the alien, the 
question of allegiance does not arise. I want 
in that connection to take the statement of Captain 
Arshad — it is a most emphatic statement he made. 

** We believed that the only allegiance we owe is 
allegiance to our country.’’ I cannot describe 
better than dn his words the result of that day’s 
proceedings. 

That brings me up to a somewhat difficult 
subject like the case of any subject people, in 
particular India. All of you are aware that every 
charge of treason in England is a charge of working 
against the King and the country. The last one is the 
reported ease of John Amery. In the situation in 
which an Indian finds himself, the question is under 
what circumstances and to what extent this question 
of allegiance can be raised at all, . because once you 
divide the King from the country, it becomes a very 
difficult issue altogether for any human being to decide, 
and hence I would prefer to rest my argument on the 


31 


©ccuErendes of 17th February. The position of 
an Indian in a case of this kind is difficult and I am 
going to submit to the Court on first principles what 
its true solution is. Where the King and the country 
coincide there is no question of an alternative. If you 
ight against the King and also fight against the 
interest of your own country, the question does not 
arise, but the question does arise where there is a fight 
for freedom, and I propose to read passages to show 
to what extent the world has progressed in the matter 
of the recQgHition of human rights. When you are 
nominally fighting against the King but really fighting 
to liberate the countr}^ then the point is whether the 
question of allegiance can arise at all. Unless you sell 
your own soul, how can you ever say that wdien you 
are fighting to liberate your own country, there is some 
other allegiance which prevents you from so doing. 
That means that if that happens there is nothing but- 
permanent slavery. 

Therefore it is that I submit that in the cir- 
cumstances of this case a choice was presented by the 
force of circumstances to those prisoners of war who 
were ‘surrendered by Britain. — I do not say wrongly — 
because there are reverses in the forbunes of war. Who 
am I to say whether it is rightly or wrongly done 1 
At the same time you cannot disregard this most 
important fact that for the time being by reason of the- 
exigencies of the war Britain found itself unable to give 
any protection to her soldiers to fight for bhe country 
and that being so , they found themselves in a very 
unenviable position. - My learned friend may say : ' you 
ought to have remained prisoners of war,’ and he ma}^ 
argue that they may do anything under the circumst- 
ances short of making Avar. I concede that proposition 
where allegiance to the King and country coincide, but 
where the two do jiot coincide, a different situation 
arises altogether. My learned friend may say that 
they were fighting on behalf of a puppet Government 
or they allowed themselves to be used as stooges of the 


Japanese. Even accepting this somewhat unenviable 
egression of stooges or otherwise, the question is one 
of fact, namely, whether or not it was a regiilax' army 
honestly believing that H is fighting for the’ freedom of 
its country. question of a bad name that may be 
given has really no relevancy to the legal issue but 
in as much as a great deal of dirt has been thrown by 
expressions of this character- — ^puppet Government and 
words to that effect — and the question 
of the strength of that army may be raised, it is my 
duty to tell the Court how the evidence stands 
on record. The evidence that stands on record 
is that the No, 1 I. N. A. was formed and 
was dissolved in December. I shall forget 
that for the purposes of this case, because waging 
war which is the subject of the argument, applies to 
what you might call I.N.A. No. 2. I have attempted to- 
ixrove and I have established that the I. N. A. though 
small in numbers, w^as fighting as allies of the Japanese 
Arni}^ and there is no ignominy in admitting that or 
in doing that, b^, cause the objective at that time of 
both the armies was undoubtedly to free India from 
Britain. The objective was no more and no less than 
that of the allies in fighting to free France or Belgium 
or any ocher country, and if ifi that process there was 
a unified command or a single strategy, you, Sirs, will 
not say with your knowledge of military affairs that 
that makes one army the stooge of the other. It is a 
phrase with which my learned friend will not be able 
to walk away if he uses it, and that is why 
1 want to tie his legs, if. I can. If the British and the 
American Armies fought under the command of General 
Eisenhower, Britain may not be called the stooge of 
the Americans, and 1 hope my learned friend will not 
descend to tlu^ level of calling the I. N. A. stooges of 
the Japanese. The evidence given by Lt. Nag is 
^^ery impcrtanp from this point of view. He "was 
extremely prolific in the results and he came to prove 
at the instance of the Prosecution that there was a 
very organised regular army, and that a big war was 

. 3 ^ 


foHgtt. My^ is tliat he was hoisted with 

his own petard. * If he proved that a regular war was 
fonght, that is precisely my defence. He was qualified 
to speak abont it. He was legal adviser of the I. N. A. 
and he told this Court in effect — I am quoting his 
words— that the two armies fought as Allies. Whether 
the alliance was right or wrong is not before this 
Court. The only thing that is before this Court is 
whether or not this army fonght as an organised army. 
My learned friend will not be able to support any 
allegation that they fought for any other objective 
except the liberation of India. If an allegation of 
that kind is made, it is a false allegation, and we have 
given a complete' lie to it. The pipsecution witnesses 
from beginning zo end admitted that the object of the 
I. N. A. was to fight for the liberation of India, and 
every one, whether volunteer or non- volunteer, willing 
or unwilling, has admitted that they had no other 
objective except the liberation of their own country. 
That being so, my submission to the Court is that 
in so far as any allegation is made t© the contrary it 
is only put forward as a point of prejudice, and I had 
to meet it with a view to remove the prejudice, be- 
cause as I said it is not in human hands to choose your 
allies under the circumstances which may be forced upon 
you. And whether you fight with the aid of X, Y or 
Z for the purpose of liberation of your own country, 
the fact that Y was otherwise a bad person has got 
nothing to do with the case. But in all human discu- 
ssions there is always an argument at a tangent ; many 
human minds confuse the issue, and hence it is that I 
have attempted to cross-examine, at all events in the 
briefest possible way, to make this point clear. The 
point that I tried to bring out was that the I.N.A. was, 
though small, a very organised army, inspired by the 
best of motives, and fought for that purpose, though 
unsuccessful for the time being. 

There is one other thing which I ought to have 
mentioned and I regret I omitted it while I was talking 

74 


on the jSrst issue. That was with reference to the 
Minister sent by Japan to the Government of Azad 
Hind. I ought to have stated earlier, because the 
points which I have mentioned were proclamation,- 
recognition, declaration of war, followed by possession 
of territory, and also the Minister of the Nippon 
Government accredited to this Government. The last 
is not essential, but still in point of fact it was alleged, 
and I will state how the facts stand under that head. 
The fact is that a Minister was sent in fact. No less 
a person than Mr. Sawada of the Foreign Office told 
the Court that it was decided to send a Minister to the 
Provisional Government of Azad Hind, while he was 
the Vice-Foreign Minister and he was competent to 
speak about their decision, that a Minister in fact was 
sent. As it happened he came without letters of credit 
or his credentials, and as if it mattered the whole argu- 
ment was to show that a Minister ceases to exist 
because he did not bring the papers. Supposing one 
of you, Sirs, sent me your agent, and I choose 
not to demand from him his letter of authority 
and I accept him, it is a most extraordinary 
argument that the agent ceases to exist. That 
is a sort of logic which my learned friend wishes 
to apply to this case. But a good reason was given 
founded on diplomatic practice which you should 
accept. The evidence says that being a Provisional 
Government, in accordance with the dignity of nations, 
or comity of natioAs, no credentials are required. In 
other words, the important point is whether the man 
came^and was recognized by the person for whom he 
-was intended. During the evidence, my learned 
j&iend got an answer from one of the witnesses 
to the effect that the head of the State, Netaji 
Subhas Chandra Bose, did not receive him. But 
there is further evidence which realy destroys 
any other points on this question: Thereafter 
(Credentials were asked for, the head of the State 
according to his conception required it, and yon 
have the evidence that credentials were prepared and 


that they were signed by the Japanese Emperor and 
were despatched but under the then conditions of war 
they did not reach. But because the Japanese Minister 
was duly accredited I submit it is a reinforcing 
' argument in my favour. When he came, the two- 
Grovernments-— meaning tthe Provisional Government 
of Azad Hind and the J apanese Government — took a 
different view of what you may call diplomatic practice, 
but that does not affect the issue. The sending. 
Government in the end, when so required, actually sent 
letters of credit, and the fact that it reached or did not 
reach does not affect the issue; at all events it comple- 
tely cured such defect or deficiency as there was in the 
procedure. And in point of fact I ask the Court to hold 
that there was a duly appointed Minister, which is all 
that arises here. The reason why we brought in the- 
evidence was among other things that the Provisional 
Government of Azad Hind was a properly organ- 
ized Government, and accepted, and the accept- 
ance does nob require necessarily the sending 
of an envoy, or an ambassador, or a Minister,, 
or whatever the position or the relation between the 
Governments may be. 

What is it that the I.N.A. embarked upon 
in collaboration with the Japanese? According to 
their agreement which I submit I have proved, any 
part of Indian territory w'hich may be liberated would 
be immediately handed over to the l.H. A. If 
you, as men of affairs, understand things rightly, it 
is the only thing to do. Where is the question of 
being an instrument. If, however, there was any 
instrument, it was the Japanese, because it is they 
who were assisting in liberating India, with a view 
that the liberated parts of India would be handed 
back to the I.H.A. The facts of the case are, 
that the two proclamations were issued by the 
representatives of both the Governments — Gen. 
Kawabe on behalf of the Japanese Government and 
Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose on behalf of his Govern- 


ment. You may say nobody fights a philanthropic war. 
But whether or not it was philanthropic remains to 
be seen. I can well understand, and I submit it 
for your consideration, that Japan as indeed one 
of the witnesses said, that the East would be 
better protected by a free India or that they might 
have better prospects of trade which is their only 
means of maintaining their standard of life, which 
incidentally is also the means of Britain. It was not 
a philanthropic war at all. So far as the freedom 
of India was concerned, it was, I submit, the object 
of that war, and you have it in evidence on oath 
before the Court. It may well be, I presume it was, 
that a free India might better be able to assist by 
means of trade and otherwise to enable the Japanese 
to maintain their high standard of life. Therefore it 
is idle, unless people appreciate the true issue for them, 
to say that unless you conquered territory there call 
be no other object in assisting in getting its freedom. 
It is that idle argument which I wish to meet before 
this Court. But we are not left to speculation. My 
learned friend cross-examined one of the witnesses. 
He said, Oh, yes, you are assisting the Indian National 
Army with a view to attain your Japanese war aims, 
a.nd he thought he had got away with it. But when 
we asked what were the war aims, then I am afraid 
all this cross-examination fell to the ground He said 
it was with a view to assist war aims which was to free 
India. There may be many who doubt promises in 
this country but I am not one of them. I am one 
who looks on the brighter side of life and believe that 
if Inma could be freed in that way, why honest men 
should not believe it, it is difficult to understand. The 
question before the Court shortly is this. What were the 
relations between the I. N. A. and the Japanese Army, 
ihat is the short point. It is a point of prejudice and 
yet It IS my duty in defence of the honour of those 
whom I am defending and the group to which they 
belong that they were not the stooges of the Japanese, 
as oheaplv might be said by the opponents. That 

t7 



We hold these truths to be self-evident, that 
all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain inali- 
enable rights ; that mong these are life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness ” — (and 
here I would like to point out that the recent 


is the short history of the position of the I. N. A. vis- 
a-vis the Japanese Army. 


I was speaking about the quality of allegiance, 
and I submitted to the Court that in a case 
of this kind where you have got to administer 
the law as a matter of justice, equity and 
good conscience, you may have a case where the 
country and the King do not coincide and w''here 
there is an imposed allegiance on a subject people 2 ^>nd 
I am not talking merely as a matter of theory. I am 
going to give you an instance of a case of this kind 
which has occurred in the days when the British Com- 
monwealth was called the British Empire ; and the 
statement that I wish to read is the Declaration of 
Independence by the United States of America on the 
Declaration of war and before they had attained any 
statehood, as it is called in the cases which I. have 
given. I am reading from a book called Speeches 
and Documents on Colonial Policy edited by Keith 
and published by the Oxford University Press in 
London. It is at page 70. It says : 


“ When in the course of human events, it be- 
comes necessary for one people to dissolve 
the political bonds which have con- 
nected them with another, and to assume, 
among the powers of the earth the separate 
and equal station to which the laws of nature 
and of nature’s God entitled them, a decent 
respect to the opinions of mankind requires 
that they should declare the causes which 
impel them to the separation. 


proiioiiiiceiBeiit, of Mr, Ttuvmn aad .of ^ ,, 

Chiiroliill ate to the same effect) — 

** that, to secure these rights, governments are 
instituted among men, deriving their ^|ust 
powers from the consent of the govemed, that, 
whenever any form of government beconms 
destructive of these ends, it is the right of the 
people to alter -'Or to abolish it, and to 
institute new government, laying it| 
foundation on such piinciples, and 
organizing its powers in such form, as to 
them shall seem most likely to effect them 
safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, 
will dictate that governments long establish- 
ed should not be changed for light and 
transient causes ; and accordingly all ex- 
perience hath shown, that mankind are more 
ksposed to suffer while evils are sufferable, 
than to right themselves by abolishing the 
forms to which they are accustomed. But, 
when a long train of abuses and usurpations, 
pursuing invariably the same object, evinces 
a sign to reduce them under absolute des- 
potism, it is their right, it is their duty, to 
throw off such government and to provide 
new guards for their future security. ^ ?^ch 
has been the patient sufferrance of these 
colonies, and such is now the necessity which 
constrains them to alter their former systems 
of govermnent. The history of the present 
King of Great Britain is a history of repeated 
injuries and usurpations, all having, in direct 
object, the establishment of an abolute 
tyranny over these estates, To prove this; 
let facts he submitted to a candid world ; ’ — 

(Then they cite the grievances— I will not 
read them all. ). Then the statement says . 

'' Nor have we been wanting in attention to 
our British brethren. We have warned them. 


from time to time, of attempts made by their 
legislature te extend an. nnwarrantabie juris- 
diction over us. We have reminded them 
of the circumstances of our emigration - and 
settlement here. We have appealed to their 
native justice and magnanimity, and we have 
conjured them, by the ties of our common 
kindred, to disavow these usurpations, which 
would inevitably interrupt oxir connections 
and correspondence. They too have been 
deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguin- 
ity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the 
necessity which denounces our separation, 
and hold them, as we hold the rest of 
mankind, enemies in war, —in peace, friends. 
We, therefore the representatives of the 
United States of America, in General Congress 
assembled, appealing to the Supreme 
Judge of the World for the rectitude of 
our intent ions, do, in the name and 
by the authority of the good people 
or thess colonies, solemnly publish and 
declare and this is the. ^mint ) — 
That these United Colonies are, and of 
right ought to be, Free and Independent 
States;” — (and then comes the important 
sentence)— “ That they are absolved from all 
allegiance to the British Crown, and that all 
political connection between them and the 
State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, 
totally dissolved ; and that, as Free and 
Independent States, they have full power to 
levy -^var, conclude peace, contract alliances, 
establish commerce, and to do all other acts 
and things which Indedendent States may of 
right do. And for the support of this decla- 
ration, with a firm reliance on the protection 
of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to 
e.ach other, our lives, our fortunes, and our 
sacred honour* 


Here you have a case in which this quality 
of allegiance came to a test. They owed allegiance in 
the familiar sense to the King of England. They 
owed allegiance to their own country, and they 
realised that the time had arrived when the ques- 
tion became one of conflict between the allegiance 
to the King and the allegiance to the country. 
So that in accepted history, we have got a classic- 
al instance of a case where the choice between 
allegiance to the King and the allegiance to the coun- 
try was presented to the world, and men of honour 
chose allegiance to their cown ountry to the imposed 
allegiance to a foreign king. Therefore I venture to 
stand before this Court today with the most classical 
illustration, the illustration of a race, of a country, 
that has saved the world today, and in the last war 
and did marvels in th^ cause of civilisation; and if that 
illustration is not going to be respected, I submit justice 
w^ould be denied completely, I submit that 
what happened at Farrer Park, by reason of 
the actual state of events in this country, was 
perfectly legitimate, and indeed legitimised by what I 
may call the course of history. Indeed it is amazing 
how from the year 1770 to today the words are as true 
as they were then : — 

“We hold these truths to be self-evident that 
all men are created equal, that they are endow- 
ed by theiT* Creator with certain unalienable 
rights ; that among these are life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness.” 

' And I commend this to you, Sirs, in order that 
you in your wisdom will consider it just, if ever any 
question arises. This declaration took place on the 
4th July, 1776; and ultimately a war was fought, 
which resulted in 1781 in establishing what is today the 
United States of America as an independent republic 
of the world. I venture to submit this a his- 
torical instance, important in its character, valuable 

4i 


as sbowmg’thB TO the world has functioned. 

I want to call attention to the oath of allegiance to the 
ProvisiGnal Government of Azad Hind and its context^ 
for it is important that you should know'- it. 

‘‘ Indians in East Asia today are no more 
the subjects of an alien power ; they are the 
.proud citizens of the Provisional Govern- 
ment of Azad Hind. To bring this home 
to the mind of every Indian in Malaya and to 
rouse our community to a full realisation 
of the responsibilities of the new status, it 
has been decided to ask each member of the 
Indian Independence League to take an oath 
of allegiance to the Provisional Government 
of Azad Hind., Detailed directions regarding 
this have already been sent to aU the State 
branches along with the form of the oath. 

Each member, on taking the oath, will be 
given ‘oath of allegiance card’ and the 
‘Indian Independence League membership 
card’ he or she now holds will be taken back 
by the officer administering the oath and 
destroyed. The privilege of owing allegiance 
to our government will be extended only to 
members of the Indian Independence League - 
as any Indian who is not a member of the 
League cannot be considered as a true 
Indian. As . Netaji said in his speech in 
Sypnan on 25th October ‘we will not treat 
them as Indians or friends. There is no 
place for them in India. 

What I wish to point out is that in so far 
as these documents are concerned they evince the 
same interest as was evinced by those who issued 
the Proclamation of Independence of the United 
States of America. * 

The next point to which I wish to call attention 
in this context is the law of treason with reference to 


^ IS concerned, it is a loose 

expression. The whole of the law on this snbiect 
has been codified in the Indian Penal Code and I 
call attention to Chapter VI of the Ind^^Penal 
^ against the State. There you find 

So'.? T^f S w'’™ “Otter 

waging or attempting to wage war 
gainst 121A is conspiracy to commit 

122 is collecting 

Im ?om%ir . Governor-Lnereretc! 

AsS-'c nowlr n- against any 

^siatec power m alliance with the Queen 126 is 

■ “t 

Jllowing prl™.;, of si ?r“i to .iKS 

to_ a public servant negligently suffering such 

Sriti" •“ ‘“o 

oo ®">“iission to the Court is this. In so far 

as the question of the law of treason is concerned ij 
this country, my learned friend cannot talk of treason 
caUed treason in the commorSw 
“y 3,®^rned friend would have to look to 

In Indian. Penal Code 

In other words my submission to the court is this— 

speaking, . apart from Section 121 my 

learned friend will not and has no right to reSrt to 
what he calls the principles of treason. 

The next point to which 1 shall call nttoT^+ir^Jl 
on page 95 ^ transcript of it here. It is 

P^®'®®'^ imder the 

protection of another that is more powerful,. 


or lias even entered into subjection to it witb 
a view to receiving its protection — if the 
latter does not effectually protect the other 
in case of need, it is manifest that, by tailing 
in its engagements, it loses all the rights it 

had acquired by the convention, and that the 

other being disengaged from the obligation it 
had contracted, re-enters into the possession 
of all its rights, and recovers its i ndependence 

or its liberty. It is to be observed that this 
takes place even in cases where the protector 

does not fail in his engagements through a 
want of good faith but merely through 
inability. For the weaker nation having 
submitted only for the sake of obtaining 
protection— if the other proves unable to 
fulfil that essential condition, the compact is 
dissolved— the weaker resumes its right, and 
may, ifit thinks proper, have recoume to a 
more effectual protection. Thus the Dukes ot 
Austria, who had acquired a right of pro- 
tection and in some sort a suvereignty over 
the City of Lucerne, beii^ unwilling or 
unable to protect it effectually, that city 
concluded an alliance with the three first 
cantons; and the Dukes having carried 
their Complaint to the Emperor, the inhabi- 
tants of Lucerne rephed “that they had used 

the natural right common to all men, by 
which everyone is permitted to endeavom 
to procure his own safety when^ he is 
abandoned by those who are obliged to 
grant him assistance. 

This is the law which has been enunciated and 
accepted in England ever since. This was in 1797. 

My submission is that the insuigents are in 
the position of rebels up to a stage, but a stage is 
reached tirhOTe if the State has an organised army 







it becomes possessed of the right of belligerency, 
erm though they may ultimately fail. The ques- 
tion of allegiance does not arise then, but I would not 
be surprised if with a view to divert the discussion 
into a wrong channel any such statement is 
made. 

Before I go further, I wish to make quite 
clear a point about the prisoners of war. The 
prisoners of war may submit even to the extent of 
assisting the enemy — that is passive assistance up to 
the point of labour. You will find ip. the same books 
that they may not actualjly join the enemy and in this 
connection I wish to submit to the Court what 
was the relation or the I.N.A, to the Japanese. 
You belong to the profession of arms and will appre- 
ciate what I am submitting to you. I have stated 
the position as much against myself as possible. 

I am now assuming that the events which took place 
at Farrer Park did not take place. I am assuming 
against myself that they were" just prisoners of war! 
The question still remains what is it that thev did. The 
question arises whether they ever allowed themselves 
to be used as what I might call topis of the enemy or 
any other instruments, whatever the phrase used. 
Having beep surrendered as prisoners of war, if the 
Japanese chose to leave the Indians to secure their 
liberty —(I am wiling to agree that it suited them) 
that by itself does not bring the I. N. A. and the 
accused before us within the prohibition imposed upon 
the prisoners of war. It is a point that 1 wish to 
elaborate up to a stage. I wish to state that there is no 
obligation whatever which prevents a person who is a 
prisoner of war from fighting on his own for the liberty 
of his own country. 1 submit that my learned friend 
will not be able to controvert that, and therefore 
I wish to make it quite plain that the question of the 
relation between the Japanese Army and the l.N. A., 
the question of the objective of the Japanese as regards 
India— these points have got to be re-emphasized 


before tins Court. tJ-nless they are bbrtih m mind/ 
the Court may easily go into a ■wrong track. 

The point is this. I quite agree that the Court 
or any member of it may say : ''They were fools in 
believing the Japanese”. That has nothing to do 
with the case. Other men may have been wiser. The 
question is whether those who formed the I. N. A. did 
believe in a bona fide manner that they would be able 
to secure the freedom of the country. If they bona 
fide believed it, the fact that there are wiser men on 
earth does not after the issue so far as the renounce- 
ment of the guilt of that army fighting for the libera- 
tion of India is concerned. Hence it is that I wish 
to submit that the evidence which I submitted yester- 
day and a few more passages to which I wish to call 
attention today is relevant for that purpose. You 
have it in evidence and it is a matter again in which 
the question is of one’s own belief. The question is 
not whether that belief was something which probably 
the Court or any member of it may think was of very 
credulous people. That has n6thing to do with 
the point. You have it definitely in evidence before 
this Court, in the' evidence of prosecution witnesses, 
that if any nation or any race or any class came into 
being to oppose the independence of India, they were 
prepared to fight that, including the Japanese. That 
is why I was very anxious to point out that it is only 
when a story is completely pieced up and comes before 
the Court that its significance can be appreciated. The 
whole point of it is that the question is not so much 
as to whether you or I or anybody else would have 
relied upon it as a promise. From that point of view 
probably we are a credulous race. We have relied on 
many promises of others and of Japanese also. But that 
has nothing to do with the point. The point is that 
if these people honestly believed, as I say they did, 
that they were securing the independence of India, 
then the question of what a prisoner of war cannot do, 
does not actually arise and will not arise. 


I 


In this connection I would like to' ree^d the evi- 
dence of Nag. The question that I put to him was; 
Do you remember ever attending a meeting in Singa- 
pore at which Capt. Mohan Singh told the prisoners of 
war that if need be they would fight the Japanese in 
addition to the British I He said he would fight any- 
body who stood in his way even if it were the Japanese 
or anybody else. The next is P.W. 9 Havildar Sucha 
Singh, and this is the passage to which I wish to refer: 
■^‘He said that the I.N.A. has already been started in 
Singapore and a good many people had joined it; and 
the I.N.A. will only fight for the freedom of India and 
for no other cause. If we go to India and the Japanese 
go with ns, we are equipped with arms, and we 
will fight the Japanese if they turn round against us. 
This is a golden chance for us and we may not get such 
a chance again.’’ The next witness is P.W. 18: He 
said : ‘‘After I was posted to Bose Brigade, Captain 
Shah Nawaz Khan delivered a lecture which I heard. 
He said that the Bose Brigade which was formed was 
to go first of all to the front, and this Brigade is com- 
posed of picked officers and men.” And then . the 
passage goes on ; “He also said that if and when we 
fight with our allies the Japanese nation, it should not 
happen that we remain as second rate in the fight and 
thus disgrace our nation. When we reach India we ' 
shall meet Indian men and women, and those who are ' 
elders to us we should consider them as mothers and 
those who are younger we should consider them as our 
daughters and sisters, and if anybody will not obey 
these instructions he will be shot dead; and if and when 
India is freed and the Japanese who are now helping 
us tried to subdue us, we shall even fight them. 
He also said that even now if a Japanese gives you one 
slap, you should give him three in return, because oun 
•Government is parallel to their Japanese Government, 
and we are in no way subservient to them, and that 
when we reach India, if we notice any Japanese 
maltreating an Indian lady, he should be 
first warned by word of mouth not to do 

Bf.4 



so, but i£ be contmued to do. so, we were at 
liberty to use force and even shoot him in order to 
prevent it, because the fight which we are making now 
is for the freedom apd well-being of India and not 
for the benefit of the Japanese. This lecture was 
delivered in Taiping,*' Then, I come to P. W. 19. 
He said: “ I was aware of the declaration of the 
Provisional Government of Free India. Prior to my 
joining the I. N. A. I was in a prisoner-of-war camp.'" 
Then I come to the other passage which is relevant 
for the purpose. “I knew after joining the army that 
the sole ambition of the I. N. A. was to fight for the 
freedom of India against any army in the world, but 
my own idea was not to fight but to escape. By ‘ any 
army in the world ’ is meant also the Japanese. " Then 
I come to P. W. 24. He said : '‘In August 1943 I 
* was in Neesoon campi.: Gaptain Shah Nawaz came 
to address the Heavy Gun Battalion there. He said 
that the I. N. A, had been formed for the liberation of 
India and it would fight not only British Imperialism 
but also those would put obstacles in the way of 
India’s freedom or any other party which wished to 
subjugate India.” 

I had hitherto avoided reading any evidence 
because there was no substantial contest as to the 
facts which have been proved. The record of evidence 
clearly shows that in so far as the I. N. A. was con- 
cerned, they acted on their own. No doubt, they 
accepted the alliance with Japan on promises which 
they, at all events, honestly and sincerely believed, 
and if they believed them, I submit there can be no 
question of any obligation. There are so many 
matters which have been gone into and which in 
patience we suffered in the belief that ^there was no 
relevancy to the charges before the Court. But now 
that they are before the Court, I must separate them 
as best as I can and, while separating them, give 
answer to every single suggestion that was made or is 
be made. Hence it is* that I am here before 


the Court to point out that in doing what the I. N. A. 
did, there was no question of any breach of any obli- 
gation or the prisoner of war obligations or duties, 
remembering the extreme obligation, which, I submit, 

I have stated as strongly against myself as it is 
possible to do. 

The next point to which I wish to call attention 
is this. In addition, there is the evidence of the last 
witness, B. W. 12, and that sets out more or less fully 
the point of view of those who honestly believed in 
doing what they did. I am not saying that the Court 
is not called upon to examine the matter in its 
own light. At the same time, the Court has got to see 
not so much what any individual member might have 
done as iiiat whether you believe what they said 
before this Court and that was their object. 

This witness said : ‘‘My reasons for joining the 
I.N.A, were many. I admit that it was a difficult 
question to decide whether I should join the I.N.A. 
or not, because there were many factors which I had 
to consider. It was a momentous decision. Uptil that 
time It was not greatly interested in politics or the 
political welfare of India because I was educated that 
way, and moreover when I joined the Indian Army in 
1936 I felt that politics was not encouraged in the 
Indian Army and hence I stayed away, but when the 
question of I.N.A. arose and we had to decide whether 
we should join it or not, I had to think deep, but it 
was such a big question that I could not make a deci- 
sion myself.” 

The reason why I am reading to the Court is this. 
He was a witness of truth and the very fact that they 
had a conflict in their minds is illustrative of the 
extreme bona fides of the men who chose to take the 
course which they did. Hence it is that I shall read a 
few more lines of that evidence: ‘T remember some- 
time in the beginning of July 194;2, when we were 

8 %.* 



being asked whether going to volunteer for 

the I,N .A * or not, I was staying at Mount PI easant , 
Singapore, where Capt. Mohan Singh had his head 
quarters. I know Capt. Sahgal for the last 12 or 13 
years • we were in College together and we were friends 
there. I felt that if I had a discussion with hiin along 
with a few other officers, we may come to some decision 
regarding volunteering for the I.N.A. So in the begin- 
ning of July, he and two or three other officers came to 
my bungalow at Mount Pleasant and we went through 
this question of joining the. I.N.A. We discussed all 
the pros and cons. We unanimously decided that 
under the circumstances we all owed our allegiance to 
our^country. 

We also felt and agreed upon that so far con- 
cerning our career in the Indian Army, there had been 
distinctions between the British officers and the Indian 
commissioned officers. The Indian commissioned 
officers had not been treated as well as our English 
comrades or brother officers. We also felt that if the 
•senior officers present in Singapore or in Malaya did 
not join the I.N.A., it was quite possible that the 
Japanese would exploit the Indian prisoners of war, 
because then the Indian prisoners of war would be 
siffit up into small groups. Some people would join 
and some would not, and the Japanese would take 
advantage of that and enrol people from amongst 
the prisoners of war who would be willing to do 
any service for tbemr We felt that that’ would be a 
disgrace to Indians!^ W agreed i that if the senior 
-officers joined the I. N. A. and formed a strong party 
and organised the I. N. A. as a regular army and 
fought the Japanese on every point regarding the 
army, we woffid have a far stronger* position with 
the Japanese than otherwise. We also felt that if we 
created an army of our own, we may be able to 
•estabish a certain amount of standing with the 
Japanese, and by doing that we may he able to stop 
the Japanese, from committing any atrocities on the 

sm 


Indians in Malaya. We had seen what the Japanese 
were doing to the Chinese and Anglo-Indians and ^ the 
Malayans. They were not treating them very well. 
Certain atrocities had been committed on the Chinese 
and also on the Eurasian community, and we thought 
that if the Indians refused to join the I. ]SF. A. it was 
quite possible that the whole of the Indian community 
in Singapore or in Malaya might suffer So we had a 
discussion on ail these points. But then arose the 
question that if we did join the Indian National 
Army, what would be the reaction of our people in 
India ? 

My suggestion to the Court is this that, apart 
from the process, the thought which the last witness 
brought to bear upon it and the discussions which he 
had with other people, clearly show that they did not 
take the steps either dishonestly or hastily. They 
took this step after taking into account the whole 
of the situation in existence at that time, and the 
future as they saw it. 

And if that is the condition in which they did 
it, I ask the Court to hold that they honestly believed 
in the propriety of the step they took and the justice 
of the cause for which they toolc it. And hence it is 
that I wish to point out to the court that it was not 
a case, as the text-books say, of a prisoner Of war 
joining the enemy in order to fight his battle. That, 
I quite agree, according to the text-books he may not 
do. But where a prisoner of war already released, as 
I have told you earlier, fi.nds himself in the situation 
an which he did and then fights for himself and for 
his own country, being prepared to fight against the 
J apanese themselves if they ever became untrue to them, 
in such circumstances, 1 submit, there was no question 
and there could be no question of the Indian National 
Army being guilty and of those w^bo joined that army 
being guilty of any act which may be regarded as cont- 
rary even to what you may call the code of duties 


m 


imposed tipon a prisoner of war. I have already sub-p 
mitted and at the risk of repetition I will say, that 
it is entirely irrelevant and there is no such thing as a 
charge against these men before you of a breach of 
duty as prisoners of war. In fact there is no such 
charge in the Indian Penal Code, so far as I can see. 
There may be a charge under the Indian Army 
Act but no such charge is at present before you. 
There is not even a charge of desertion and indeed 
there cannot be, for when the prisoners of war 
were surrendered there was no occasion for deser- 
tion. So let us not be carried away by what 
you may call the popular language of desertion, 
breach of duty and all the rest of it. Let us 
concentrate, and I ask the Court so to do, on the 
charge on which the accused are on trial before 
the Court, and on that only. The rest is a matter 
of prejudice ; and if one has a complete answer 
even on a matter of prejudice, it is a matter of 
satisfaction. It is a matter which I understand 
— and I appreciate — that tribunals of this kind 
are likely to take account of, namely, that general 
bona-fide, honesty and integrity aU goes to the credit 
of individuals who are on trial as so much in their 
favour. 

Then, Sirs, there is one piece of evidence in so 
far as this particular matter is concerned, a piece 
of evidence of extreme importance, and that is how 
the first I.N.A. broke up. As to how i4 broke 
up you have evidence before the Court and it is 
unanimous as to the reasons for which that event 
occurred. Rash Behari Bose was for many years in 
Japan and he was too easily inchned — ^to put it 
most mildly — to believe in the Japanese. Mohan Singh 
on the other hand was very cautious. Mohan Singh 
in fact has himself evinced by his conduct that should 
anything happen to him, that is to say, if he is 
arrested or removed, the army should he dissolved. 
And the real reason is this, that while on the one 


iiand Mohan Singh was anxious that there should be 
an army formed for the liberation of India, at the 
same time he was equally anxious that the army 
shduld not serve as a mere instrument of Japan. And 
it is because he had his suspicions, is because — of 
the Resolutions in the Bangkok Conference with regard 
to making clear the aims of the Japanese for the pur- 
pose of fighting the war so far as India was con- 
cerned, — that Mohan Singh began to lose faith in the 
promises of the Japanese. And as soon as the 
Japanese realised that through the agency of Rash 
Behari Bose — and you haye picturesque evidence here — 
Rash Behari Bose came along, collected all the senior 
officers and declared that Mohan Singh had been 
removed. I could not quite appreciate, with all the 
thought that I devoted to it, the point that my 
learned friend made or attempted to make as to 
whether he was actually removed by Rash • Behari 
Bose or by the Japanese. For my own part I do 
not mind the suggestion that my learned friend made 
that the Japanese arrested him. That is precisely 
the point, that the first I. N. A. was at a stage 
at which there was a trial of strength between 
those Indian nationals who were members of the 
I. N. A. and the Japanese. Later on when the Japa- 
nese realised that the Indian National Army and those 
who were likely or wanting to join it were not prepared 
to become tools in their hands, that there was a break, 
and hence when you come to the second I. N. A., when 
Subhas Chandra Bose took command of the Indian 
National Army, the second time you find an association 
between the two armies, -—may be very unwilling on 
the part of the Japanese. Very often one has to make 
a choice when one finds a strong man on the otherside: 
and hence it is that I wish to insist_ before this Court 
that throughout the dealings between the I. N. A. and 
the head of the Provisional Government of Free India 
at this time, the position taken up by them was not 
of an instrument of^the Japanese, but a body formed 
with the object of liberating themselves, no doubt get- 


ting all tbe assistance from the Japa- 

nese as an allied army* And that, I submit, is the key 
to the bona-fide of the men, the belief of every indivi- 
dual man who at aU events tbinkingly™-* if I may use 
that expression^] oined the I. N*. A. I daresay it. often 
happens in the world that once you find a thinking and 
leading man taking a course, other people bonafide 
believe it to be the true course and join it. Therefore 
I submit there is ample evidence on record, evidence 
emanating from witnesses which in ordinary courts 
and tribunals is the best to be relied upon by the de- 
fence, evidence from prosecution witnesses, not all 
willingly given, that they fought their own ground, 
they fought their own cause, and therefore there was 
no question whatsoever of their breaking any duties 
which they owed as prisoners of war. But you have to 
remember all the time and again and again that there 
is no such charge in the trial before you. There are 
only two charges before you which I need not repeat. 
But T want to be quite careful because it will be my 
duty to deal with the material^ lest it might be sug- 
gested that I did not deal with it, and 1 wish to point 
out its relevancy and its significance to the extent to 
which these points bear on the conduct of the men on 
trial before you. I have no desire to shirk an inquiry ; 
in fact I am here as far as I can— -apart from any ques- 
tions of private opinions on political issues — to impress, 
upon you the truth, integrity and sincerity of men, 
which after all is a bigger asset sometimes than the- 
legal technical issue. There is also the evidence of Lt.- 
Col.^Loganadan, D. W. 7 with reference to the ques- 
tion; and I am obliged to refer to it particularly be- 
cause of the pamphlet called Our Struggle which 
was placed before you. There is just one point which 
I must make before I read the evidence, that all that 
is proved is that the pamphlet was issued. But I hope 
and trust that my learned friend will not suggest that 
the mere fact that a pamphlet is issued, that -by itself 
proves the truth of the statements made therein. Let 
me therefore begin by saying that I am not obliged to 


i explain why Rash Behari Bose said what he did. It 
will be an erroi; on the part of the Court to say that 
because Rash Behari Bose said something about Mohan 
Singh, therefore it is true. At the same time I wish to 
call attention to this evidence with a view to pointing 
out the terms on which Mohan Singh and Rash Behari 
Bose stood, with a view to point out that any allegations 
emanating from the disappointed Rash Behari Bose at 
that time are not to be taken as words of truth. 
Secondly, in any case an allegatian made by A against 
B, neither of whom has appeared in Court as a witness,, 
is proof of the allegation made by him. 

With this observation I now call attention to- 
the evidence of p. W. 7 (Lt.-GoL Loganadan). 

I know Captain Mohan Singh. When I joined 
the Indian National Army he was G. 0. C. The 
relations between Captain Mohan Singh and Rash 
Behari Bose were not very happy. Of my own 
XJerso^al kaowiedge I know that Rash Behari Bose, 
having lived so long with the Japanese, was inclined to 
be guided and controlled by them. Whereas Mohan 
Singh said he felt that the Japanese should be dealt 
with a firmer hand than what Rash Behari would be* 
able to do. 

I then come to D. W. 12 (Captain Arshad).. 
The passage to which I call attention is this : — 

“ I was in the first Indian National Army 
Headquarters, then as General StaiT Officer in G 
Branch. The first I. N. A, was dissolved in December 
194:2. The I. N. A. had been raised after the Bangkok 
resolutions were forwarded for ratification to the 
Japanese Government. The Bangkok resolutions were 
the result of a Conference held in Bangkok in June. 
There were many resolutions in that and they were 
passed by the Conference and then sent to the Japanese 
Government for ratification, and we hoped that the- 
ratification would come quickly; but as the days went 


hj Captain Mohan Singh, who was then G. 0. C. of the 
Indian National Army, felt that the Japanese were 
delaying the ratification of the- Bangkok resolutions 
^tnd he asked the Japanese liaison body which was 
^jittached to us, called the Iwakuru Kikan to ex- 
pedite the ratification of the resolutions. They were 
not very clear in their replies. They tried to delay 
them as much as possible. I was present. Captain 
Mohan Singh kept his headquarters informed of all the 
•correspondence and the arguments which he was 
having with the Japanese. Captain Mohan Singh told 
us his doubts of the intentions of the Japanese. He 
«aid that he noticed that the Japanese were not 
playing the game, and he said that if the Japanesfe 
continued with that attitude of theirs he would dissolve 
the Indian National Army, and we all agreed with him 
because we felt that unless and until there was a clear 
understanding between the I. N. A. and the Japanese 
we would not continued the Indian National Army. 
■Besides that, there was another main point of dissention 
between the Japanese and Captain Mohan Singh. At 
the Farrar Park meeting the Japanesb had handed 
over all the Indian prisoners of war to Captain Mohan 
‘Singh. Until that time the members of the I. N. A. 
:as well as those prisoners of war who had not joined 
tihe I. N, A. were under the command of Captain 
Mohan Singh. • But in December the Japanese wanted 
to take those people away from Captain Mohan Singh 
who had not joined the I. N. A. Captain Mohan Singh 
felt that the Japanese were not keeping to their word 
and he refused to part with the prisoners of war. These 
main reasons as well as the other minor reasons forced 
us to dissolve the 1. N. A. 

And, Sir, the Bangkok Eesolution No. 13 which 
is referred to, reads thus : 

‘'(13) Resolved that the Indian National Army 

shall be made use of only. 

(a) For operations against the British or other 
Foreign powers in India. 



(b) For the purpose of securing and safeguarding 

Indian National Independence, and 

(c) For suoli other purpose ■■■■as. may assist the 

achieTementof the object, viz, Indian 

Independence. 

Lt. Nag (P. W. 1) refers to the same subject 

ill these terms • 

‘'Oapt. Mohan Singh left written instructions 
that if he was arrested, the I.N.A. should ^be 
- dissolved. ‘In the event of my arrest the I.N. 

A. will be dissolved and all thel.N.A. badges of 
rank and records will be destroyed.’ There 
was a general feeling from the beginning that 
the I.N.A. should not be subordinated to the 
Japanese and that we would not allow it to 
be subordinated to the Japanese. There was 
no question of dissolving it at any time during 
those days. The predominant motive was to 
free India for the sake of Indians. 

“After the 2nd I.N.A. was formed the same 
feeling was there, until Subhas Chandra Bose 
arrived in July 1943. After that everybody 
thought that they had got a leader who could 
guide them on proper lines without being sub- 
ordinated to the Japanese. Thereafter the 
two armies fought as Allies, i.e., the Indian 
National Army and the Japanese.” 

This, 8ir is the evidence which has been placed 
before this Court. As I said, my submission before the 
Court is "hat it was when the I.N.A,, which was formed 
on the second occasion, felt confident that they would 
not be subordinateid to the Japanese that they really 
fought as Allies. And hence it is t|iat I submit to the 
Court that in so far as relations between the I.N.A. 
and the Japanese Army were concerned, it has been 


97 



established by evideBce that they were of the character 
which I claim for them, liameiy as alies. So far as 
the I.N.A. was concerned, it was actuated by only one 
motive and one business, and that was to secure the 
freedom of India. That is the issue, which as I 
have said, does not actually arise, but which was bear- 
ing on the integrity of purpose of those who are 
on trial as members of the Indian National 
Mxmj. 

the next point to which I wish to 
call attention is the evidence before the Court that the 
Indian *National Army was completely officered by 
Indian officers. True, an attempt was made by my 
learned friend in crosa-examination as to the question 
of the High Command. I do not deny for a moment, 
though I do not understand or profess to understand 
very much the organisation of armies when they fight 
'together for apparently the same purpose in any case, 
but knowing what you dp about the last but one ^ya^ 
and the last war, when any question arises of unified 
command it serves very little purpose to suggest that 
in so far as the higher strategy is concerned, it was no 
doubt in the hands of the Japanese. No doubt pro- 
bably they claimed at all events that they understood 
the art of war better, and that after all the Indian 
National Army consisted of men of not that standing. 
But apart from accepting better judgment on what 
should he the proper strategy, when it came to a 
question of internal administration cf the I.N.A., it 
has been amply proved before the Court that the 
I.N. A. was entirely independent in its composition, 
including every officer. The evidence of Lt. Nag is 
in these terms : 

‘"The whole of the Indian National Army was 
trained by Indian Officers and not by the 
Japanese, It was entirely and throughout 
officered by Indian officers and not by 
Japanese officers. 




The colours of the Indian Katioiial Army 
the Indian National Congress colours, i.e, 
saffron, white and green. Their badges were 
distinct from the Japanese badges.’’ 

And then he answered other questions which are 
immaterial, namely that among the colours in the middle 
of one of the badges there was a brown star and it 
was resented by the personnel of the I. N. A. as it 
might be mistaken for the rising sun. 

P. W. 19 gave the following evidence : 

*‘So far as I am concerned, I took instructions 
from our own Indian officers only and not 
from the Japanese. As far as I am aware, 
there were no Japanese in command in our 
area or otherwise in the I. N. A. I was 
Assistant to Lt. Abdnr Rehman who was left 
in charge of the rations atlTalam. There was 
a long carry of 48 miles for rations. The 
rations consisted of rice, salt, oil and sugar. 
Sugai^ was very scarce. The rations were 
verv short consisting of rice, salt and a little 
oil." The Indian National Army was fighting 
under great hardship on that front. Whilst 
I was in the I. N. A., I carried out my duties 
faithfuUy.” 

The next point which I wish to make is 
that apart from what you may call the general higher 
strategy, the Indian National Army was ^completely 
independent. And though I am not anticipating a 
point which it will be my duty to argue, namdiy 
whether or not the question arose that people joined 
the I. N. A. because they might be worse off as 
prisoners of w'ar, the less said about it the better. 
The evidence clearly shows that the only ration that 
the I. N. A. had, apart from sugar and oil which was 
nominal, was rice, and that was the luxury which 


attracted men to the I. A. My learned friend will 
consider twice over- before* trying any such argument. 
The question really 4s that one set of men believed in 
a cause and the other set of men either from suppineness 
or otherwise did not, and nobody ever gave thought 
to the question as to whether one would l^e better 
off or . not. One thing is quite certain : that apart 
from what actually happened by the conduct of the 
Japanese, those who joined the ,1. N- A. w^ere 
certainly facing the possibilities which every soldier has 
to face, unless he wishes to avoid it, which prisoners of 
war could, namely fighting with the opponent army. 
And, therefore, my submission to the Court is that this 
idea of. contrasting the comforts of the I. N. A. and the 
comforts of the prisoners of war under the, Japanese, 
is entirely overdone. It is entirely a question as to 
w’^hat points of view appealed to one or the other 
sets of men, and therefore, Sir, my submission is that 
in so far as that is concerned, we have now been able 
to place before the Court the actual evidence on the 
question. 

. The next point is that theT. N. A. was a purely 
voluntary army, and notwithstanding the^ attempt 
made, the Prosecution entirely failed to prove that 
it was not voluntary, because from time to time it has 
been proved before, this Court by the speeches made 
by the accused and Sri Subhas Chandra . Bose, whicli 
indicate that at ' every stage opportunity 
was given to . every member of the I, N; A. to with^ 
draw if he chose to do so. But the strongest evidence 
is this : It is common ground, apart irom actual 
principles which have not been accurately proved, 
that -only a portion of the volunteers could he armed, 
equipped and trained, because of the paucity of 
material, and that there was a large number of people 
who could not be trained and could not be armed for 
w'ant of resources, — what is called the surplus volunte- 
ers. But I put it to you, Sir, as men of commonsense 
that it would require very much effort on the part 



of my learned friend to say that when they had more 
than enough men already, that they coerced more 
people to join the I. N. A. Or, in the language of Lord 
Shaw, I think it’ is a statement that stultifies itself 
because it is stated that ‘ we have enough men and we 
‘Cannot arm them,* and yet it is alleged that, .you go 
on coercing people to join. I think it is a folly of 
which no decent human being would-be guilty if he 
had a grain of oommonsense. What has aotuaUy 
happened is that people have been punished for crimes 
of their own, and in order to appear glorious before 
this Court, they attributed it to pressure by the 
I.bT.A. It is a very clever half-truth, which is not 
uncommon. 

You get a fact which occurred. Then in order to^ 
^appear vii^tuous lie would say that he was puuish- 
•ed to be coerced to join the I. N. A. A more ludicrous 
story could not have been presented to the Court, 
because in one case the witness admitted the reason 
why that took place. They were sent to the detention 
■camp. Having been sent there, they were asked to 
surrender their ring -leaders. When they did not, ten 
people came and there was a free fight— 300 on one side 
.and 10 on the other. And for the Government to put 
forward this sort of half-baked, story in order ^ that the 
Court may swallow it passes one’s understanding. 

This is Lt.-Nag: ‘‘I heard Subhas Chandra 
Hose state at a meeting held soon after the meeting 
of the 21st October 1943 that anyone who wished 
to leave the I. N. A. , was permitted so to do.’’ 

P. W. 5: Prior to my arrival at Port Dixon 

in Kuala Lumpur— ^t that time I was i-n 

^^^^^' ‘JCupanese— the bad conditions were due to the 
Japanese. In January-Pebruary 1943 I saw Capt. 
Shah Nawaz for the first time when he came to collect 
volunteers. I am quite clear that Capt. Shah Nawaz 
Khan left it open to everybody to join the I. N. A. or 


tiot ttey clios#?. I reiaem'ber that heVanted staunch 
men who were prepared to lay down their lives for the 
freedom of India. I never saw Capt. Shah Nawaz 
after that lecture.’’ 

P. W. 24 : I reached Popa on the 25th or 26th 
February. Col. Sahgal said at Popa that those who- 
^d HQt wish to stay in the I. N* K and wished to go 
Over to the enemy should tell him today. He will then 
make arrangements to send them in one party to the 
enemy, but they will not be permitted to take any 
arms or papers with them. H do not want that mei\ 
should desert in driblets.’ As far as I understand it 
Was Sahgal’s intention that after the party went over^^ 
men should not go over in driblets and sa Qause 
Uemorali sa tion, ” 

D. W. 6 : ‘‘ The recruitement was absolutely 

voluntary. We had surplus volunteers 
whom we could not train or arm.” 

D. W, 7 : ‘‘The Indian National Army was 
purely voluntary. As far as I am aware 
no coercive methods were used in recruit- 
ing. I am aware as a member of the 
Provisional Government that we declared. 
Wfl^r on Britain and America^’ 

l?hen, sir, there is one more statement referring: 
to Capt. Dhillon, to which 1 wish to call attention. My 
submission to th® Court is that in so far as the accused 
before the Court are concerned, they by their open 
speeches gave everybody to understand that it was 
entirely their own choice whether to join the I.N.A, or 
not. 

That brings me next to the evidence about the 
alleged coercion for the purpose of compelling men or 
inducing men to join the I.N.A. The position, Sir, is. 
this with reference to that. At the time when the- 




question arose as to the admissibility of, the eviden^, 
it was c-indidly stated by the Advocate-General tha-t 
he did not rely on Sec. 10 but the in whio^i it is 
souijbt to make it relevant is this. _ He said that the 
accused did not parbicipate in it, did not do it, did not 
encourage it. Hut that they knew about it, 

Tlie matter did not rest there. When they 
asked other people to join the I.N.A., they gave a 
veiled threat: “Bememher if you do not join, whathard* 
^Mps exist.” And the matter was further strained 
before this Court by saying— meaning thereby among 
other things— that there would be personal ooereiom 
It was on that statement that this honourable. Court 
was pleased to admit the evidence. The attempt was 
made to show that the accused made this veiled sug- 
c^estion. That attempt has completely failed becau^ 
Cant. Dhargalkar who was called to give evidence in 
support of this, fell through. 1 shall read that part of 
his Widence to show that he completely collapsed m 
what he eame to prove. He came to prove that the 
three accused, or some of them, went with the other 
officers. He came to support what the Advocate 
General was instructed to put forward, namely, that he 
was given the alleged veiled threat. When we came to 
cross-examine Capt. Dhargalkar, he said : ‘I was never 
asked by anybody. I was never addressed by anybody” 
and the more significant thing is, he ended hy saying - 
“I cannot st^te to the Court who said what to anyone.” 
The net result of his evidence amounts to this that the 

Government having undertaken to this Court to prove 

that the veiled threat was given in that form, and 
that meant evidence possibly relevant in the eyes of 
the Court, the evidence was allowed to be given. But 
in the light of the evidence of Capt. Dhargalkar, there 
is none in which any allegation of a veiled threat exists. 
I therefore ask the Court to hold that evidence as 
completely irrelevant because it wus admitted on this 
provisional promise, namely, that it would be proved 
that there was a veiled threat given by the accused. 


103 


because there is no other in which it could be 
made relevant* Thei^ is no charge against the accused 
of any personal cruelty of. any kind. There was no 
charge that they encouraged it, and the mere fact that 
they had knowledge would not. be anything, — even that, 
they have failed to prove. When I pointed out that 
mere knowledge was not enough, my learned friend 
added a further point, which I presume induced the 
Court to allow that and that is when they used the 
words which they _ are alleged to have used — ‘' If yon 
do hot join remember the hardships” — meaning thereby 
that in as much as they knew that wrong methods were 
being adopted, they threatened the men by saying 
wrong methods would be adopted in their case. That 
I submit is the only process of reasoning by which he 
attempted to make his evidence relevant- My learned 
friend has . completely failed to establish either the 
knowledge or alleged threat, and for these reasons, Sirs, 
I submit that this evidence should now be excluded, 
and I have prepared a petition so that it may remain 
on record for my submission. 

The learned Judge Advocate told the Court 
on the occasion of the question of admission of 
the evidence : 

The learned Advoeate-G'eneral really bases 
his case on the speeches of the accused 
which he will prove showing, as he says, that 
the accused referred to the hardships which 
would be inflicted on prisoners, of war , unless 
they joined, and thereby implying that they 
had knowledge of the methods by which 
he alleges that recruiting for the l.N.A. was 
being carried on. 

At the same time, now we have arrived at 
a stage when I respectfully ask that the Court should 
rule that that evidence should be entirely disregarded, 
because there is no .proof, of the proruise on which 



tliat evidence was submitted^ That is the formal 
application I make to the Court. 

■Judge-Advocate : Do you mean that yon are 
■asking us to make a decision on this now ? 


Counsel for Defence : On this point. 

Judge-Advocate : I am afraid it is not at all the 
procedure to make piece-meal decisions on parts of the 
■case, without hearing the learned Advocate-General 
and without hearing me. That decision will be made 
in due course, but I must ask the Court that they 
should go on now without making any piece-meal 
decision at this present stage. 

Sri Desai : I shall leave it at that. I thought that 
I would save the Court/ and perhaps incidentally 
myself, the necessity of having to go through that evi- 
dence, to show how utterly useless it is. But that 
being the view of the Court, I will not pursue it. 

That brings me to the next question. My sub- 
mission is that the basis on which that evidence was 
admitted has complejieiy disappeared ; and in as much 
as it has disappeared it should not be taken into con- 
sideration in this case at all. 

The only reason why I thought it my - duty to 
■call the attention of the Court at this stage wa^ that 
you might have to go through the evidence and think 
if it is relevant. . 

The first witness, to whose evidence I think it 
necessary to call the attention of the Court, is Capt. 
Dhargalkar. This is what Captain Dhargalkar said in 
his examination in chief : 

‘‘ I do not remember Lt. Dhillon being there, 
but ! remember Capt. Shah Nawaz Khan 

105 ' 



^nd Capt. Sahgal coming there. I recog- 
Mse both these officers as accused before the 
Court. Ne^^^ of the two accused ever 
spoke to me, but discussions usually, took 
place and nearly all the discussions were con- 
cerned with our joining the I. N. A. I was 
present at these discussions. It is very diffi- 
cult for me to quote the exact words which 
Ca,pt. Sahgal and Capt. Shah Nawaz Khan 
said, but the gist of the thing was: ‘Why 
don^tyou an join the I. N. A. rather than 
waste yourselves living under these condi- 
tions.” 


That is really the whole point. Let mfe exa-^ 
mme whether the promise is fulfilled even in the exa- 
mination in chief. If conditions ” merely meant 

conditions as prisoners of war, whether for the time 

being under the I.N.A. or the Japanese, that is not a 
matter of charging the accused. But I suppose my 
learned friend will Use the word “ conditions ” to mean 
almost anything, meaning thereby that “ some people 
did something to somebody else and that will be your 
condition/- I submit it does not carry the matter far 


i would then gsliI to the cross-exami- 

nation of this witness. He says 


I saw all the three accused on several occa-^ 
sions. I saw them anything between 20 to 50 
times. I only spoke to Capt. Sahgal- a 
couple of times ; I do not remember having 
spoken to Capt. Shah Nawaz Khan or Lt. 
Bhillon. I spoke to Capt. Sahgal in Col. 
Bhonsle’s house. I cannot remember any 
other occasion. I was present at fifteen occa- 
sions at which discussions took place. Capt. 
Shah Nawaz may have been present about 
twice and Capt. Sahgal was present about the 




same number of times. Tliis was in a separa- 
tion camp at Badadari, The^ was one huge' 
camp at Badadari and also a separation- 
camp. I was in the separation camp. The 
whole of the Badadari Camp was the Indian 
National Army camp. We were taken there 
by Capt. Mohan Singh. There were about 
sixteen of us living in the room. I did not 
take part in the discussion nor was I address- 
ed by Capt. Shah Nawaz or Capt. SahgaL 
That is all that happened during the discus- 
§ion/? 

Then he goes on to say : 

Capt. Shah Nawaz Khan came there, but 1 
do not know whether he came to see Capt. 
Sher Dil Khan. I was not invited to a dis- 
cussion, I was living in the room and I 
overheard certain conversations. I cannot 
remember the words of these discussions ac- 
curately but I remember the gist of them. 
The gist of the conversation included many 
other subjects other than the Indian National 
Army. I was addressed but not by any oi 
the officers present there. Capt. Shah Nawaz, 
Khan was speaking to 16 other people. Tha 
gist of his conversation was : “ Why do you 
not join the Indian National Army I re- 
member that occasion to the best of m^^ 
knowledge. It may have been any time in 
that month. I cannot remember all that he. 
said. I cannot say exactly what he said/’ 


(Yoti will see, Sir, ^ change in the gist. There 
was no question of what consequences would follow.) 

I cannot remember exactly what he said. 

I cannot single out from the others what 
Capt, Shah Nawaz Khan said. My answer is 


107 


the same with regard to Capt. Sahgal 
What I told the Court is the general impres- 
sion without ktfowing who said what.”. . 

- This is the evidence of Capt. Dhargalkar, and 
I respectfully and emphatically submit to the Court 
■ that the promise on which that evidence was admitted 
remains unfulfilled ; and in as much as . it : remains un- 
fulfilled, my submission is that the evidence should 
be disregarded completely. 

Now, with that submission and in view of the 
record, it is my duty very briefly to examine the 
‘ evidence which has actually been given, and I will 
preface the examination with this remark. This is a 
case where in some instances what is called a half-truth 
implies an untruth : e.g. there was a detention camp 
where people ^vere taken if they were guilty of acts of 
insubordination or any other act contrary to the discip- 
line of an army. Having been takeii there, there v/as 
no doubt a certain amount of tasks and fatigues they 
were asked to do. That is perfectly true, but that hav- 
ing been done, the man wants to make a martyrdom 
of it. I will tell you why. He says he was taken there 
and he was asked to join the T.N. A. It is all, I submit, 
embroidery of the case, and I will ask the Court to ex- 
amine that evidence in that light, and in one or two 
instances l shall be able to show that reluctantly he 
almost admitted the ease I put to him, that he was sent 
"there because he was guilty of insubordination. People 
very picturesquely said they were asked to pick up one 
■end of a pole and every time a man followed them or hit 
them — I think the very exaggeration defeated its own 
purpose. ‘ I do not think any Court, wdll believe 
rsuch an absurd story. True, he was taken there, and no 
^doubt he had to do a certain amount of fatigue; No 
'doubt it may be that a non-commissioned officer 
thought it was below his dignity to pick , up things 
which were necessary. In fact you might remember 
with what amount of reluctanop the witnesses gave the 







kind of evidence before the Court.— I would recall a pict-- 
ure of one of the witnesses when I «feold him that this-, 
was onty for' the purposes of manure and there was the- 
evidence of a garden, — ^it almost taxed one’s patience 
to be able to get out of him that evidence, and get him. 
to admit those facts; and even then he kept on saying 
“Oh, there was a road there and in between there was^ 
something and if you call it a garden it is wrong and so 
The fact remains that the witness was taken 


on. 


there for some act of insubordination; he was put to a 
certain amount of task, but then in order to glorify him- 
self as a martyr, he now comes forward before this Court 
and says “I was taken there.hecause I did not join the 
I.N.A.” And when I cross-examine him as to %vhat 
particular position he held with ■ particular distinction, 
and what distinguished career he had, and he ultimate- 
ly collapses and admits he was an ordinary soldier. To 
think therefore that stories of this kind would pass* 
muster before a Court composed of men of affairs and 
experience, I submit, will not do* 


I call attention first to Wolit Bahadur, P. W. 14. 
The kind of picture he gave— this method of carrying 
baskets at the eiid of a pole — I do. not suppose it is any 
great innovation or torture, unknown in India. The- 
way in which he described it, and if he was not giving 
evidence before men of experience in this country, was- 
almost insulting to one’s intelligence. After all it is a 
commom method of carrying a load on bars with a man. 
at each end ; and if he objects to carrying a load like 
that I am very sorry for him; but l am afraid he has to 
labour, and if he has to work, -he has to work ; and the- 
more we learn to do manual labouisp»I think, the better- 
for men of my country. 


And then he said— it was a ridiculous story — 
he carried out the order and picked up the- 
cow dung. There came a road. There were six men 
who stood just for the purpose of i giving a stroke as; 
he lifted the load. That I submit defeats itselL 


109 ^ 


In cross- examination — that is where I wish to 
•call attention to a few passages — this is what he says : 
•"‘He said that we had now fallen from the English 
into the Japanese hands and we have to carry out 
•their orders and do* their fatigues. He told us that 
-the British had run away and left us there. He said 
that our home was in India and we have to join with 
other Indians to fight for India. He also said that 
for this reason we should join the I. TST. A. He also 
said that the I. N. A, was being formed to set 
India free. He said that for this reason we should 
join the I. N. A. About one or two men said that they 
did not know anything about the I.N. A. and they 
were not going to join it. At that time we did not 
know what this L N. A. was, I know Jamadar 
Til Bahadur Adhikari.” This is a very important 
thing. They are the people who are said to have come 
In this party to attack this gentleman and his friends 
in order that they may be coerced to join the I. A.‘ 
It would he fortunate if one can think a little in 
advance. He admitted that every single one of them 
who took part in this raid to induce this gentlemau 
and his friends to join the 1. N. A. were all meir 
respected in their regiment and respected in the parts 
of the country from which they came. If he had 
only realised what it involved, he would probably not 
iave admitted it, “I came to know that the I. N. A., 
was being formed. I know Jamadar Til Bahadur 
Adhikari, Jamadar Puran Singh Kha was was a man 
who was respected by our unit and so was Jamadar Til 
Bahadur Adhikari. Jamadar Til Bahadur delivered 
only one lecture at which I was present. He also told 
us about the ohje^ of the I. K A. which was 
the same as Puran Singh had told us. When 
Til Bahadur delivered the lecture there were about 
fiOO men present.’* He admitted to me that they were 
being asked in the ordinary course to join the I, N. A., 
asked by people whom he admitted to be respectable 
and the point m asking for the admission i'^ this, that, 
those were among the people who came armed with a 
view to attack these innocent men in order that they 


may Join the I, A. I make a present of that kind 
‘of story for yonr acceptance. 

Then, Sir, comes in very common parlance the 
•cat out of the bag. “Those who did not join the 
I. N. A- were required to do fatigues for the Japanese. 
Those who joined the I. N. A. were not required to do 
fatigues for the Japanese.” ’ 

Prosecution Counsel : I am afraid my teamed 
friend is under a misapprehension. He gave no names. 

Defence Counsel : In his examination in chief 
he gave the names of the people who formed the party 
of attackers. It comes in cross-examination. 

Prosecution Counsel: He does not say that 
these were the people who came to assault Mm. I 
know my learned friend put those names to him. No 
•such questions were asked that thesf were the people 
who were in the firing party. 

'Judge Advocate : That certainly was not said, 
Mr. Desai. ' 

Sri Desai : The point of the argument 
will be perceived, name or no name. “ Those who did 
not join the I.N.A. were required to do fatigue for the 
f Japanese. There was dispute when we refused to do 
atigue duties for the Japanese. The leaderB whom I 
have named told us not to object to the fatigue. 
In spite of their persuasion some of iis did not 
obey. We reported that we will do fatigues 
for the Japanese but we have nothing to do 
with the I.N.A, The guard was sent because 
some of us did not obey”. That is the point. The 
point is that it was not because they were to be 
persuaded to join the. I. N. A, that the guard was 
sent. On his own admission they did not obey to 
do the task they . were sent on and 


ttet destroys the whole of that evidence, name or no 
name. His whole ptirpose was that these people came 
on their own with a view jnst to educate them, because 
they would not join the I. N. A. If my learned friend 
will follow the process of cross-examination and the* 
admission made by Wolit Bahadur I only point 
out that it was up to the witness to say that they were 
not in the firing-party. 

Judge Advocate : It is you here who is in the 
wrong, You have said that these men were in the 
firing party, whereas it was pointed out that they 
were not. 

gri Desai : There is the evidence in chieL 
I took the names from the summary of evidence. 
Because of that ruling the names were not allowed to 
be given. Whether the witness proved or failed to 
prove ' that the attack took place, because they would 
not join the I. W. A. that is the true issue, and 
remembering that to be the true issue, I beg leave to 
read where I left, and that is this : There was a 

dispute when we refused to do fatigue duties for the 
Japanese. The leaders whom I have named told its 
not to object to do fatigue. In spite of their per- 
suasion some of us did not obey. We reported that 
we will do fatigues for the Japanese hut we have 
nothing to . do with the I. N. A. The guard was sent 
(that is the material point) because some of us’ did not 
obey.’' You cannot get out of that. In other words 
the story that the guard was sent with a view to shoot 
them because they did not join the I. N. A., is entirely 
destroyed by . this evidence. ^‘The guard was sent 
because some of us did not obey. The guard came to 
seize the ring-leaders.’’ That is precisely my point. I 
said they were aU guilty of oiie or other offence 
against discipline, and hence action was taken against 
them, and this is the best illustration. Of course 
people get warned : after one man has been cross- 
examined you may not get the same type of actual 





admission. But here you have the clearest possible 
admission, the negation, the complete negation that 
any attack was made on them, because they did not 
join the I. N. A. Of course they always repeat like 
parrots, when it becomes necessary : that is what 
happens. But occasionally there are lapses. “ The 
guard was sent because some of us did not obey. The 
guard came to arrest the ring-leaders. We were about 
550 men. Some of the men had a dispute with the 
gua#d. The guard stopped us from doing this 4nd 

- -then.fired in the air ” i^Tiat possible course forsooth- 

it was sent for the purpose of asking them to join the 
1. 3Sr. A. and they should have fired in the air ! The 
whole point is that these were recalcitrants, a disobedient 
crowd. They were a.sked to surrender As a warning 
they fired in the air. They would not obey. Of 
course the trouble took place. “When we did not 
obey the order of the guard, they fired. The guard did 
not prevent us from doing fatigue but they spoke to us 
about I. N. A. which we did not obey.” All this 
rubbish is difficult to understand. “ First they fired in 
the air, and when we did not obey ultimately they 
fired at us. About two or three m<^n were injured 
attef the firing. Then we pursued the guard. The 
dispute between the guard and ourselves was that we 
psented the appearance of the guard during the 
i^ture time.” I do not know what it means. 
VVnatever that means, they know better. As l said here 
It IS a complete demolition and the best illustration 
of now the false is mixed up with the true. There is 
no doubt that there was a scuffle. That is not denied 
But they want to annex the scuffle to sofne- 
thing else. That is a piece with all the evidence 
with which I am familiar. You get hold of a known 
tact which IS not disputed, and then put it on to 
somethi^ else. My submission to the Court is that 
this evidence alone is sufficient to discredit the kind of 
evidence the Government has put forward with a view 
to show that atrocities were inflicted for the pumose 
ofjoimngthel.N.A. As to the tortures, they weS 


of two kinds. Eega-rding one, I kave got definitely 
out of the mouth of the witness himself that they 
objected to the fatigue. They were persuaded not 
to do it. The very leaders whom they respected, 
persuaded them not to object to do fatigue. They 
were again asked to surrender their ring-leaders. 
These people would not. They fired in the air and ulti- 
mately they fired at us. Three people died and 
there were 550 of them. Such evidence, can my 
earned friend or any gentleman in his very high 
position eve*’ place before the Court, name or no name? 

Prosecution Counsel : I only corrected a state- 
ment which was not Justified by the record. 

Sri Besai : I admit that I was in the 
wrong. I say the point of the argument is really 
this that the witness who came to swear false to the 
fact that the party was sent armed with a view to 
fire at them in order to compel them to join the 
I. N. A., here stands on his own evidence self- con- 
demned. He admits that the purpose was different. 
The occasion was different, and that disobedience was 
the only cause. My case is that the cases which they 
have selected are cases of a similar kind where people 
undoubtedly were dealt with for breach of discipline, 
but which they now attribute to a false cause, namely, 
their refusal to join the I. N. A. The next is the 
case of Muhammad Hayat. That is the case in which 
we said that because they killed some cows, a quarrel 
arose and hence a sGufiae. It is true a scuffle took 
place. The question is — was it with a view to compel 
them to join the l. N. A. That is where I say they get 
hold of an admitted event, or a more or less admitted 
event, and annex it to a false cause. He said : 

‘‘The Camp Commandant was Captain 
M. Z. Kyani, who was succeeded by Col. 

Shah Nawaz Khan. I heard Col. Shah 
Nawaz Khan lecturing to the camp. I was 


114 






not present at the lectoe he delivered in the 
camp, but I was present at the lecture he 
delivered in the mosqtie. He said that 
Sikhs and Hindus have already volunteered, 
and that the Mussulmans should also join. 
He said: ‘ Muslims must join the I. N, A. 
because when the Hindus and Sildis go, they 
will trouble you in your homes in India. ^ 
He did nbt threaten us with force but he said 
that we ought to join the I. N. A. He did 
not say that he only wanted sincere men. 
He said H will not give any sort of trouble 
to you, but you should volunteer, I want 
true volunteer's. After Dua Khair, we said 
that we will not join the I.N.A. We meant 
by that that none of us who were present 
there had a right to join the I.N.A. There 
was no charge against the men of my unit of 
having committed theft of seven cows belong- 
ing to civilians, and of having slaughtered and 
eaten them. I deny that. That charge is a 
lie and that the cows were eaten is also a lie. 

I am shown my additional statement in the 
summary of evidence. I admit that I said 
in the summary of evidence that Major Aziz 
Ahmad told us that we were to go to the 
concentration camp because we had killed a 

cow.’’ 


That was at the time they were sent. Re- 
member what was the contemporaneous statement 
made. I want you to remember that. The Court 
would have no doubt that that was the real cause of 
the dispute, and that joining the I.N.A. or not joining 
the I.N.A. was not the cause. 


‘‘No skins or bones were fotind, and no investi: 
gation was made. I never volunteered for 
the I.N.A. The Badadari camp was a mixed 
camp of volunteers and non- volunteers in 


Jialy 194:2. Neesoon camp was also a mixed 
camp ...... There was no difference in rations 

for the volunteers and non- volunteers* In 
July 1942 there was no separate treatment for 
volunteers in the Badadari camp, I was 
carrying on anti-I.N. A. propaganda. There 
was no charge against me of killing or stea^h 
ing a cow when I was removed from the 
Badadari camp to the concentration camp. 

Aziz Ahmad never told us that we were being 
sent to the concentration camp because we 
had killed a cow. I am again shown my 
statement in the summary of evidence. I 
signed my statement. It was read over to 
me. I made this statement about Major 
Aziz Ahmad having told us that we were 
all cto go to the concentration camp 
because we had killed a cow.” 

In other words, at the time when he was taken, 
it was proved from his own mouth that he was 
definitely told that the reason for his being sent was 
the killing of the cow. 

* ‘ On the day I went to the concentration camp 
there were approximately 60 or 70 men 
there. .... .1 said that after two or three days 
men of my unit were sent away from the con- 
centration camp. I and 11 other men were 
kept there. After our people went away, there 
were approximately 60 or 70 people left. They 
were all non- volunteers. I am talking of the 
month of July 1942.” 

Then comes the most tell-tale thing which any 
man of common-sens© wUl understand : 

‘T was released from the concentration camp 
after 21 days because I had become very 
weak,” 

The whole point is this. Any man reading 
between the lines will be able to see that these people 

116 


were taken to the concentration camp because they 
were charged with having stolen and killed a cow* 
He himself admits that it was a charge made at 
the time. Major Aziz Ahmad said ‘you have to go to 
the camp, because this is the charge against you 
After investigation, he was released after 21 days. Is 
that the real story, or what he now says is the real 
story? It does not, show that they were oppressed 
or coerced to join the I. N. A. ; 

There is one ordinary canon of reasoning and 
common sense. Is the Court to accept the story he 
said at that time or is it to accept the story told now? 

I submit that at that time nobody imagined that any- 
body was going to make anything out of this incident 
for the trial against some people in future. The 
question is, which of the two stories is likely to be 
true, and I respectfully submit to the Court that there 
can be only one conclusion. The story he told then 
is the true story, and not the story he tells now. That 
is my submission with respect to this witness. 

The next witness I take is Ahmad Nawaz, 
r. W. 10. Every man has to undergo some sort of 
punishment for an offence. This witness is taking 
the story as it occured, and adding to it so as to make 
out that what was done to him was a punishment to 
induce him to join the I. N. A. The only grievance of 
this gentleman is that he was| asked to carry cow- dung. 
It was not after ail such a serious punishment as he 
tried to make out. When I asked Mm whether he was 
asked to mix cow-dung with soda-ash, he said that 
in his part of the country they did not do so. 
The time has not yet come in this country 
tor the use of every kind of mineral manure, of 
any other kind of manure except cow-dung, 

I asked him whether it was not intended to be used 
for the purpose^ of manuring the garden, and it 
took a very long time before we could get anything 
at all from this witness. The demeanour of this 

117 


witness, and Ms b^feavioiuir to tho Court stands 
condemned. 

I am now reading part of the cross-examination: 

do not fenow what the cow dung was taken 
for. I only know we were made to take it as 
a punishmont. W© stacked the cow-dung near 
a road in the camp and on both sides of the 
road was the gai'den. We were never told to 
powder the cow-dung for manure. It is cor- 
rect that I said that we xnixed ash with the 
cow-dung but I do not know for what purpose 
it was used. I only did it as a punishment/’ 

To this man everything is a punishment. When 
this gentleman was asked to mix some soda- ash with co w 
dung for manure, he thinks it is by way of punishment. 
He is indignant when he is asked to do something and 
thinks he was asked to do it as a punishment; He 
says : 

“As a farmer, in our own home, we only use 
cow-dung as manure and we do not mix ash , 
with it. Only for three hours on the first day 
I did this work of carrying cow-dung and 
stacking it near the garden. It was stacked 
at a distance of abont . 10. or 12 yards from 
the garden. For the remaining five days we 
were digging and levelling earth and prepar- 
ing garden plots/’ 

When you come to analyse the facts, the indigo 
nity this witness comes to nothing. He was asked 
to do the ordinary work of preparing garden beds for 
the vegetable garden and mixing some manure. So 
for as the morning is ooncer ned, it only lasted three 
hours of his life time. If this is what is called an 
struqtly, I submit to the Court, it is a ridiculous type 
of strucity. A manis asked, to make beds in a garden 


118 


and prepare some manure, and -he imagines it to be 
punishment. He may think so, but' it is for the Cour^ 
to say whether it is so. Does the Court believe tha^ 
it was an ordinary piece of work, or it was an oppres“ 
sion, coercive methods, and I do not know w^hat othe^ 
language ^ used to describe it. Is it a torture to pre* 
pare beds and to prepare manure? I submit with great 
respect it is a ridiculous kind of evidence which is 
put forward as an item of torture, and for what pur- 
pose? — for the purpose of maldng this gentleman join 
theLN.A.l Does this stand to reason and common 
sense ? I submit “with great respect, that in spite of 
the picturesque language used,' the Court will not 
accept the version of the witness. It is a ridiculous 
thing. He was asked to do ordinary fatigue. This 
is legitimate work which ought to have been done 
willingly and it is ridiculous to suggest that this was a 
kind of torture used to induce or coerce the witness 
to join the I.H.A. That, Sirs, is the evidence of 
Ahmad Nawaz. 

Then, take the next witness, Havildar Muham- 
mad Sarwar. He said, ‘‘Everybody refused to join the 
I.N.A, The Jamadar and Subedar were armed with 
pistols and they took them out and started firing on us, 
and ordered the guard also to fire on us. The guard 
consisted of approximately li men They started 
firing. Two of us were killed......... Everybody said 

Allah-o-Akbar.” Now, I will read from the cross- 
examination of this gentleman. He said : ‘T was for 
three weeks in No. 4 hospital. It was a very big hospital. 
There wer e patients of all kinds there, i was taken to 
the hospi '^al I do not know^ wdio took me, because I 

was unconscious. There w'as an officer to whom I 

said that I was willing to join the I.N A. The only 
force that made me join the I.N.A. was that I wanted 
to escape this had treatment and bad food. When I 
joined the I.N.A,, I came to know that they were 
trying to free India.’’ And this is the gentleman who 
says that there was a regular firing in order to make 


11 ^ 


him join the I.N,A He goes on : ‘‘I knew I was expect- 
ed to go and fight. I knew it was a question of life 
and death. I thought that death was better than these 
troubles. I had no faith that they would set India 
free. I had every faith that if I went to the front, I 
might be able to go to the other side, because we had 
so many hardships otherwise. At the place where we 
were first, there were numerous other peo;^e besides 
the 300. I do not know the Camp Commander’s name. 
The Unit Commander was Lt. Purshotam Das. That 
was the Japanese Prisoners of War Camp • We were 
split up into parties for the purpose of fatigues. On 
the day prior to the firing accident, we were not divided 
into parties of 323 for fatigue purposes. We were not 
asked to from a party of 323 men. We were not given 
an order. I do not know anything about being asked 
to surrender our leaders. I never heard of it. It is 
not true that Lt. Purshotam Das advised us not to' 
resist. In the party which came to the Camp 
there was one * Muhammedan Jamadar. He was 
second-in-command of the guard. There was a 
scufile between the men of my unit and 
the guard after the firing had taken place. 
Only one man of the guard was killed. The guard 
consisted of about 300. The name of the guard who 
was killed was Sardar Singh, who belonged to the 
Kapiirthala Regiment. ” That will show who attacked 
first. I leave it to you, Gentlemen, to judge who 
was the attacker and who was the attacked. And 
remember this that they were in a party of a few 
hundred, Avhereas the guard consisted, as he puts it,, 
of 300 men, Because we refused to join the I. N. A.,, 
they started firing. ” That is the picture which we 
are asked to accept. I submit with very great respect 
that the story is a most incredible story. There was 
no conversation and they at once started firing 1 

Now, Sirs, that is the story which is presented 
to you for acceptance, and I ask the Court not to 
accept it because it is a ridiculous story. What is the 








idea' of 'dnng at the men whom they ask to joiii the 
I. N. A. ? What do you gain by it ? You gain this 
kind of soldiers with a view to fight ! My submission 
to the Court is that there was this scuffle which he 
reluctantly admits, and evidently they were the first 
attackers. But they have employed a little story by 
means of wjiich they say that there was firing on them. 
If the Counsel thinks that he can walk away with this 
story, I submit he is mistaken. But when you come to 
torture, I ask, is it supposed to be a torture ? It was 
an ordinary fatigue duty. In this connection, I would 
like to call the attention of the Court to the Geneva 
Conventions, Articles 27 to 34, with reference to the 
work of the prisoners of war on. page 298. I am talking 
of 1929- ‘ * They should be kept according to their 

rank and if they are physically fit they may be 
employed by private individuals, but the captors 
must assume entire responsibility for their main- 
tenance. 

Prosecution Counsel : I am afraid I must inter- 
rupt. The evidence is not as my learned friend reads 
it. The evidence is not that the guard was killed 
first. 

Sri Desai : What he said was : ‘^The name of the 
guard who was killed was Sardara Singh. There was 
no other member of the guard who died before Sardara 
Singh was killed.” I had not the’ least doubt about 
it. 


The point that I. submit to the Court is this. 
The witnesses fall into three types of classes. The 
first category belongs to the cow-killing incident. The 
second that the incident was with reference to refusal 
to do fatigues. The third relates to the incident of 
refusing to form parties for fatigues as required by 
the Japanese, whose prisoners they were. As a result 
of these three incidents, certain accidents occurred. I 
submit to the Court that the Government had definitely 


failed to prove any torture for the purpo^^ of 
jwning the I.N.A. Each of these accideats is attribut* 
able in two cases almost—to an admitted fact. In 
OTe case it is due to the form which the attack took. 
00 ith reference to the other witnesses, the less said the 
better. All that they have said was that they were 
asked to do certain duties which they thought was an 
indignityj which they were asked to do, which, I sub- 
mit, is ordinary decent labour. I know many men 
of higher rank who do gardening as a matter of 
honourable occupation, and as a change of occupation 
from ordinary work. What these gentlemen were 
really asked to do was gardening, and they seriously 
come here and say what an indignity it was to ask a 
soldier to do gardening. iVnd that is why he refused 
to Join the I.’N.A. The Counsel has entirely failed to 
prove what he set out to prove, and I feel the Court 
snould hold if it were necessary— according to my 
submission it is not neceasary at all — that it has not 
been proved, apart from what is read or stated or 
alleged, beyond any reasonable doubt, that any torture 
was inflicted in order to join the I. N. A. That, Sir, is 
my submission on that count. 

That is all that I wish to say about the evidence 
on the subject of atrocities alleged to have been 
committed on these men to join the I.N.A. With 
reference to the point that I mentioned in the morning 
as regards cases which might possibly be relied on, I 
will give yoii a list of the three oases which may be 
relied upon and givejmu my remarks on them. Before 
that I wish to make a submission. I will make a 
^quest at a later stage but I wish to mentiort to the 
Court in so far as any new authority is cited by my 
learned friend I do not w^ant a general right of reply 
but I will ask the Court in the end that on any new 
law that may be cited I may be allowed to give a reply 
because I could have no opportunity even by anticipa- 
tion of doing it. I will make that request more formally 
towards the end. The three cases which may be relied 


upon are Regiifi^ vrg. Lynoh (1903) 1 King’s Bemoh 
Regina vrs. Jaegrae (1907) Appeal Cases p. 346 and 
Regina vrs. Casement (1917) 1 King’s Bench. I do not 
wish to address you as if you were a high court, and 
therefore what I will do is this. There are two points 
which distinguish these oases which I will briefly state. 
They are cases of an individual being charged under 
the English law for an act of treason ; they were not, 
cases of men who were members of an organised army 
and of an organised Government. The second distin* 
guishing ground is that in these cases there was no 
question of what I have submitted shortly as double 
allegiance. Therefore my submission will be that if 
these cases are relied upon this is the answer that I 
have got with reference to them. I will now go on with 
the regular trend of my argument. 

The next point which I have to deal with before 
the Court is the evidence relating to the charges of 
murder, hut I will take them all together without 
attempting to distinguish them. But I distinguish 
them under two heads ; One is with reference to 
the four persons alleged to have been shot on one 
occasion and Muhammad Husain, the person shot on 
the second occasion. I will first briefly state the case 
as I desire to present to the Court, and then deal with 
the evidence. It is a matter in which with due 
submission I probably will call attention in some 
greater detail to the evidence of three or four witnesses. 
As to the others, I will only make a submission 
as to what they said. 

The position with reference to that is this. As 
regards the four persons there is a crime report and 
therefore up to the point of punishment there is evi- 
dence before the Court. As regards Muhammad 
Husain there is no crime report. In fact as regards 
Muhammad Husain there is no document whatever 
relating either to the sentence being passed or the 
sentence being carried out. Further, there is not even 


a easiialty. record iii either case, that I find on the 
record. As to Muhammad Husain the only answer 
given hy oneof the witnesses as to why a casualty report 
was not made was that they were moving from Popa 
that day, and then when I further cross- examinaed 
him— which you will find in the cross-examination 
when I come to it^ — ^he has given no adequate explana- 
tion for the absence of the casualty report. There i& 
this further evidence— I am only anticipating it — ^that 
in the case of Muhammad Husain there are three 
persons who are alleged to have shot, — Jagiri Earn 
and two others, whom Jagiri Earn himself did not 
know. I do not wish to enter into details at this 
moment except when I read it, but I wish to point out 
the salient features. It is said in the evidence that 
Muhammad Husain had three shots on his heart or 
near thereabout. It is further said in the evidence— 
he said this — that there was a tear in the shirt ; and 
further in answer to the court, which is a most mate- 
rial point, he said there was no blood of any kind or 
sort. That is the state of evidence with reference to 
Muhammad Husain, 

And now I will deal with the two sets of cases. 
There is one other ruling which I should have mentioned 
and that is that there is in evidence before the Court 
that Lt. Dhillon who is said to have signed and 
watched the sentence carried out was in a state of 
complete collapse of health and on that the document 
before the Court is Exhibit WV. And the date of 
that document is 6th March 1945, the date on which 
it is alleged this execution was carried out. I am 
reading the relevant part of that document which is 
at the bottom. 

Jai Hind — I think most of your queries 
have been answered in this order. 
Others I will answer when I come tomorrow. 

I ought tO' have come today but last night I 
went to check certain defences and on my 


; 124 


^ arrival back I felt very weak ^ so weak that 
I have never felt before thronghont my life. 
Major Shankar gave me an injection today 
thongh for a complete course I must get 12 
here when there are none available. I will 
get one tomorrow. ” 

My case is that so far as carrying out the 
sentence on the four persons is concerned, though 
in fact the order was passed, it was never carried out. 
hTot only that, but I will be able to point out from the 
evidence on record that there are many other similar 
instances, sworn to and admitted by the witnesses for 
the Prosecution. That is in outline why I submit that 
the case in so far as the execution of the sentence is con- 
cerned, is not proved. I may go a little farther and state 
to the Court that there is no presumption that because 
sentences were passed they were therefore carried out. 
The charge of murder has got to be proved by 
proving completely what is called the corpus delicti of 
that particular person. And I will say that if there is 
a reasonable doubt in your mind that the Prosecution 
hasfailed to prove the actuM execution of the sentence, 
my clients are entitled to the benefit of that doubt. 

That is the position with reference to the 
executions. There are four witnesses with reference 
to Muhammad Husain. As regards the first witness 
Havildar Ghulam Muhammad, the evidence need not 
be read to the Court because all that he says is that 
he was brought up before Capt. Shah Nawaz, 
which in fact is not denied. There is this in 
Ohulam Muhammad’s evidence : 

‘T know Havildar " Ganga Sarah, The First 
Battalion Commander reported that he 
(Ganga Saran) had refused to obey his orders. 

He was a sub-officer in the I.N. A. He was 
produced before Col. Sahgal for this offence 
and was tried and sentenced to death. He 
was afterwards pardoned and released.” 


Havildar Gauga Saran himself in hi? cross- 
examination has admitted .that as a fact. 

The next witness is Sepoy Allah Ditta (P.W. 24) 
He deals with the earlier part of the story, namely 
his intention to desert. This is what he says : 

. '‘Muhamfnad Hussain said ‘I had a few 
difficulties and therefore I intended to 
desert’. But ho inquiries were made into 
his complaints. Muhammad Hussain was 
told by Col. Shah Nawaz : * You are sentenc- 
ed to death by shooting because you intended 
to dessert yourself ai>d were persuading others 
to do the same. Therefore you are not 
pardoned.’ I heard Col. Shah Nawaz 
say : , “Put off the case to the Regimental 
Commander”. (Note by Court : Witness used 
the words in English). Then we all three of 
us were sent out. I recognise Col. 
Shah Nawaz Khan as an accused before the 
Court. We waited there for ten minutes 
and were brought back to Brigade Head- 
quarters. Muhammad Hussain, Jagiri Ram 
and myself came together back to Brigade 
Headquarters. Muhammad Hussain and my- 
self were put back in the same cell in which 
we were before and Khazin Shah took away 
Jagiri Ram. The same day at about 5 p.m. 
Sardar Muhammad, Adjutant of our Battalion 
and Aya Singh took away Muhammad Hussain. 

I have never seen Muhammad Hussain since 
then.” 

Then, Sir, in cross-examination he said : 

“No decision was arrived at either in my case 
or in the ease of Jagiri Ram.” 

The Court, will remember that there were three 
people, and it is common ground that as regards 
two the sentence was hot carried out. 








“It is true that all that Col. Shah Nawaz Khan 
said was : “You deserx^e to be shot.'' CoL 
Shah Nawaz Khan said that rebels like yon 
will be sentenced to death by shooting. 

Col- Shah Nawaz Khan told Muhammad 
Hnssaiii : “Yon yonrse.f wanted to escape; 
secondly, yon have tried to persuade others 
to escape; therefore,, you are a rebel to the 
I.N.A. and sentenced to death by shooting." 

I saw Col. Shah Nawaz Khan write something 
on the crime report. How could I read the 
crime report without picking it up from the 
table, I do not understand English. " 

I come to the part of the story which in itself 
has not the same importance as what it indicates, 
showing that the witness w-as a completely factual 
witness. The man does not knoAv English and yet he 
says “he was waiting a crime report", and the object 
of the cross-examination is to showr that he told a set 
storywhich he himself could not Lave possibly seen 
or done, and that is the kind of witness he is. That 
is then object of that part of the cross-exami- 
nation. 

“ I saw Col. Shah Naw^az Khan write some- 
thing on the crime report." 

The man says he does not know w’^hat is crime, 
but he was told what is a crime report. Yet he is 
asked to tell a set story that there was a crime report 
which CoL Shah Nawaz Khan was actually writing, 
because he was called upon to prove that it was a 
crime report and sentence was written on it. 


“ I saw CoL Shah Nawaz Khan write some- 
thing on, the crime report. How could I read 
the crime report, without picking it up from 
the table ? , I do not understand English. 




||||» 



I do not know what- he wrote and where, be- 
cause I do not know English and i was not 
reading the crime report at that time.” 

And the only re-examination is : 

The crime reports were lying on the table 
and Col. Shah Nawaz Khan read them out as 
he spoke to us individually. He wrote on the 
crime report which had already been drawn 


That is his part of the story. Then we come 
to the actual evidence of persons by whom sentence 
is said to be carried out,— Jagiri Ram. You have seen 
him in the witness box. He is in the Nursing De- 
partment. He admitted to the Court that he had 
never handled a gun in his life, or a ride, or any shoot- 
ing instrument. But in order to give the colour of 
truth, Jagiri Ram is made to say this : “ I was unwill- 
ing ; I do not know how to shoot ; I have never handled 
a shooting instrument, but a gun was put on my 
•shoulder...”. I ask you, Sirs, to give me the benefit 
•of any description on his part ra^ther than attempt 
to construct the story for him as if he did so. Then 
he put the gun here and the trigger was pulled and it 
■seems, that this, untutored rifleman was extraordinarily 
-accurate, that along with the others all the three 
shots lodged in the chest of the deceased. Sirs, it 
will be for you to judge the story. I am going to 
:read out only that part of it which is material : 

^Tknew Muhammad Hussain and Allah Ditta. 
Muhammad Hussain, myself and a Garhwali 
talked about escape when we were in Popa 
Hil area. While we were talking of escape 
Khafih Shah sent an orderly and ordered us 
to report to Battalion Headquarters. 

'.^ 28 ' 







Muhammad Hussain said that he had men- 
tioned to Jagiri Ram and Alla Bitta jokingly 
about an escape. Khajin Shah questioned me 
and asked if they mentioned this jokingly. 
I replied that I had no proof of his inten- 
tion to escape, but he fnentioned it jokingly 
to me. Mohd. Hussain and myself were 
tied to a tree near the Battalion Head- 
■quarters, while Khajin Shah was questioning 
tis. Khajin Shah questioned me as to who 
Tvas trying to escape and I said that I did 
not .know the name of any one who was 
trying to escape. Then Mohd. Husssain 
was questioned. He also said that he did 
not know anything. After sunset Khajin 
•Bhah took Mohd. Hussain and myself to 
Brigade Headquarters. 'When I was taken 
to Brigade Headquarters, Mohd. Hussain, 
Khajin Shah and one sentry were with me. 
Brigade Headquarters were near a nullah. 
■On arrival at Brigade Headquarters, Khajin 
■Shah went to a telephone and after that Alla 
Bitta also arrived at the nullah. After that 
all three of us, Mohd. Hussaiu, Alla Bitta and 
myselt- were put in the Quarter Guard and 
•our hands were tied. On the following day, 
we were brought before Cbl. Sahgal. Col. 
Sahgal questioned me as to whether I intend- 
ed to escape. I said no, I did not intend 
■to escape. Buring this conversation with 
■Col. Sahgal, other people present were 
Major Negi and Khajin Shah. Col. Sahgal 
asked me if I had reported to any one after 
Mohd. Hussain had mentioned to me about 
escape. I said I did not know anything 
about Mohd. Hussain, and I did not reply to 
any N. C. 0. I worked with my Medical 
Officer. Then we cams Gut of the room and 
went back to the Quarter Guard. Then Lt 


each one of us a beating and said that he 
would release ns if we would tell him the 
names of the people who intended to esca|)e. 

I continued to say that I did not know. Next 
day we were taken to Divisional Commander 
Shah Nawaz Khan, We were accompanied 
by Major Negi, Ediajin Shah and a sentry. 

All three of us, myself { J agiri Ram) , Alla Ditta 
and Mohd. Hnssain, were lined up before the* 
Divisional Commander. The Divisional Com- 
mander asked me to speak the truth 
whether I intended to escape. I said no 
intend to escape, Capt. Sha.h Nawaz Khan 
asked us why we did not report the matter. 

I said that I did not know anything about 
it, and I did nof intend to escape. He asked 
if there was any officer or N. C. 0. near 
me. I said no, I was working with 
my medical officer. Then Captain'* Shah 
Nawaz Khan asked Alia Ditta : When 

Muhammad Hussain had talked to you about 
escaping, did you report to any one Allah 
Ditta said: ‘VI do hot know anything about 
Mohd. Hussain’s escape ; I thought it was a. 
joke, I do not know anything about it. ” 
Captain Shah Nawaz Khan then said to AUah 
Ditta : ‘‘ You are an N. C. 0. Why did you 
not report Alla Ditta begseed his pardon , 
and said that he did not know anything 
about Mohd. Hussain. Then Capt. Shah 
Nawaz Khan questioned Mohd. Hussain, and 
Mohd. Hussain replied that he was in difficult- 
ies and that he intended to escape and ask- 
ed to be forgiven, Capt. Shah Nawaz Khan 
then told him : “ You are not for our country; 
you are our enei^iy. I will give you death 
by shooting, ’’ Then Mohd. Husain asked for 
forgivness, and said he was prepared to go 
anywhere he was ordered, Capt. Shah 
Nawaz said nothing to this. ” 




The whole importance of the question 
whether ra fact any sentence was actually prcnounced- 
But, whether or not it was * pronouncedf, the ultimate 
issue is, whether it was carried out; Bike the case of 
the other two co-accused — Jagiri Ram and the other 
man — he said that nothing was decided, and 

all three of us were then sent out, and we 
were taken to Brigade Headquarters accom- 


hen comes the next material part of the 


story 


Khazin Shah told me, * You will shoot 
Mohd. Hussain, because you are one of the 
men who were trying to escape with himh I 
declined and said I will not shoot 

1 have ^ understood many psycholo^ 
problems but this particular one is curious, nan 
that a man who d )es not know hnw. tn cKrki-k-f. 


cannot shoot, is ihlade to shoot jnst ,a» a sort of 
punishment, which I do not understand, and which 
I trust you will not be able to understand even if you 
set a problem to yourself. 

‘‘Khazin Shah told me: “You will shoot 
Muhammad Hussain, because you are one of 
the men who were trying to escape, with 
him.” I declined and said I will not shoot 
him and that I did not know how to fire a 
rifle. Khazin Shah told nie again: “If you do 
not shoot Muhammad Hussain, you will be 
shot yourself. I still refused and he drew his 
pistol.” 

I can only express my inability to understand 
this particular psychology except a very foolish 
invention. . - 

I refused again and Aya Singh got hold of a 
rifle* He put the rifle to my shoulder and 
put my finger round the trigger. Khazin 
Shah told Aya Singh to gi\"e the order to fire. 
There were three of us, one Singh, one Tamil 
and myself. Mohd. Hussain was blindfolded 
by Aya Singh. He was made to sit on the 
* ground with his back against a tree stump 
and his hands were tied behind his back, 

Aya Singh ordered me to fire and ail three 
fired. Muhammed Hussain died there. 
Khazin Shah ordered Aya Singh to give the 
order to fir© and Aya Singh gave it. Khazin 
Shah told me to report to my company and 
not to come to the Battalion Headquarters. 
That, evening we marched off to Logyi. Then 
we stayed at Logyi two oj; three days. Then 
I ’^eht over to the British.” 

The cross-examination is further continued : 

“ After I^had made the statement it was read 
over to me and I was asked whether it was 



the correct version of mj statement and I 
said: “Yes, it was”. I was again shown 
my statement day before yesterday and I 
was asked if the contents were correct and 
I said : “Yes.” It was translated to me in 
Hindustani and read over to me, and I also 
repeated my statement once again and they 
both tallied. 1 have had no training in the 
use of weapons. I Joined the army, I worked 
as a servant and a labourer. On joining hos- 
pital, I was trained in the work of bandaging 
patients and making their beds. I had 
nothing to do with the fighting part of the 
army. Except when the patients were sent 
to the hospital I had nothing to do with the 
men of the fighting units. ” ......... 


The point which I wish to make is that not one of 
the persons is able to identify any of them by even the 
remotest possible description, and you cannot prove the 
death of “A” by saying that I saw somebody shoot 
someone whom I cannot identify. Continuing he said : 


“Mohd. Husain and the Garhwali I have 
referred to were members of the fighting units. 
At the time of the conversation they were 
not sick. I did not know them before the 
conversation, but they were living in the same 
company. I had no talk with them before, 
but when they came to my company I was 
in company headquarter^'^. When this conver- 
sation took place I was in Popa Camp. I had 
neV-er been to Burma before. Before joining 
the I.K.A., we were given very hard fatigues 
by the Japanese in connection with the load- 
ing of coal at the ports day and night I do 

not know the name of the Garhwali to whom 
I have referred.” 


■■ i , . 

The test is whether the other alleged conspira- 
tors were known to him. 

“ I know he was a Garhwali because he lived 
with us and he spoke Garhwali. I had never 
talked either to the Garhwali or to Muhammad 
Husain before the day Mohd. Husain joined 
company headquarters, I had never spoken 
to the Garhwali before that day in the iiuilah ; 
and from that day’s conversation 1 say 
that he was a Garhwali. I do not know' any 
language or dialect beyond the dialect which 
I speak. 

I came to know Mohammad Husain in com- 
pany. He used to live with me at head- 
quarters. He used to sit in my company. I 
know he was a Mohammadan, I do not know 
' anything jmore about him. He used to speak 
in Punjabi with me. He used to live with 
me, surely I knew him. I cannot give a long 
description of him except his physical descrip- 
tion, I do not know anything else about him. 

It was by chance that Mohd. Husain and I 
got together and the Garhwali arrived in the 
* meantime. 

When I was arrested I said that I never 
intended to run away because I would have 
been also shot otherwise. I knew Lt. Aya 
Singh because he was in my company. 1 know 
he is alive. I saw him in Jigargacha and 
Chittagong. The last time I saw him w'as in 
Chittagong where he arrived two or three day» 
after my arrival there in about May last. 

‘‘ I saw Oapt. Shah Nawaz Khan at Divi- 
sional Headquarters. There 'vtere other 
orderlies and sepoys there. I do not remember 
having seen any officers other than Capt'. Shah 

m ^ 



JSTawaz Khan. I do not know the English word 

crime I. know the word report ” in the 
words ** crime report which are Avritten on 
a piece of paper now shown to me. There was 
no need for anybody to teach me the meaning 
of crime report when I was about to be 
produced. ’’ 

I put it to him to asoertaih if he understands 
the explanation. There cannot be any other 
explanation except^ tutoring. 

I was told that a crime report would be 
put up against me and that we three men 
would be brought before Capt. Shah Nawaz 
Khan. No announcement was made before 
me in respect of anybody except Mohd. 
Husain being ordered to be shot. Capt. Shah 
Nawaz Khan did not say anything about my- 
self and Alla Hitta. Alia Dita was not present 
with us when we conferred in the nullah 

Mohd. Husain admitted that he had inten- 
ded to run away ; that he wanted to run away 
because he was in trouble ; and asked to be for- 
ghmn and said that ho was prepared to go 
anywhere tliat he was ordered to. After 
that Capt. Shah Nawaz Khan «aid that he 
(Mohd. Hussain) was not for his c nintry ; that 
he was an enemy, and that hewvould give him 
death by shooting. We Avere then marched out. 

I am quite clear that nothing else happened. 

“ I was given a rifle at the time of the shoot- 
ing of Mohd. Husain. I do not know any 
weapons other than a rifle. The rifle wms put 
on my shoulder in the aiming position by Aya 
Singh. I do not know the names of the Tamil 
and the Sikh who were present at the shooting 
of Mohd, Husain, but they were both ];)resent 
■on the scene when I arrived. I do not know 


135 



anything else about them or what th«y did^ 

I do not know their names but I have seen 
them in Battalion Headquarters* I cannot say 
anything more about them than what I have 
said. I was not myself then. The nfle wa& 
put into position and I was told to hold it. I 
held it with the help of Aya Singh. The rifl'o 
was pointing to MoM. Husain. He was sit- 
ting on the ground about 5 yards away. I 
pressed the trigger when one-two-three was?^ 
said Three shots were fired but I do not 
know which shot shot him down. I did not 
go to Mohd. Husain’s body to see how many 
shots had penetrated it. I did not go near 
Mohd. Husain’s body after the firing. Thp 
last time I saw it, it was lying there.” 

This is the account given by Jagiri Ram and 
the most important points are these : First, that be 
did not know his fellow shooters and he cannot identify 
them. Secondly, he admits that Khajin Shah and Aya 
Singh are both alive. The third thing that he says is 
that I do not know Mohammad Husain and tbere is no 
intelligible ground given why a man who did not know 
how to shoot was made to go through this process and 
it is for the Court to give some explanation. I can 
only submit that I can find none, and under these cir- 
cumstances, I ask you to say that this witness’s evi- 
dence is evidence which falls short of proof of the death 
of a particular individual otherwise not described, and 
in the absence of two persons who have not been pro- 
duced before this Court. 

'fhen, Sir, there is one more witness on this- 
point, and that is witness L/Naik Sardar Mohammad- 
I will read the evidence which relates to this matter. 

I knew Mohammad Hussain. On the 
27 til March Lt. Kliajin Shah sent for the 
runners. On arrival of the runners he" 



ordered them to bring the following men to the 
Battalion Headquarters : Sepoy Mohammad 
Hussain. Lance Naik Alla Ditta, Lance 
Naifc Mohammad Shafi, Sepoy Jagiri Ram 

and Sepoy Gobbru Singh Kbajin Shah 

told me that these men intended to run 
away. He further told me that be was go- 
ing to Brigade Headquarters that evening to 

talk about these men, and he went away 

I met Lt. Khajin Shah on the way and 
I handed over these men to his charge. 
He let off Lance-Naik Mohammad Shafi 
on the spot, because his platoon com- 
mander had recommended him, and I came 
back. He said that Mohammad Husain had 
been sentenced to be shot.^’ 


I submit with due respect that it is not 
good evidence. 

‘‘to be snot. Nothing was said about others, 
but Jagiri Ram was with him at the time. 
He asked me to go to Ghulam Mohammad, 
the Brigade Adjutant and ask him whether 
Mohammad Hussain was to be shot under 
Battalion arrangements or Brigade arrange- 

I w’as also asked to bring 

Sepoy Mohammad Ibrahim who had been 
released from the quarter guard. I 
received instructions that Mohd. Hussain 
was to be shot under Battalion arrangements 
and on the same day. I brought him back 
With me to Battalion Headquarters. . . I 
conveyed these orders to Lt. Khajin Shah. 
Lt. Khajin Shah then ordered me to 
grange for the execution cf Mohammad 

Hussain He asked mo to detail 10 men 

with pick-axe and shovels. 1 detailed these 
men to dig a grave. I know that a grave 
a. dug. I was then ordered by Lt. 


Klhajm .Shah to take Slohammaxl Hiissain 
to the edge of a nullah. Mohammad 
Hussain was taken to the edge of the 
nullah. Lt. Khajin vShah, 2nd Lt* Aya 
Singh and Havildar- Major Govind Singh, 
some sepoys and myself went with 
Mohammad Hussain to the nullah. Lt. 
Kha jin Shah ordered Mohammad Hussain to 
5>e tied to a tree And also ordered that he 
should be blindfolded. I passed on the 
•orders to Sub-Officer Govind Singh who 
carried them out with the help of two 
other sepoys. After this Lt. Khajin 
Shah called two men out of the fatigue party 
to shoot Mohammad Hussain. They were 
both sepoys, one was a Tamil and the 
other was a Sikh, x^fter the arrival of 
these men, Khajin Shah ordered that Jagiri 
Ram would also fire on Mohammad Hussain. 
The three men stood in a line facing 
Mohammad Hussain and Khajin Shah told 
Aya Singh to give the order to fire. x\ya 
Singh hesitated. Khajin Shah once again told 
him to give the order to fire. Aya Singh 
gave the order, “Kneeling Fire.” All 
the three sepoys^ fired a round each on 
Mohammad Hussain. Mohammad Hussain 
was killed. His body rolled over sldew^ays. 
Khajin Shah then ordered me fo send 

Abdul Hakim to arrange for his burial 

Ho casualty report was sent. The sending 
of a casualty report was part of my 
* duties. I did hot make a casualty report 
because night had fallen and we had to 
inarch the same night. On the 3rd April 
I escaped and reported to the allied 
forces 

“The. night that Mohammad Hussain was 
shot we moved to Logyi. That w^as ou the 
29th March, 1945. 


That question was put with a view to find out 
the connection between that day and the day of 
escape. 

I did not have the time to prepare a 

casualty report of Muhammad Hussain’s 
death. On the 1st April 1945 I did not take 
a casualty report to Capt. Sahgal. I do know 
if any was sent. I knew Jagiri Ram from 
^le day he was arrested and taken to Brigade 
H. Q, I had been posted to the regiment 
oiily three or four days previously, airid that 
is why I did not know Jagiri Ram. I knew 
that he was a non-combatant nursing orderly. 

Aya Singh Avas helping Jagiri Ram to fire 
the rifle. He was standing near him. 

Jagiri Ram fired with help. Lt. Khajin Shah 
ordered that Jagiri Ram will also be one of 
the firing squad. I could not see very well 
but the firing squad had been orderd to adopt 
the kneeling position and the}^ did kneel a bit. 

1 do not rernember whether tJagiri Ram was 
standing or in the kneeling position. I was 
between 12 and 15 yards away Avhen Mohd. 
Hussain fell. I went away after giving orders 
to ^bdul Hakim. I went near Mohd. Hussain 
and found that he was dead. He had three 
shots in him. The shirt covering his left 
breast w-as torn and from the amount 
ot tear I considered there were three 
shots. I was not present at his burial. 

(Question by, the Judge- Advocate) : 

1 When I found that three shots had gone into 
hina and that he was lying on a side 1 inferred 
that he was dead. The firing was about 8 to 
10 yards away from Mohd. Hussain. The 
s looting of Mohd. Hussain occurred at about 
dusk. I did not see any blood on Mohd. 
Hussain. 


m 

/ 


This is th^ whole of the evidence that yon have 
before the Court and. with the absence of Khajin Shah 
and Ay a Singh, with the inexplicable alleged joining of 
Jagiri Ram, with the complete unidentification of the 
other two persons who joined in the shooting, and with 
the most extraordinary story of three shots having gone 
into the body of this man in one and the same place 
and not a single drop of blood was found, I submit to 
the Court that the evidence falls short of any proof of 
the execution of this sentence. 

Though it is a small point Jagiri Ram 
himself said that he fired the rifie standing and I have 
a vivid recollection that later on, when he was asked to 
say where his muzzle was pointing he was completely 
at sixes and sevens to answer the question or to explain 
the position, or to answer where and how he held the 
rifle and where he aimed and how he shot. That is 
the position in so far as the record is concerned. 

Then to the evidence relating to the alleged 
shooting of the four persons. The first and the most 
important point in reference to that shooting is the 
exhibit 3V which I have read to the Court. If you 
had such clear evidence it is obvious that the other 
evidence must be rejected. You have the evidence 
about the condition in which Lt. Dhillon then was. 
The submission I am making to the Court is that 
this event did not take place because the whole of the 
story hinges around order after order being given by 
Lt. 'Dhillon. I am able to show, as I submit I am able 
to show, that document was written at a time when 
there was not the remotest occasion of making up any 
document whatsoever as to the condition of his health. 
But the fact remains that the previous night he had 
gone out on reconnoitering and he came back, 
and I ask you to pay attention, in a condition so -weak 
ohat he had never felt like that in his life before. He 
was actually given an injection by the doctor, that 1 1 
more had to he given, and it was difficult to find any 


140 


! more medicine. For chat teasdn alone, if there were 

no other reason, the piotnresque account given by the 
two witnesses, whose evidencfe I am going to read as to 
, ^ the company being called out and Lt. Dhillon standing 

and giving orders and calling each man, is a story 
entirely untrue. More , than that, the story of the 
location of it all seems to be completely upsetting. 

As to one of the two witnesses a comment is 
^ necessary. He had no intelligible reason to he there; 

and he had medicines to give as I shall presently 
point out. He also happens to be one of the members 
of the nursing staff and he said he had no reason to 
remain there. But the still more important thing is 

that the second person says— his evidence shows 

that the first witness was not there. What do yon 
make of that? 

Counsel for the Prosecution : He does not say 
* that he was not there. He only says, did not see 
any other man.” 

^ ^ Sri Desai: I say that the true inference 

is that he was not there, because he said he saw 
nobody, no stranger. The evidence suffers from such 
grievous infirmities ; first, the practical improbability 
of the person who gave orders for shooting being there. 
Of course one can disregard anything ; hut after all you 
are to judge by human standards and not by possibiii- 
ties. In fact I do go as far as this: supposingf a charge of 
, this kind had been brought— apart from a trial of this 

kmd'Y 'and evidence had been given as to the impro- 
bability of the person who is alleged to have given 
orders for shooting being there, no jury would ever 
^ venture to convict him. You may say : ^‘Oh, yes 

the man was ill but we stiE believe he went there/’ Of 
co^se you are entitled to do so ; you are iudaes- 
I do not deny that. But I ask you to be judges on 
material before you ; and the material before you is 
such that as judges of fact it is impossible at all events 
as I respectfully put it then and put it now— if you 


141 


had a reasonable doubt that Lt. Dhillon conld not 
hare been there that day, I submit there is an end of 
the case. Any other picturesque description is immate- 
rial. What is material is that the man who is alleo-ed 
to liave given orders for the shootiiig was not there ; 
and whether he was there or not depends on the state 
of his health, as to which there i£ a contemporaneous 
report ; and I submit to* the Court that it would be 
highly dangerous to accept, in the state of that man’s 
health, the story df these tw^o men. As to both of them 
I will be able to , point out inherently from their own 
evidence that they are not witnesses of truth ; and that, 
you' prefer that evidence and act on yoi.)r own peril. I 
submit that is the real issue before the Court. I will 
read the evidence of the other two persons who said 
they were there. 

There is another point which also c:5mes out. 
There is no identification of the persons alleged to have 
been shot with the persons mentioned in the crlne- 
report, I do submit to the Court that if you find a 
crime report and on the strength of that document ib 
is quite easy to have two willing witnesses of this 
kind—peopie who, I submit, on their own confessioa 
(and I can show it by examination of their evidence) 
ought not to be believed. I say the strongest piece of 
evidence in my client’s favour is the evidence of his 
state of health that day, and you cannot disregard it.. 
You can say: “Oh, no; never mind how his health was ; 
we still believe be was there.” But I submit that- 
that is a process of reasoning which is not, what I may 
•call, founded on justice or will be accepted by this- 
Court. I will read the evidence of the first witness on 
this point: 

“One day I was carrying a patient and saw 
four men near, a nullah whoso hands were tied 
behind their backs and who were escorted by 
two .-^entries. When I was coming back after 
leaving the patient in hospital, I noticed some 



men assembled near the nullah. Seeino; this: 
assembly of men, I went up there. When I 
reached there, one company was fallen in, and 
a trench had been dug there. The four men 
were made to sit in the' trench. Then Major 
Dhillon asked for volunteers to shoot these 
men. Two men from that company and one- 
man from Brigade H; Q. came up. Their 
names were Naik Sher Singh, Kalu Earn and 
Hidayatullah. Two carried rifles and one a 
pistol; Sher Singh had the pistol. Then 
Major Dhillbn called out the name of one of 
the four men in the trench. Major Dhillon 
told the company present that these four men, 
had gone over to the enemy and had been' 
caught, and therefore their punishment would 
be death. Then Major Dhillon ordered 
Hidayatullah to shoot the prisoner who had 
been called out of the trench first. By this 
time this prisoner had ooine out of the trench. 
He was standing on tile edge of the trench! 
This prisoner was then shot by Hidayatullah 
and he fell down. The prisoner was not blind- 
folded, He was about 20 yards from Hidaya- 
tullah when fired upon.” 


Then there is the description about the other- 
three men in the same way. Then he says : 


“I did not see them moving after Sher Singh 
had fired. Then I saw Captain Lee, the 
Medical Officer of the Battalion examine 
them. Captain Lee said something to Major 
Dhillon.” 


Captain Lee is another witness who should have 
I een called to prove this : 


“Afterwards Major Dliillon ordered the dead 
bodies to be buried. I did not see them 


buried..,.. J over to tbe Giir^ba Regi- 
ment a fortnight after these men were shot. 
These four men who were shot were Jats. I 
know ttotixing else about them/' 

It is most extraordinary. You have A.B.C. and 
D to ^i^^th, and you are asked to believe 

the one man who did not know who they were. In a 
trial for murder, if you are told that A was ordered to 
be shot and some one says : saw somebody shot 

and therefore I come to the conclusion that A was shot,” 
I think one would be shocked to hear sneh a thing. I 
submit we have made our points quite clear in cross- 
examination, This witness said : 

‘T have never seen these men before. I did 
not know where they had come from.” 

It is not the charge at all that any four men 
were shot for any other crime or for no reason whatever. 
You are not called upon to say whether some other 
men were shot or why they were shot. That is not the 
charge. 

Having dealt with the first part, which I do not 
want to repeat again, you will see how many infirmities 
are there. First, the improbability of Lt Dhilion 
being there, according to the description in the sick 
report : next, no identification of any of the four men, 
never having been seen by these two men before. 1 
do not say merely the cumulative effect of the whole 
thing — but even if any one of thenv was wanting you 
cannot say it is proved. 

Then I have tried to prove from this evidence as 
far as it is possible to do so, as to whether or not he 
was required to go back to his duties, and he ultimate- 
ly had to admit that he could not be there in the pro- 
per discharge of his duties ; and after all the way in 
W/hich you will judge a man is not by merely saying 


wivn they did, but by the probabilities of. circums 
taiiees. If a maa is expected to be on duty, and he 
says he stayed away out of sheer curiosity, W'oiild you 
rather prefer to believe that he went to his duty and 
was not there, or are you prepared to- say,, just because 
he said so, that he was there ? He says further : 

“I stopped there for about half an hour.” It 
is rather important from the point of view which I 
submit is of a manin that condition, w’^hlcli as I said, is a 
fact winch you cannot p)ossibly disregard. In that 
condition, according to him, this process took half an 
hour. Then he says : 

I liacl nothing to do with either the men 
who were present there or the incident which 
took place there, I cannot tell the date or 
the week or the month on which this incident 
happened. I went over to the Gurkha 
Eegiment which was in a nearby village, the 
name of which I do not know. The incident 
to which I referred happened in 1945. I 
did not mention this incident at all in the 
Gurkha Regiment. I did not talk to ajiybody 
out of the assembly in the nullah. The 
company assembled in the nullah was about 
iOO strong.” 

The next %vitnes8 will tell you there were about 
25 men there — 

I did not see any outsider apart from the 
officers, the company and myself.” 

If in the teeth of that, the Advocate-Genera 
sti'il insists that my interpretation of the evidence 
of the otuer man that he was no stranger is 
not correct, i ask the Court hot to accept such 
an argument, because he may be plain and tell 
us who were there. I cross-examined the other 
witness and asked him whether besides the 


officers and tlie company there was any stranger, and 
he said ‘ No ’ ; and if after that I am to be told that I 
have not proved from the motith of the other witness 
that the first witness was not there, it is an untrue 
interpretation of the evidence. He further says : 

“ I knew the names of Hidayatullah, Sepoy 
Kalu Barn and Naik Sher Singh because they 
belonged to my Battalion. My duty was 
to render first-aid. I never prefered first-aid 
to the three men I have mentioned. While 
at Popa, the Battalipn consisted of 200 to 250 
men. The three men do not come from the 
same place in India as I do. I do not know 
where they come from. I had no personal 
contact with these three men before that 
date. I had nothing to do with them after 
the incident.'’ 

I say the probability is one in a thousand — 
the man knows nothing before, knows nothing 
afterwards ; does not shoot and does not know how 
to shoot ; has no business to be there ; and yet you are 
asked to believe that evidence that the shooting took 
place. I submit it is a story which men of reason, just 
as we have on this tribunal, will not accept. The 
evidence goes (5n — 

‘‘ They used to be in my Battalion and I 
knew them. I cannot give the nominal roll 
of all the men of the Battalion. I know the 
names of some but not of all men in the 
Battalion. I can give the names of 10 or 12 

people in the Battalion I did not talk to 

any of these men before that date. I have 
never seen these three men since.” — (that is 
with reference to the persons alleged to have 
been shot). 

“ I was 10 to 12 yards away from Major 
Dhillon. Nobody asked me why I was stand- 





ing therft. I had nothing to do with wha^) 
Major Dhillon said on that occasion. I am 
not a poet. I am not a writer either. I 
swear and say to the Court that I remember 
every detail of what I have told the Court. 

* 1 remember very well that none of the first 
men nor any of the other men were blind- 
folded. I omitted this detail in my evidence 
because 1 was not asked. I said that three 
volunteered to shoot these four men. The 
whole company was armed. Most of them 
had rifles and a few of them had not. I knew 
at that time the name of the man whom 
_Major Dhillon selected tD shoot first. I do not 
know the names of any of the four men who 
were shot nor do I know their identity. After 
the shooting, Major Dhillon went away and 
so I went away as well. At the beginning I 
did not know what was happening there, but 
when I came to know what was happen! nv 

there, I stayed on to see tho end. I was 12 
to 13 yards away from the place where these 
men fell. This occurred at about 4 o’clock 
in the afternoon. I did not have a watch.” 

The next improbability is that at the time there 
were sudden air raids, and this process which 
according to the witness went on for half an- hour is a 
matter for you to consider. But the important 
points are those which I mentioned first. This witness 
himself says : 

“• The place was subject to air attacks during 

those days Aeroplanes used to come over- 

us frequently. There were trenches about % 
and the nullah was a sheltered area. I do not 

know the persons who chose the nullah 

I am shown my statement of the summary of 
evidence. I signed that statement and 
identify my signature. It wfl,.s 


me before I signed it. My attention is drawn 
: tO' the passage. ' As far as I remember, I said 
^ that Major Bhillon had ordered Sher Singh to 
fire a pistol, bnt it was not taken down.’’ 

i mean, he is quite willing to- improi^e on aiiy 
story so long as yon ask him to do so. 

I was not interested in Captain Bee’s 
examination or his report. I was not 
interested in their burial either. Barbans 
Singh gave orders for their burial in my 
presence.” ' 

Questioned by the Court he said r 

This company in, the nullah was properly 
fallen in. These men were in front of the . 
company. The company was about 10 or 12 
yards from these men and I stood near the 
company on one side. Major Bhillon gave 
orders for the fourth man to be shot.” 

Sepoy Gian Singh : I remember four men 
being shot there. At about 4 o’clock one evening our 
company got orders to fall in in a nullah. On arrival 
there I saw four men whose hands , were tied behind 
their backs. They were in a trench. Major Bhillon 
said that these four men had tried to go over to the 
British and so they were sentenced to death.” Then 
he gives the names and details of the shooting of each 
man. ** These four men who were killed were Jats. 
I do not know anything more about them.” For all 
I care any four Jats were killed, that would be the 
proof. That this particular sentence was carried out 
wquld be, I submit, the height of improbability, and 
unless there is definite evidence that the four particular 
individuals named in the crime report were shot, as 
having been identified as having been shot, I 
submit to the Court that you cannot possibly hold that 
these particular four persons were shot. The charge 




isai(ing or abetting or the committing of the crime 
ot shooting, and by proving that a Jatwasshot, I 
submit with very great respect, nothing is proved. 
My case IS honestly and deliberately that this is a false 
story. I he sentence was not carried out. But takine 
. everytmng against myself, and standing before a court 
of law I say you do not establish a charge of shootin<T 
A by saying that you shot a Hindu. A Hindu mav 
have been shot for all I know on the same day! ^ 


1 , . Then, Sir, we come to the cross-examination of 
this witness. “ The nullah to which I have referred 
was about five feet wide.” Imagine the picturras 
this man gives, and of course it cannot possMy agree 
with the other picture. The other picture was one 

This man’s picture is 
that from where I stood to where the trench was 
it was about 2.1 feet, 20 feet deep and five feet widT” 
Pew would believe that the company had faUe^in 

I cannot imagine 
that a company would be asked to fall into a kind^ of 
well as this gentleman has described. Then he savs 
that the height of the room was about 20 feet. “There 
were about 30 men in this space. Such men of the 

men had gone out on fatigue. The trench 

one end of the nuUah. I do not remember how £y 

officers were tnere. Capt. Dhillon was in front of thi 

company The trench was below the nullah bed I did 

90 and trei4 wfs betwSu 

A oTrson irthe Sfh company had fallen in. 

A person m the trench could hear what was said from 

the place where the company was; if it was spoken 
loud enougn to be heard. In thajb narrow space^it is 
impossible to suppose that the other gentleman if he 
was there could ever have escaped ®d5ecS. T^^e 
man sa 3 -s that the whole process took half an 
hour, and hence the value of -nl u • 
that I make »T X “ , “® submission 

I do not remember any person 


not belonging to tbe company being there.*' 

I say that it requires a lot of conYiction to snbmit 
to a court of law that this does not prove what I say 
^it proves, namely that the first witness is proved 
by the second witness not to have been there. After 
all he said that there were thirty people. He knew 
that they were members of his company. Others had 
gone out on fatigue duty. This man says definitely : 

“ I do not remember any person not belonging to the 
company being there.” 1 submit with great respect ^ 
that it has only one and one result, and that is that 
at all events the second witness says that the first 
witness was not there at all, Bemember that within 
that five feet space you could not escape noticing any 
man. You could not help it if he was there. We 
were standing in a place like this room except that it 
was not so broad. At some places it was wider but the 
place where we were standing in the nullah was about 
5 feet broad. Of these three men who volunteered to 
do the shooting, two belonged to the company and oiie 
to Brigade Headquarters Police. Those three men who \ 
did the shooting were fallen in with the rest of the 4 
company when they volunteered to shoot. Because 
of air raids men used to go and hide themselves in the 
nullah bed and Naik Sher Singh w^as hiding in the nullah 
at the time. At that time there were constant appre- 
hensions of air raids. The trench was about 20 yards 
away from where I was standing. The trench was at 
right angles to the bed of the nullah. I did not notice 
at the time what the length of the trench was. I did ^ 
not notice whether the nullah was any wider at the 
point where thetrencli was. We were standing in two 
lines in the nullah facing the end of the nullali and I was 
in the middle of the company. All the men were fac- ^ 
ing towards where the men were shot. The men were 
in two groups. Major Dhillon was standing in front of 
the two groups, V about 2 paces away from me. 1 
heard Major DhiRon order the four men out one by 
one. I do not know their names* I had been in the 
company for a long time and that is how I knew the 


150 







iiW* 




names of Kalu Ram and Hidayatullah./^ I submit 
that this again falis completely short of the proof of 
anything whatever like the death of an individual 
with whose death a man is accused. Remember that 
you have got to be satisfied, not in a vagiie sort of 
way, that some peoples were ordered to be shot, that 
some people were shot and those who were shot were 
those who were ordered to be shot. It is a process of 
absolutely vicious reasoning which I hope will not be 
resorted to or made use of by the Prosecution. Merely 
because the names of four persons whom you say were 
shot were there, you cannot prove that they were shot 
by saying that some people were shot. 


Therefore, to summarise the evidence, it suffers 
from the worst infirmities, and much more so in a case 
where a man is charged with murder. First, it is 
improbable that the person who is alleged to have 
given orders was there or could have been there. It is 
improbable that in that state of health he coitld have 
been there for the period of time alleged for the 
process. Next, neither of the two witnesses is able to 
identify in the least degree who was shot. Then, the 
second witness says that the first witness was not there, 
and the second witness gives a picture which it is x or 
you to believe to what extent it is correct. And 
then in addition to that. lam going to call attention 
to the evidence of witnesses, where in many instances 
of that kind, people were sort of sentenced but the 
sentence was never carried out. 


*^^^0 evidence to which I am referrin;^ is the 
evidence of .P. W. 5 and it belongs to the same period 
to which this particular alleged shooting refers. The 
evidence of P. JV". 5 in cross-examination is : ‘‘I know 
Captain Rab hjawaz. ITe was the pommander of one 
of the P. 0. W’s Camps a!; Port Dix n, and the other 
camp was commanded by Capt. Kar i Ghana Bias of 
the first Bhawalpur Infantry. Cap! Rab Nawa/^. did 
not volunteer for the I. N. A. nw did Captaui Bias 


After Capt. Sakgafs oonferepce on tlie Ist of Marcii, 
within the next two weeks, there were several people 
arrested. After investigation all were released except 
Capt. Bedi. The reason for my reinenibering the 
date on which”' Capt. Sahgal commanded No. 2 
Division was that on 28th February 1945 five o:(ficers 
deserted and on that occasion Capt. Sahgal arrested 
Captain Bedi. Captain Sahgal arrested Captain Bedi 
on the 1st or 2nd of Match 1945 as a Divisional 
Commander. I do not remember the exact date on 
which Capt. Sahgal began to act as Divisional 
Commander. ’’ 


' Then, Sir, you have the evidence of Gangasaran, 
to which I have already called attention, and this 
belongs to the same period as the date of the alleged 
execution of this sentence. Considering the evidence 
on record, I would submit to the Court that there 
is such a. lacuna of evidence of identity, of improba- 
bility, tli at the Court should hold that there is at 
least a reasonable doubt whether this particular event 
took place. I of course put it more affirmatively my- 
self, but feeling as I do in a case of this kind, it is my 
duty to put the case at the very lowest, ‘ and I say 
that there is waxit of evidence that is sufficient for my 
purpose. It is not enough that A should have been 
ordered to be shot, that by any process of reasoning 
therefore he xxxust have been shot. That is a process 
which I submit is wrong and not permissible. The actu- 
al execution of the sentence has got to be proved with 
complete identity between those against whom the 
sentence -was passed and those 'whom it is alleged w'ere 
shot on this occasion. The thing has got to be proved 
by affirmative evidence and the burden of proof is 
completely on the'* Prosecution, hundred witnesses 
notwithstanding. In this case there are only t^vo. 
One of them, says that the other Avas not there. The 
point really is not how the deficiency of evidence 
arises. The question really is that the burden, of 


proof being on tlie Prosecution to show that a 
definite person, A, B, C, or D was killed, and died 
fis a result of the action of a person who ordered 
the shooting is a fact, which must be proved. 


Ali that is proved is, taking the allegation at 
its face value, that four shots were fired, and the 
identity of the persons shot is not known. My sub- 
mission to the Court on that is that the evidence on 
this point suffers from infirmities which I have de- 
tailed to the Court in dealing with the evidence. 

Therefore with reference to this charge dealing 
with murder, my submission is that the Prosecution has 
entirely failed to prove the charges. The alternative 
submissioR is, assuming that the Court agrees with me 
that this was done in due course of the execution of 
the duty of an officer in the I, N. A. governed by its 
*own code, there is no question of any liability. 

I say that Kalu Ram and Sher Singh who are 
said to have fired the shots are alive, and there is not 
that sufficiency of evidence either on facts or 
identity. Therefore I ask the Court not to run away 
with the idea that a sentence was passed on A, B, C and 
D, some people were shot on that day, and therefore 
the persons shot were those identical persons. This 
is a point which I cannot too often submit for the 
consideration of the Court. To say that A was shot 
because some persons were shot, is indeed a piece of 
logic which ought not to be allowed in a» case of this 
grave magnitude. It is not permissible even in an 
ordinary ca-vse.' The question says: Bid you see A ? 
The answer is-: I do not know, but I saw somebody 
going into the fort and he was expected to go there. 
In a case of this kind, to say that he did go, would be 
t.he height of wrong reasoning. That is all I have got 
<*0 say on the question of the sentence. 


15-3 


. I submitted in the begining of this case that 
this army of the T. N* A. was an organised army. The 
actual sections of the I. N. A. Act have been cited, 
as the Court will see from the crime report, and the 
Court will see that there can be no liability for any 
acts done in due prosecution of the war in the execu- 
tion by officers of their respective duties. That of 
course is a complete answer. I submit that even if the 
ease is laid against A as a private individual, even 
then the evidence on the subject of having caused 
death, falls short. 

Then there is a small point. I come to the 
evidence of Col. Eitson and Ghuiam Muhammad with 
reference to the circumstances of Captain SahgaVs 
surrender. It is a point of substance, beca\ise under the ^ 
terms of the surrender which were offered and accepted, 
the accused are entitled to all the privileges of prisoners 
of war on the cessation of hostilities. I shall npw 
read the evidence of Col. Eitson, P.W. 29. He says: 

I then went forward myself up to the east 
corner of this village, when I met my leading 
Company Commander together with Captain 
Sahgal, the accused. With him were a num- 
ber of other o.fficers of the Indian National 
Army and approximately a hundred Indian 
troops of the I.N. A. at that x3artioular time. 

More appeared later. My leading Company 
Commander handed me a note which he had 
received from a surrender party under a white 
flag. I am afraid I have not |)reservecl the 
note. I destroyed it about two months later 
when I was going through some papers, and I 
am afraid I saw no importance of this note 
which I threw away. The note was addressed 
to the Commander of the British Forces, or 
may have been addressed to the Allied Forces, 
and it said that approximately 30 officers and 
500 troops of the I.N.A. wish to surrender as 





prisoners of war. I tlien. talked to Captain 
Saligal, and lie gave me his name and his 
regiment. He said ‘ I am Captain Saiigal % 
and I asked him what his nnit was both in the 
I.H. A, and in the Indian Army, and he told 
me then that ' he had been in the 5/lOth 
Baliich and that he was then commanding a 
regiment of the I.K.A., and that he bad with 
him there at his Regimental Headquarters a 
ist Aid attachment and one Battalion of his 
Regiment. I then made arrangements for 
the collecting of all the arms of the prisoners 
and arranged with Captain Sahgai about their 
feeding. We had no food for them.'’ 


You have to read this evidence in the light oi 
what Ghulam Muhammad said. He has given evi- 
dence before you to this effect that all non-commis- 
sioned officers collected together, they w-ere given an 
hour’s time; to consider the question of surrender as 
prisoners of war, and that if that was not accepted 
they were prepared to light. A letter to that eff’ect 
was written and despatched, and you have the evidence 
of Col. Kitson as to what happened. Under these 
circumstances I submit tnat in so far as the surrender 
of Captain Sahgai is concerned, it has been on the 
terms on which the offer was made, and I submit he is 
entitled to be released. 


There are one or two small matters which I 
should like to deal with before I raise three points of 
law. You must have heard the evidence of the last 
defence witness, Captain Arshad. He gives you a 
truthful account of what occurred prior to the surren- 
der of Rangoon, and the reoccupation of Rangoon. 
I have produced four documents which ciearly 
show the recognition on the part of the British 
officers of the existence of an organised army 
called the I. N. A. The men in charge have 
been addressed by their proper designation and 


they have been entrusted with definite duties, and 
there is ample evidence to prove that the I.lsT.A. was 
an organised army, and it was treated as an organised 
army. I would;draw your attention to Exhibits 5 Us. 

5 Vs. and 5 Ws. You will find instructions there 
regarding the address of officers. This includes a 
doGument by Brigadier Lauder. 

So, I submit that right up to the time of the 
surrender there has been recognition on the part of the 
opposing armies, that the I.Sf.A. was an organised army 
and it was so referred to and addressed through its 
proper officers. They were also recognised as officers 
for the time being. That, Sir, is practically the whole 
of the case regarding the documents and the recorded 
evidence. 

I now come to certain submissions regarding 
further points of law. They are three in number and 
they are founded on a true interpretation of the Indian 
Army Act and of the rules thereunder. Under Section 
41, this Court is authorised and is given jurisdiction to 
try among others civil offences. 

The word ‘ civil offence ’ is defined in the Act 
itself. Section 7, Sub-Section (18) reads; '‘A civil 
offence means an offence which, if committed in British 
India, -would be triable by a Criminal Court.” The 
question really depends on the true construction of 
the words ‘ triable by a criminal court h I know and 
I am fully aware that the Criminal Procedure Code 
has not been applied to the proceedings of this Court. 
But that is irrelevant to the issue that I am now going 
to submit to the Court. If, by the definition under 
Sub-Section (18) yoix have to find out what is triable 
by a Criminal Court, you cannot just do it in the air. 
I defy my honourable fi;iend, or anybody else, to say 
what it is unless you go to the appropriate Act which 
show's what things are triable by a Criminal Court. 
That is not saying that the Criminal Procedure Code 
is applied here. That is where there is a likelihood of 



false reasoning. The point is this. In order to un< 
stand one statute, and where the statute exprei 
refers to what is triable by a Criminal Court, you ii 
go to the statute which defines what is triable bi 
Criminal Court. It would be an extraordina'-y th 
if the whole thing were left in the air. Therefore, 


witB standing that the statute is not applicable to the 

proceedings of this Court. What I do say is this. 
If you have to find out what is triable by a Criminal 
Court, you must go to the statute which shows what 
is triable by a Criminal Court, and that statute, so far 
as one is aware, is the Criminal Procedure Code. On 
that two points arise. One is that under Section 196 
of the Criminal Procedure Code it is laid down as 
follows . 

“ No court (meaning no criminal court) shall 
take cognizance of any offence punishable under 
Chapter VI (which is this offence) unies.s upon the 
complaint made by the order or under the authority 
of the Provincial Government or some officer em- 
powered by the Provincial Government in this 
behalf.”^ If merely for the purpose of finding out 

what is it that is given to you for triar yon have to 

go to another statute, then it is a wrong argument 
to say that you will not. Let me put it in 
plainer language. When you say that my terms of 
engagement are the same as- those of Major Preetam 
Singh’s, it is not enough. I must ascertain my terms 
from the contract. That is the simple illusfcmtii m which 
T^l bring home to even a layman's mind the point 
th^t I am intending to make. The point that 1 am 
making IS this that the civil offences which are com- 
mitted to you for trial are tho.se which will be triable 
by a criminal court. Therefore, my first submission 
IS that what offences are triable by a criminal emirt 
_you! can only discover by looking at another law which 
IS appropriate to the purpose and not bv shutting vour 
eyes to it. When you go and look^into that law 


'what do YQp find ? That law requires that that 
offence would not be triable by that criminal court 
except upon the complaint of an officer of the Local 
Government, etc. It has nothing to do with Captain 
Mead's case or any other case. That was a case of 
Section 270 of the Government of India Act and has 
got no bearing on the question. The poh^t is this. 
How do you discover or where do you discover that the 
offence is triable by a criminal court. That you 
must discover because you cannot say that anything 
that is brought to you for trial, you will try. 
You will yourself ask : ‘ ‘ What is it that 
I am entitled to try and if 1 am only 
entitled to try that which is triable by a criminal 
court, I must necessarily go to the statute which gives 
me that power." My submission to the Court is that 
by reason of Section 196, no complaint having been 
made by a Local Government or an officer in that be- 
half appointed by them, this Court may not try an 
offence under section 121, Chaxcter VI. My next point 
is again a point of construction, a point which, I 
submit, is of commonsense. If I am given a power 
to try offences within a certain limit, then 1 muso find 
out what is being triable by a criminal court. If I 
find that a criminal court is incapable of trying an 
offence, then you must come to the conclusion that a 
criminal court of its own motion and of its own autho- 
rity is incapable of trying that offence. If a criminal 
court is incapable without more of trying the offence, 
equally this Court is incapable of trying the offence. 
In other words, there are two alternative arguments 
before the Courv. One is that within this sphere of the 
offences triable by this court, this particular offence 
does not %11, in that it is not triable by a criminal 
court without more. In other words, a criminal court 
of its own motion could not possibly take cognizance 
of this charge. Until the Local Government by itself 
or through its proper officer, does not move, the crimi- 
nal court is incapable of trying it. Therefore, the 
question is two-fold. .Firstly, that the criminal court 


Lo8 


being incapable of trying, this Court is also incapable 
of trying it. Secondly, if you put the point that the 
criminal court is capable of trying, but with a condi- 
tion satisficrL Therefore, in either view of the case, 
this Court is not competent to try the charges before 
it. My submission is that, in so far as the charges 
of alleged murder by Shah Nawaz or Dhillon are 
concerned, they are really part of it and nothing else. 
It is not suggested on the record that either of them 
wanted to shoot anybody for personal enmity or for 
any other cause of any other kind. It is patent on the 
face of the record that they were part of the actions 
which they took as ojBdcers of the I. N. A. Therefore, 
my submission is that the Court is not competent to trv 
the two sets of offences before it. Per conira if the 
Court is of opinion or should it come to be of opinion 
that the charges of murder or abetment of murder* 
are independent charges, then my submission to the 
Court is that under Rule 24 of the rules of conduct 
of trial ill tJiis court, the joint trial is completely 
illegal on a decision o^ the Privy Council in Indian 
Law Reports, 25 Madras, Snbramaniam’s case. (Rule 
24 was read out and the Judge Advocate pointed out 
the amendment to it). That does not fall within the 
Rule because^ as to the murder and abetment of 
Muhammed Hussain all the persons are not there. So 
that whether you call up this rule or any other rule 
there is what you my call in ’the plain language of the 
section, a complete misjoinder of the charges and of 
the accused. Shah Nawaz has nothing to do with the 
alleged murder nor has Dhillon anything to do with 
the murder of Muhammad Hussain. I submit to the 
Court confidently thatif you tr^at the second set of 
charges as independent charges, this trial is wholly 
illegal. 

# I will now give to the Court the judgment of 
the Privy Council in Law Reports, 25 Madras, on 
page 61. 

‘' The appellant was tried at the Criminal 


169 


Sessions qf tlie High Court, and convicted cn 
a?;} indictment the first count of which con- 
travened the provisions of Section 233 and 
234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (which 
proved that every separate oSenco shall 
be charged and . tried separately, except 
that three offences of the same kind may be 
tried together in one charge if committed 
within the period of one year), and did not 
fall within the provisions of section 235 (1) 
which x>rovides that, if, in one series of acts 
;SO connected together as to form the same 
“transaction, more offences than one are com- 
mitted by the same person, he may be 
charged with and tried at one trial for 
every such offence. On a case certified 
under article 26 of the Letters Pedent and 
.and heard by the Full Court, it was held by 
the majority, of the Court that, the union of 
the first count with the others made the 
whole indictment bad for misjoinder, but 
that it was open to them to strike out the first 
count, rejecting the evidence with regard to it, 
.and deal with the evidence as to the remain- 
ing, counts of . the indictment. This was done 
with the result that the conviction was 
upheld on one count only,, the sentence being 
reduced.: . . . - 


Held, by-the Judicial Committee that the 
disregard of an express provision of law as. to 
the mode of trial was not a mere irregularity 
such as could he remedied by Section 537 of 
the Criminal Procedure Code. Such a phrase 
as irregularity’ is not appropriate to the ille- 
gality of trying an accused person for more ^ 
different offences at the same time, and those 
offences being spread over a longer period than 
by law could have been joined together in 


one indictment. 


Hot conld such illegal procedure be am- 
ended by arranging afterwards what might or 
^ight not have been properly submitted to the 
]urv l o allow this would leave to the Court 
the functions of the jury, and the accused 
would never have been really tried at all upon 
the charge afterwards arranged by the Court. 

conducted in a manner 
prohibited bylaw, was held to be altogether 
Illegal and the conviction was set aside".’' 


p. 96. 


The judgment of the Lord Chancellor 


IS on 


_ ‘^In this case the appellant was tried on 
an indictment in which he was charged with 
no less than forty-one acts, these acts extend- 
ing over a period of two years. This was plainly 
m contravention of the Code of Criminal Proce- 
ure, Section 234, which provides that a per- 
son may only be tried for three offences of the 
same kind if committed within a period of 
twelve months. The reason for such a provi- 
Sion, which IS analogous to our own provisions 
embezzlement, is obviously in order 
that the lury may not be prejudiced by the 
multitude of charges and the inconvenieLe of 
^ of instances 

consequent embarrass- 
ment both to judges and accused. It islikelv 
to cause confusion and to interfere with the 
fhp distinct offence which it is 

tteobject of all cnmmal procedure to obtain, 
die policy of such a provision is manifest and 
the necessity of a system of written accusation 
specifying a definite criminal offence is of the 

th Procedure. Their Lordships 

tiiinl^ that the course pursued and which was ■ 


161 


plainly illegal cannot be amended by arranging 
afterwards what might or might not have been 
properly submitted to the jury.” 


It means that it is too late for even this Court 



to say, '‘We vdll either strike out the charge of 
waging war or strike out the charges of 
murder and abetment of murder in 
which some of the persons are uninterested 
and not charged with reference to offences 
charged against others.” 

Then the judgment proceeds — 

"Upon the assumption that the trial was 
iilegaiiy conducted it is idle to suggest’ ’ — I 
am glad I am not using those words but the 
Lord Chancellor uses them — "that there is 
enough left upon the indictment upon which a 
conviction might have been supported if the 
accused had been properly tried. The mis- 
chief sought to be avoided by the Statute has 
been done. The effect of the multitude of 
charges before the jury has not been averted 
by dissecting the verdict afterwards and 
appropriating the finding of guilty only to such 
parts of the written accusation as ought to 
have been submitted to the jury. 

" It would in the first place leave to the 
Court the functions of the jury and the accu- 
sed would never have really been tried at all 
upon the charge arranged afterwards by the 
Court. 

Their Lordships cannot regard this as cured 
by Section 537.” 

They do not say that any irregularity has not 
•caused injustice and so does not matter. But 
even that does not exist, because he must 




162 


l)e held to the consequence in both ways. My learned 
friend says that the Criminal Procedure Code does 
not apply, and as such we proceed. So he cannot 
have resort to Section 537. And then you get back 
to a very narrow point that the trial, as I submit, is 
clearly in contravention of Rule 24 of the Rules of 
Procedure. It is a complete irregularity and there is 
no way of curing it. Their Lordships proceed:— 

“Their Lordships are unable to regard the 
disobedience to an express provision as to a 
mode of trial as a mere irregularity.” 

In other words, you cannot in one trial charge 

eople collectively unless they have committed all the 
offences collectively, wnich admittedly they Lave not 
done. Even on the extended words which the 
Judge- Advocate read they would not apply because 
one thing is quite clear in relation to the charges, 
end that is this, that some of the accused are not 
in any maimer liable for the offences alleged to have 
been committed by others. Therefore I submit that 
this trial is wholly illegal. The judgment pro- 
ceeds:— 


“ Such a phrase as irregularity is not appro- 
priate to the illegality of trying an accused 
person for niany different offences at the same 
time and those offences being spread over a 
longer Tieriod than by law could have been 
joined together in one indictment. The 
illustration of the section itself sufficiently 
shows what was meant. ” 

The remedying of mere irregularities is 
familiar in most systems of jurisprudence, but it would 
be an extraordinary extension of such a branch of 
administering the Criminal Law to say that when 


the Code positively enacts that such a trial as that 
which has taken place here shall not be permitted that 
this contravention of the Code comes within the 
description of error, omission or irregularity. 

“ Some pertinent observations are made 
upon the subject by Lord Herschell and Lord 
Russell of Killowen in Smurthwaite vrs 
Hannay, where in a civil case several causes 
of action were joined Lord Herschell says that 
■ Ji unwarranted by any enactment or rule it is 
much more than an irregularity’ , and Lord 
Russell of Killowen in the same case says, 

, ‘Such a joinder of plaintiffs is more than an 
irregularity; it is the constitution of a suit in 
a way not authorised by law and the rules 
applicable to procedure’. 

With all respect to Sir Francis Maclean and 
the other Judges who agreed with him in the 
case of In the Matter of Abdur Rahman, he 
appears to have fallen into a very manifest 
logical error in arguing that because all irre- 
gularities are illegal, that therefore all things 
that may in his view be called illegal are 
therefore by that one adjective applied to 
them become equal in importance and are 
susceptible of being treated alike. But the 
trial was prohibited in the mode in which 
it was conducted, and their Lordships will 
humbly advise His Majesty that the con- 
viction should be set aside. 


And I submit it does not require much argument. 
It is therefore wrong on the face of the charfijes with 
which these men are charged, and I submit that this 
trial is wholly illegal and I ask you to hold 
it so. 


164 




I That is as far as I will go on the record on the 

points which arise for yonr decision, and there are very 
few points indeed. I will plainly and briefly state to 
^ ^ the Court the points on which I rely, so that there may 
W be no room for mistake or equivocation about it. I say 
I that this is a case of men not acting on their own in 

I any struggle or waging war at all. This is a case of ^ 

J. ^ men as part of a regular organised army, accepted as" 
such by their opponents, fighting a war under the 
I directions of a regularly formed Government. That 
^ being so, I submit that they are subject to the ordinary 
laws of war with which I have troubled you at some 
length, namely, they are entitled to all the rights and 
iihmunities of belligerents. My submission is that to 
the extent to which this is a matter pertaining to war 
and the conduct of war it is outside the municipal law. 
But I am afraid sometimes in the narrow precincts of a 
Court like this, one may say : “What have I got to do 
with international law?” But fortunately for myself I 
am fortified in this case so that I can fall within the four 
corners of the Indian enactment, i. e., Sec. 79. Isay 
that if my first submission as to the jurisdiction of 
municipal law and its non-application is not upheld by 
this Court — though I submit it should be — I say that 
within the meaning of Sec. 79 it is quite plain^ — you are 
1 bound to give effect to it and I have submitted 

I authorities — that the word “ law ” as administered in 

I Britain and India recognises the principles of inter- 
I national law. And therefore, if a thing is justified yb 
law, T can plead justification before this Court under 
I ’ Sec. 79. That is my first point. 

i My second point before the Court is that as 

I regards questions which were incidental, I do not wish 
r to repeat them here, though I wish to submit to the 
I Court that the question of allegiance is irrelevant to 
1 the issue, but to the extent to which it is relevant I have 
■ already submitted that when the time arrives in relations 
k between the Crown and the Colonies, the Colonies are 
f entited to throw off their allegiance on the outbreak 



165 


of war for the purpose of their liberation. And I have 
given you the most classical instance of those who are 
now the friends of Britain and, if I may say so, their 
warmest and greatest supporters in the task of saving v 
civilisation. You could not have a stronger instance i 
than that. I 

*■ ' " " '! 

Then the next-point which I ask the Court to ' 
hold is that on a question of fact entirely, in so far as= . 1 
the Indian National Army was concerned, it was a 
voluntary organisation. Even if there were conscrip- 
tion, it does not make any difference in this case, be- ; 
cause there are countries where there is conscription and ; 
punishment attached to it even today. But it has ‘ 

become fashionable to say : Oh, there was torture ^ 

and coercion” and all the rest ofit, and I ask the 
Court to hold that it was entirely free from any such 
complaint. At all events, apart from any hearsay, 
on the evidence recorded before this Court, I have i 
already submitted that the people who complain of 
torture fall into four classes : there were these who ^ 
prove that in two cases it was for reasons w^hich are 1 
self-confessed in one case and practically admitted in 
the second case. The first was refusing to do fatigue 
and the second case was cow- killing. As to the other ' 

cases of an isolated character, they are exaggerated, ' 

and deserve nothing else but contempt at your hands. 

If men were asked to do fatigue duty, merely 
because they have to carry baskets or make beds foi . 
the purpose of sowing vegetables, if they say it was l 
torture, I hope my learned friend will not use that ‘ 
word in connection with that conduct. 

Then I ask the Court to hold that in any event 
this evidence is totally irrelevant for the purpose of | 
this case, for the reasons which I have submitted, 
namely, that the ground on which that evidence was 
attempted is entirely proved not to exist. 

The next thing that I submit to the Court is 


166 


that the evidence with reference to the afleged charges 
I f murder would he really covered, if I am right in 
ay first submission, by the fact that they are part of 
the prosecution of the war, in that these people wer^ 
sentenced by Court Martial to be shot under the proper 
law. The next thing I ask the Court to hold is that 
there was an organised Government, that a very large 
number of Indians in the Par East owned allegiance 
to this Government, which was recognised, having had 
ceded to it territories which are mentioned, and it 
was hy this Government that war was declared,?and 
the Indian National Army fought this campaign. 

I will hand over to the learned Judge- 
Advocate the list which I offered to give him yester- 
day on the point which my learned friend on the other 
side attempts to make, in that as if there w^as some 
provision as to flogging, intending possibly thereby to 
argue that the whole of that Code was an uncivilised 
Code. I think he was snatching at a complete straWj 
because as to the rest of the Act he admitted that it 
was in consonance with the Indiian Army Act. And 
the only thing that he referred to is corporal punish- 
ment. I am therefore handing to the Judge- Advocate 
provisions of the law in which the same thing appears 
under a different head, in force when the Indian Army 
Act was in operation. 

Judge- Advocate : Are you referring to Sec. 22 of 
the Indian Army Act? 

Sri Desai : My learned friend tried to 
make out as if whipping was a punishment which 
was abolished with reference to the army in this 
country, and I submit that he was entirely mistaken. 

Judge- Advocate : The very first sentence in writ- 
ing that you have given is wrong. You have got flogg- 
ing under the Act as it stands. Punishment of whipping 
can be inflicted on menial servants up to a maximum 


167 


of20scores— that is what is written here, and the 
correct thing is 12 strokes on active service. 

Sri Desai : If I am wrong, I must correct 

myself. 

Judge-Advocate : I have corrected it now. 

Sri Desai : The point, Sirs, which I am trying 
to labour before the Court is this : In addition to the 
provisions in the Indian Army Act, there are provisions 
under the Defence of India Act and in the Ordinances. 
All of them have got to be taken together to see 
whether or not, and what punishment is permissible. 

By Ordinance 3 of 1942 — if necessary we will 
produce the actual copy of the Ordinance before you— 
whipping was ordered as a punishment. 

Let me get hack to the point : The point really 
is that in so far as the governance of the Army is 
concerned, it was governed by an Act which, except for 
the purpose of whipping, has been practically or 
tacitly admitted to be the Indian Army Act. As 
regards whipping, I submit to the Court that that kind 
of punishment exists, though not in the Army Act 
wholly, in the three Ordinances which are reproduced. 
Supposing to the extent to which there was an excess 
of the number of strokes, I submit with very great 
respect that it is not going to make an uncivilised 
Army because of that. Therefore, substantially the 
point is, there is an army governed by a Code which is 
substantially, if not actually, word for word, the same 
as the Indian Army Act. 

I next come to the question that, in fact, the 
alleged atrocities — that is the mildest word that can be 
used from the point of view of my learned friend — 
which are said to have been exercised for the purpose 
of getting enrolment to the I.IST.A. are in fact not 


168 


true. Tha accused are not charged with It, nor have 
they anything to do with it. They neither did it, 
nor permitted it, nor encouraged nor have 
they any knowledge of it. That, Sir, is the 
actual position so far as that charge is concerned. 

Then, coming to the alleged charfce of mur- 
der and abetment, I have dealt with that and I have 
satisfied the Court that the execution of the sentences 
has not been proved. 

My next submission to the Court is that this 
trial is wholly illegal. 

My next submission to the Court is that so far as 
the construction of the words ^offences triable by a 
Criminal Court’ is concerned, the Court must have 
reference to the only enactment which says what are 
the offences triable by the Court, and you cannot do by 
saying that the Criminal Procedure Code is not applic- 
able, — and if it has to be resorted to, then it has to be 
stated : First, this charge is not triable at all. Alter- 
natively, in any case, this charge is not triable except on 
the complaint of a Local Government or an officer 
authorized in that behalf, and such a complaint does not 
exist. And for this reason my clients should be declar- 
ed innocent of the charges against them. 

The last thing that I wish to say is that if any 
new or iiesh authority is cited by my learned friend 
which I had no opportunity of meeting, I should be 
permitted to hand in a very short statement, coveriBg a 
single page, as to why those authorities if they are 
relied upon are not applicable to the facts of this case 
or to the decision in this case. 

Finally, Sirs, I acknowledge with appreciation 
the courtesy and attention that has been given to us, 
and I hope that when I hand over a signed transcript to 
each member of the Courts it will receive such attention 
as it may deserve. 


With regard to yoiir last 
submission, under what rule are you applying to make 
another address ? 

Sri Desai : I do not pretend that there is a rule. 
It is a matter of common justice. If any authority is 
cited by one side which the other side has never had any 
opportunity of seeing or meeting, with the best of 
imagination he could not possibly deal with it. There- 
fore, common fairness demands that he should be given 
a| chance to explain. All that is forbidden is an 
address to the Court. But surely for your own assist- 
ance, if we may pretend that we are able to give any 
assistance, if anything is cited by the other side which 
is not seen by me, surely I should be allowed to present 
to the Court a very short resume of my grounds on 
which it is not applicable. 

Judge- Advocate : Would that not apply to any 
case in which your opponent had the last word 1 

Sri Besai: Then the law is accepted. My 
learned friend will not contradict it. Even when a man 
has no right of reply and a fresh authority is cited, he 
has a right to answer. I hope my learned friend will 
agree with me there. It is a rule of common fairness. 
You do not need a rule for this : that a thing which 
is never urged before this Court, is urged before this 
Court, and no reply is allowed. 

Judge- Ad vocat e : As I have often told you, 
gentlemen, a Court Martial is bound by very rigid 
rules outside which they cannot go. The rule is la d 
down for your strict obedience by the Indian Legislia- 
ture, and whether rightly or wrongly you cannot go 
outside that rule. Buie 48 of the Indian Army Act 
is the only rule I know with regard to the right of 
address, and it reads as follows : 

(Reads Buie 48 of the Indian Army Act. 


170 



That rigid rule is for your strict compliance. 


Sri Desai : There is one point I would like 
urge. The words are : “The Prosecutor may reply . 
If the Prosecutor confines himself to merely replying to 
what I have said, I have nothing to say. Let him be 
confined completely to what I have argued by way 
of reply, and I am quite content. I am glad tha 
though the ruling is partly against me, it is partly in m^v 
favour also. Let that ruling be strictly followed, namely 
that it will be enjoined on the Prosecutor that he does 
nothing more than reply to what I have argued. Then 
I am quite content. 

Judge- Advocate ; The Court regret they aro 
unable to permit a further address by the Counsel for 
^e Defence after the address of the Counsel for the 
Prosecution. 

Sri Desai : Would the Court direct that the 
Prosecutor would only reply what I have argued 
and nothing more ? You cannot have it both ways. 

; Counsel for the Prosecution : - That is not tho 
meaning of the word reply, ’ I submit. 

Sri Desai : If my friend thinks that he is 
supporting the cause of justice by saying that I cannot 
reply to a new matter in case law, that is a new law. 

prepared to submit to this restriction, I sub- 
mu the law lays on him the duty merely to reply to 
I have said. I have nothing more to say, justice or 
justice. I hope my learned friend cites nothing 
js not strictly relevant to what I have said. 

4-1^ ^ Prosecution : My submission is 

that it IS not replying to what you have said but it. 
means addressing the Court on the case, I ask for 

adjournment for my address and I have to ask for an 

adjournment up to Saturday. What I intend to do is 


4io give my address in writing, if not the whole of it, at 
least the largest part of it. V 

: The whole pf your address on 

Saturday ? 

Counsel for the Prosecution : I think so. But I 
would suggest that an extra hour might be thrown in. 
If I have it in writing, it will not take so long. 

Sri Desai : I have no objection. 

Counsel for the Prosecution : To be on the safe 
:side, an extra hour might be put in on Saturday. 

President; ISTo objection? 

Counsel for the Defence : Certainly not. 

Application for adjournment by Sir P. Engineer. 

Note hy the Court 

The Counsel for the Prosecution requests an 
, adjournment until Saturday, 22nd December 1945 
for the purpose of preparing his closing address. The 
Dourt allowed this adjournment. 

At 16-30 hours the Court adjourns until 10-00 
hours on 22nd December 1945. 


18th December, 1945. 


I'72 



PROCLAMATION 

OF THE 

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OE 

AZAD HIND 

After their first defeat at the hands of the 
British in 1757 in Bengal, the Indian people fought an 
uninterrupted series of bard and bitter battles over a 
stretch of one hundred years. The history of this pe- 
riod teanas with examples of unparalleled heroism and 
self-sacrifice. And in the pages of that history, the 
names of Sirajuddaula and Mohanlal of Bengal, Haider 
All, Tippu Sultan and Vein Tampi of South India,. 
Appa Sahib Bhonsle and Peshwa Baji Rao of Mahrash- 
tra, the Begums of Oudh, Sardar Sbyam Singh Atari- 
wala of Punjab and last but not least. Rani Laxmi- 
bai of Jhansi, Tantia Topi, Maharaj Kunwar Singh of 
Dumraon and Nana Sahib among others— the names 
of all these warriors are forever engraved in letters 
of gold. Unfortunately for us, our forefathers did not 
at first realise that the British constituted a grave 
threat to the whole of India and they did not therefore 
put up a united front against the enem}^ Ultimately, 
when the Indian people were roused to the reality of 
the situation, they made a concerted move and under 
the flag of Bahadur vShah in 1857, they fought their 
last war as free men. In spite of a series of brilliant 
victories in the early stages of this war, ilMuck and 
faulty leadership gradually brought about their final 
collapse and subjugation. Nevertheless, such heroes 
as the Rani of Jhansi, Tantia Topi, Kunwar Singh 
and Nana Sahib live like eternal stars in the nation’s 
memory to inspire us to greater deeds of sacrifice and 
valour. 

Forcibly disarmed by the British after 1857 and 
subjected to terror and brutality, the Indian people lay 


17S 



prostrate for a while— but with, the birth of the lodiaa 
National Congress in 1885 till the end of the last World 
War, the Indian people, in their endeavour to recover 
,l^heir lost liberty tried all possible methods — namely, 
agitation and propaganda, boycott of British goods, 
terrorism and sabotage— -and finally, armed revolution. 
But all these efforts failed for a time. Ultimately in 
1920, when the Indian people haunted by a sense of 
failure, were groaping for new methods, Mahatma 
<jrandhi came forward with the new weapon of non-co- 
-operation and civibdisobediance. 

For two decades thereafter, the Indian people 
/went through a phase of intense patriotic activity, 
'The message of freedom was carried to every Indian 
home. Through personal example, people were taught 
iio suffer, to sacrifice, and to die in the cause of freedom. 
From the cities to the remotest villages, the people 
were knit together into one political organisation Thus 
dhe Indian people not only recovered their x^oliticai 
•consciousness, but became a political entity once again. 
’They could now speak with one voice and strive with 
one will for one common goal. From 1937 to 1939, 
through the work of the Congress Ministries in eight 
provinces, they gave proof of their readiness and their 
^capacity to administer their own affairs. 

Thus, on the eve of the present World War, 
the stage was set for the final struggle for India’s 
liberation. Daring the course of this war, Germany, 
with the help of her allies, has dealt shattering blows 
'l-o our enemy in Europe,— while Nippon, with the help 
of her allies has indicted a knockout blow to our enemy 
in East Asia. Favoured by a most happy combination 
of circumstances, the Indian people today have a 
wonderful opportunity for achieving their national 
emancipation. 

For the first time in recent history, Indians 
.abroad have also been politically roused and united in 


174 



one organi’zation. They are not only thinking and 
feeling in tnne with their conntrynien at home, but are 
also marching in step with them along the path to 
freedom. In East Asia in particular, over two million 
Indians are now organised as one solid phalanx, inspir- 
ed by the slogan of “Total Mobilisation”. And in 
front of them stand the serried ranks of India’s Army 
of Liberation, with thelslogan Onward to Delhi ” on 
their lips. 

Having goaded Indians to desperation by its 
hypocracy, and having driven them to starvation and 
■death by plunder and loot, British rule in India has 
forfeited the goodwill of the Indian people altogether, 
and is now living a precarious existence. It needs but 
a flame to destroy the last vestige of that unhappy 
rule. To light that flame is the task of India’s 
Army of Liberation. Assured of the enthusiastic 
support of the civil population at home and also of a 
large section of Britain’s Indian Army, and backed by 
.gallant and invincible allies abroad, relying in the 
first instance on its own strength, India’s Army of 
Liberation is confident of fulfilling its historic role. 

Now that the dawn of freedom is at hand, it is 
the duty of the Indian people to set up Provisional 
Government of their own, and launch the last struggle 
under the banner of that Government. But with 
.all the Indian leaders in prison and the people at 
home totally disarmed — it is not possible to set 
up a Provisional Government within India or to 
launch an armed struggle under the aegis of 
that Government. It is therefore the duty 
of the Indian Independence League in East Asia, 
■supported bj^ all patriotic Indians at home and 
abroad, to undertake this task — the task of setting xip 
■a Provisional Government of Azad Hind (Free India), 
and of conducting the last fight for freedom, with the 
help of the Army of Liberation (that is, the Azad Hind 
-Fauj or the Indian National Army) organised by the 
League. 


175 



Having been constituted as the Provisional 
Go vernment of Azad Hind by the Indian Independence 
League in East Asia, we enter u|)on our duties 
with a full sense of the responsibility that has devol- 
ved on us. We pray that Providence may bless our 
w ork and our struggle for the emancipation of our 
Motherland, and our comrades in arms for the cause 
of her Freedom, for her welfare and her exaltation 
among the nations of the world. 

It will be the task of the Provisional Govern- 
ment to launch and to conduct the struggle that will 
bring about the expulsion of the British and of her 
allies from the soil of India. It will then be the task of 
the Provisional Government to bring a.l>out the estab- 
lishment of a permanent National Government of 
Azad Hind constituted in accordance with the will of 
the Indian people and enjoying their confidence. 
After the British and their allies are overthrown, and 
until a permanent National Government of Azad Hind 
is set up in India soil, the Provisional Government will 
administer the affairs of the country in trust for the- 
Indian people. 

The Provisional Government is entitled to and 
hereby claims, the allegiance of every Indian. It. 
guarntees religious liberty, as well as equal rights and 
equal opportunities to all its citizens. It declares its 
firm resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of 
the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the- 
ehildren of the nation equally and transcending all. 
the differences cunningly fostered by an alien govern- 
ment in the past. 

Jn'themame of God, in the name of bygone- 
generatichl the Indian people into 

one nation, and in the name of the dead heroes who 
bi\ve bequeathed to us a tradition of heroism andself- 
sibrifice, we-call u;^On the Indian people to rally round 
oiir banner ,."4nd t5%tHbv r India’s freedom. We call 

176 ^ 



upon them to launcli the final struggle against the 
British and all their allies in India, and to prosecute 
the struggle with valour and perseverance and with 
full faith in Final Victory— until the enemy is expelled 
from Indian soil, and the Indian people are once again 
,a Free Nation.' 

SIGNED ON BEHALF ON THE PROVISIONAL 
GOVERNxMENT OF AZAD HIND 

SUBHAS CHANDRA * BOSE (Head of State, 
Prime Minister and Minister for War and 
Foreign x4ffairs) ; 

Capt. Mrs. Lakshmi (Women’s Organisation) ; 

8. A. Ayer (Publicity and Propaganda); 

Lt.-Col. A.C. Chatterjee (Finance) ; 

Lt.-CoL Aziz Ahmed, Lt.-Col* N. S. Bhagat, 
Lt.-Col. J. K. Bhonsle, Lt.-Col. Gulzara Singh, 
Lt.-CoL M. Z* Kiani, Lt.-Col. A.D. Loganadan, 
Lt.-Col. Ehsan Qadir, Lt.-Col. Shah Nawaz 
(Representatives of the Armed Forces) ; 

A. M. Sahay, Secretary (with ministerial rank) ; 

Rash Behari Bose (Supreme Adviser) ; 


Karim Gani, Dehnath Das, D. M. Khan, A. 
Yellappa, J. Thivy, Sardar Ishar Singh 
(Advisers) ; 



177